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The principles which guide non-renewable resource use are based part-
lyon theoretical investigations of the consequences and the merits of 
use, which are both uncertain. Existing economic approaches to uncer-
tainty do not correctly reflect a decision-maker's position in time. The 
power to determine future decisions is overstated, and a limited range 
of objectives can be investigated. 
These problems are addressed by developing a new approach to choice 
over long time periods. The approach is recursive: each of a sequence of 
decision-makers decides on the immediate action to take, given the ex-
pected consequences, among which are the future actions. Each deci-
sion-maker forecasts how future decisions will be made by forecasting 
what the future decision-makers' objectives a~d options will be. The re-
sulting forecast actions are consistent: there is no foreseen reason why 
they will later need revision. 
Virtually any sequence of objectives can be investigated with the ap-
proach. Applying it to non-renewable resource use over three periods 
reveals that the optimal initial use: changes if future decision-makers 
use discount rates different from the first; changes if the future discount 
rates become uncertain; changes with a change in the time at which fu-
ture technological improvements become known. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Most societies depend on using metals and fossil fuels to maintain living 
standards. There are limited stocks of these things and they are irre-
versibly degraded in use. This raises the fear that they may one day run 
out, causing living standards to collapse. The immediate question is: 
what implications does this possibility have for current decisions? 
Attempts to answer this question have greatly refined and clarified the 
issue. Running out in physical terms is not likely to be a problem, be-
cause running out of economically exploitable reserves will occur first. 
Limited reserves alone are not a problem, but limited reserves for 
which no substitute can be provided may be a problem. Every refine-
ment of the issue leads to a more detailed restatement of the same ques-
tions: what implications for current decisions (on energy use, on 
exploration, on research) do the future possibilities (uncertain sub-
stitutes, uncertain new finds, uncertain future tastes) have? 
These questions cannot be answered without making two sorts of judge-
ments, covering firstly what the consequences of current actions are, 
and secondly how the merits of actions are to be gauged. Because each 
of these judgements must be to some extent arbitrary, the best situation 
that a decision-maker can hope for is to be well-informed: to be aware 
of the range of consequences, and the range of merits, of the options 
for action, before the decision. 
Theoretical investigations playa major part in informing decision-ma-
kers about situations which are too complicated for common-sense to 
be applied. To date, theoretical investigations into the long-term conse-
quences of using metal and fossil fuels have not properly accounted for 
the interactions between current and future decisions, or for the range 
of possible attitudes towards uncertainty. 
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The recursive decision approach developed in later chapters is intended 
to address these problems, and so contribute to more fully informed de-
cision-making. These chapters are outlined below, after the problems 
of making decisions about non-renewable resources, in dynamic, uncer-
tain situations, have been more fully discussed. 
1.1 Resources and actions 
Resources 
The set J of 'resources' is defined to consist of all material things seen as 
presently or potentially useful to humans. This is an explicitly anthro-
pocentric definition. Each resource might improve human wellbeing at 
some time, because use of the resource enables a preferred situation to 
be realized, or because continued existence of the resource ensures that 
undesirable situations are avoided. For example, since coal may at 
some time be burnt to provide warmth and the ozone layer filters radia-
tion to a comfortable level, both coal and the ozone layer are currently 
resources. J depends at each time t on the current and expected: pref-
erences of humans; technology (broadly interpreted) with which hu-
mans can transform things; environment, or the way things transform 
themselves. 
Each J(t) may include some 'non-renewable' resources rER(t)cJ(t): 
these are inaugmentable, because their physical quantity qr (t) can not 
be supplemented by an environmental process or human actions; each r 
is irreversibly degraded in use, so that each physical unit can be used 
only once. Therefore, qr(t) ~qr(u) for all u> t, with strict inequality ap-
plying if r is in use. 
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The definition of R(t) is more useful if environmental transformations 
which supplement or erode qr (t) at very slow rates, by human standards, 
are ignored, along with technologies which can supplement or restore 
qr (t) at very slow rates relative to the use rate at any current or envis-
aged t. R( t) depends on the technology, preferences and understanding 
at t. In principle, all resources are candidates for R, because no state of 
things can be exactly repeated. If the history of each unit of a resource 
is important to preferences, then each unit is in principle non-renew-
able, since each unit has a unique history. However, if preferences 
make no distinction between unit histories then the resource mayor 
may not be in R. 
Use of any reR irreversibly alters the opportunities which can be taken 
up in future. Some future opportunities requiring use of r must be 
missed, but other future opportunities may be created by current use, so 
that opportunities overall may expand or contract. 
Actions 
Actions are all the physical acts undertaken by humans which move or 
change an object, however small; thinking is an action. Actions and en-
vironmental transformations make up the full set of transformation pro-
cesses, which develop and change each other through time. Many 
things, including resource stocks, may appear to be untransformed on 
time scales adopted for human purposes. 
There is no single 'correct' set of dimensions for describing transforma-
tion processes. For instance, the process with the usual label 'coal min-
ing' is also a physical transfer of mass, a harvesting operation by a 
community, and a (perhaps) profitable corporate activity. Each descrip-
tion uses only a subset of the dimensions with which the process can be 
described. Internally consistent sets of dimensions implicitly set boun-
daries - things outside the boundary are not considered - and occupy a 
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level of aggregation - the transformations described are composed of 
other transformations which require different, finer dimensions for de-
scription. 
Strictly speaking only human individuals can act, but it is convenient to 
refer to group and social undertakings as 'actions'. In this study non-re-
newable resource actions are described using economic dimensions; ac-
tions include 'coal extraction at an opencast mine', and 'total resource 
use in the time period'. Other consistent sets of dimensions might rec-
ognise the actions' place within a 'corporation', a 'community', or an 
'ecosystem' . 
Some hypotheses about transformations are maintained throughout this 
study. Environmental transformations are mostly determined by cumu-
lative causation, whereby the nature of things at each instant dictates 
the nature of things at the next instant. However the transformations 
may involve a 'random' element, or be poorly understood, so that sto-
chastic relationships provide the best description. By contrast, at least 
some human actions are selected from a feasible set in a way that is not 
fully determined by cumulative causation. The 'do nothing' or more 
properly 'just think' action is always among the options. 
The concept of an aggregate selection (e.g. society 'chooses' a tax level) 
is convenient in analysing institutions (e.g. laws, taxes), and in norma-
tive discussion of societal options (e.g. which resource use patterns are 
intergenerationallyequitable?). 
1.2 Decision-making 
There is a sequence of selection, or decision, times. Each decision in-
fluences which future transformations and decisions are possible, and 
which preferences are applied in making future decisions. The in-
fluence of each decision extends over the whole future. The distant fu-
ture impact of the decision may be unimportant to the decision-maker, 
or highly uncertain, or both. 
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Decision-makers have two sorts of beliefs: some cover how transforma-
tions work, and enable the consequences of possible actions to be ex-
plored; others cover preferences or 'the good' and enable an 
appropriate action to be singled out from the alternatives. Each deci-
sion utilizes some beliefs of each sort, although they may be rudimen-
tary and may not be explicitly expressed. 
Beliefs about transformations cover the current state of the world, the 
relationships governing environmental transformations, how others 
might act currently and in future, and how the decision-maker's future 
choices might be made. A set of actions is believed to be possible in 
the current, and in each possible future, situation. Scientific theories 
have immediate application here, in showing (subject to the inductive 
premise) that certain worlds are not possible. 
Preferences, and beliefs as to the good, cover which beings or things 
should be members of the 'moral community', what rights should be ex-
tended to them, which of their interests should be taken into account, 
how conflicting rights and interests should be dealt with, and how things 
are to be valued. 
Decisions are preceded by various amounts of deliberation. They may 
be made largely on 'intuition', on general principles, or after detailed 
consideration of each sort of belief. The deliberation brought to a deci-
sion is partly a matter of choice and partly an environmental matter: de-
cision situations are foreseen with varying accuracy. No matter how full 
the investigation of a decision is, the force of scientific and ethical argu-
ment is insufficient to identify an action which is unequivocaly 'best'. 
One action (perhaps 'do nothing') must be taken, so not all actions can 
be rejected: if all actions are morally repugnant the dilemma of how to 
act must still be faced and overcome. 
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If beliefs about the consequences of action are rational, in that they are 
based on scientific delineation of the possibilities, then they must con-
tain irreducible uncertainties. Scientific predictions employ the arbi-
trary inductive premise - that the theory or 'law' will continue to be 
corroborated in future. Judgement as to the degree-of-belief in rival 
theories, or rival parameter settings, is arbitrary. 
Reality is evolutionary: things which were inconceivable occur, and the 
result of thought and experimentation cannot be exactly known in ad-
vance, so it is known that exact predictions of future beliefs will event-
ually be wrong. Beliefs are a cognitive structure and so must fall short 
of the reality they describe on logical grounds, and on the more con-
straining grounds that human rationality is limited by the capabilities of 
the human brain. 
Other decision-makers may be deciding on action at the same time, so 
each individual's beliefs must cover the actions of others. If a collective 
agreement precedes the decision time, beliefs at that time must cover 
the possibility of defaults. This mutual dependence, or outguessing, in-
troduces a further arbitrary element to beliefs. 
The irreducible uncertainties provide an upper limit to knowing the con-
sequences of an action. The limit is reached when beliefs are thorough-
ly tested for internal consistency using the full set of not-yet-discredited 
scientific theories of the day. Pragmatically, the available analytical re-
sources do not allow this limit to be approached. The consequences of 
activities involving non-renewable resources extend to the distant future 
and so are likely to be particularly uncertain. 
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Also, choice is inherently normative. A decision-maker who wishes to 
act in a justifiable way (say, a 'just way' or a 'good way') must first relate 
actions to consequences and then relate both actions and consequences 
to 'justice' or 'the good'. There are various competing conceptions of 
these notions. Some ideas such as 'ethical consistency' throw a great 
deal of light on the different value positions, but argument cannot fully 
settle semantic and ethical issues. Non-renewable resource activities 
are likely a priori to influence the existence, nature and well-being of 
potential persons in the distant future. The ethical arguments about the 
status of these persons are far from settled at present, so there is irre-
ducible doubt on these grounds (among others) about the merits of non-
renewable resource actions. 
Uncertainty and the normative nature of choice set limits to the powers 
of rationality in determining the 'best' action at a decision time, but the 
alternative decision-making schemes (perhaps religious codes, or ran-
domized selection) are more arbitrary still. Therefore, any investigation 
can only seek to inform the decision-maker about the meaning and me-
rits of actions. There is no final answer, but 'informed decision-making' 
is more or less achieved when, before the decision time, the decision-
maker is more or less aware of the consequences and merits of each 
possible action, according to each tenable set of beliefs. 
Because analytical resources are limited informed decision-making is a 
target, and in practice general principles are used to identify for which 
decisions the decision-maker seeks which information, and to select ac-
tions on the basis of existing information. The principles take the form 
of constraints on actions, or of objectives which are to be used to decide 
on action, or of less formal 'feelings' which influence actions in these 
ways. Note that seeking further information is an action. Principles 
arise in many ways; theoretical investigations playa major role in de-
veloping them. 
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1.3 Current decision-making about non-renewable resource use 
Currently, societal decision-maki:p.g about non-renewable resources is 
less than fully informed in several obvious respects. Most of these corre-
spond to theoretical deficiencies and are freely admitted to by many de-
cision-makers and theoreticians. Chapters Two and Three enlarge on 
the following points. 
A very narrow range of ethical positions are examined in practice or in 
theoretical exercises. The prevailing orthodoxy is the ethical judgement 
of 'consumer sovereignty', whereby the beliefs of individuals acting in 
markets determine which resource activities are appropriate (within the 
limits of a complex of environmental, safety, planning and anti-trust 
law). The beliefs of current buyers and sellers of resources and down-
stream products (and those who could buy or sell) therefore determine 
which consequences prevail. 
Consumer sovereignty is open to question on several grounds: why are 
individuals' choices 'good'?; why should market choices prevail?; why 
should the existing distribution of endowments (power to choose) be re-
spected? When uncertainty is present: why should individuals' expecta-
tions and attitudes to risk receive approval? This is not to suggest that 
consumer sovereignty should be abandoned. However, consumer sover-
eignty is not sufficiently morally compelling to make redundant the in-
vestigation of other ethical positions. 
Theoretical examinations of Utilitarian and Rawlsian positions as re-
gards non-renewable resources have been made in optimal growth 
frameworks. The results are hard to relate to beliefs about the merits of 
current action. This is in part because a solution in these models is a 
time path of resource actions, or a complete strategy of resource ac-
tions, and not a mapping demonstrating how current actions should vary 
with current beliefs. 
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Few sets of assumptions about possible future transformations are used 
in practice or in theory. In New Zealand government practice is guided 
largely by theoretical economic results and casual empirical observa-
tions. Another guide is econometric forecasting, which is usually extra-
polative but may also cover subjective forecasts of future shifts in 
government policy. These generally have horizons of less than three 
years. 
An exception to this has been the planning studies of the Ministry of En-
ergy which cover fifteen years in general and longer for some issues in-
cluding, notably, gas reservoir depletion. These studies were 
undertaken in a rolling planning scheme and used a lot of physical data. 
The consumer sovereignty judgement was used, with the results gener-
ally being plans which maximized the net present value of revenues ad-
justed to reflect taxation content. Major uncertainties were generally 
investigated with scenarios. 
The most ambitious attempt to inform decision-makers about distant fu-
ture possibilities also used scenarios and a great deal of information 
about possible transformations. The "Four Futures" study (Boshier et 
at., 1986) developed four scenarios of the future 50 years for New Zea-
land embedded in the wider world. Changes were explicitly related to 
postulated shifts in technology, political and economic conditions, 
demographics, and attitudes (ethical positions). Stringent attempts 
were made to ensure that each scenario was internally consistent at all 
times. The four scenarios were very different, and it was concluded that 
this demonstrated a need for 'resilience' in the face of the major uncer-
tainties. The study solidly demonstrated that vastly different futures 
are consistent with current beliefs. It could not further advise decision-
makers, about the meaning and merits of current actions, without adopt-
ing one or more value statements and likelihood statements; i.e. without 
adopting a position within the tenable sets of belief. 
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Theoretical investigations of resource issues generally examine a highly 
restricted set of possibilities - most often including perfect foreknowl-
edge. As with ethical positions, the solution sought is not an explicit re-
lationship between beliefs (about possibilities, now) and current 
actions, but is a time-path or strategy. Many of the beliefs remain im-
plicit in the dynamic structure of the model used, and many could never 
be tenable belief sets on commonsense grounds. For example, no initial 
decision-maker could reasonably believe that no future decision-makers 
will wish to deviate from the strategy adopted at the initial moment 
under the initial decision-maker's definition of appropriate actions. 
This belief is implicit in virtually all studies to date. 
1.4 Outline of this dissertation 
The sections above contend that the dynamic, uncertain context of deci-
sion-making about non-renewable resources is poorly understood, or at 
least poorly incorporated, in theoretical investigations. Resource use 
decisions are therefore likely to be guided by principles which are defi-
cient, in that they do not take proper account of this context. 
It follows that a deeper investigation of non-renewable resource use in 
dynamic, uncertain contexts has the potential to make decision-makers 
more fully informed about the consequences and the merits of their ac-
tions. This dissertation contributes to such an investigation. 
The next two chapters demonstrate that the context is, in fact, poorly 
understood. The economic approaches to decision-making in dynamic 
uncertain situations are briefly reviewed in Chapter Two. These ap-
proaches do not correctly reflect a decision-maker's position in time, 
rely on a questionable 'solution' concept, and can only investigate a 
limited range of attitudes toward uncertain outcomes. 
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The investigations of non-renewable resource use in dynamic uncertain 
contexts are reviewed in Chapter Three. The limitations of the econ-
omic approaches carry through to these investigations. The chapter con-
cludes with a discussion of the need for an approach which can deal with 
the choices of a sequence of decision-makers with varying attitudes to 
uncertainty. 
Chapter Four develops such an approach. The recursive decision ap-
proach forecasts future choice procedures, treats future chosen actions 
as part of the forecast, and restricts each decision-maker to implementa-
tion of the current actions only. The recursive approach is first de-
veloped heuristically by extending a decision tree, and then stated in 
more formal terms. The existence of a 'solution' and possible exten-
sions of the approach are discussed before the chapter concludes by dis-
cussing the potential of the approach. 
The recursive approach is elaborated upon in Chapter Five. A simple 
example brings out the structure of the approach, and choice proce-
dures for use in recursive models are discussed. Analytical tractability is 
briefly covered before some mappings useful in representing 'solutions' 
are outlined. 
The next three chapters apply the recursive approach to issues in non-re-
newable resource use, for the dual purpose of testing the approach and 
investigating the issues. Chapter Six examines the reaction of initial re-
source use to expected changes in future choice procedures, and Chap-
ter Seven extends the enquiry to uncertain contexts. Chapter Eight 
investigates the importance for resource use of the timing of uncertainty 
resolution. Each chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings and 
of the performance of the approach. 
The dissertation is concluded in Chapter Nine. This chapter sum-
marizes the preceding arguments, and evaluates the contribution made 
by the thesis to understanding of non-renewable resource use in dy-
namic, uncertain contexts. Finally, some implications for policy, and 
some areas where future research appears to be worthwhile, are dis-
cussed. 
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CbapterTwo 
Economics and Uncertainty 
Economic approaches predominate in theoretical investigations of non-
renewable resource use under uncertainty. To facilitate the review of 
these investigations the central features of economic approaches to un-
certainty are now examined. 
The theory of individual choice is discussed before social choice theory 
is outlined. Some factors which are important in intertemporal contexts 
are then reviewed. The conclusions identify the main limitations of 
using the approaches as the basis for investigating appropriate non-re-
newable resource use. Some methods of investigating choice under un-
certainty are illustrated in the Appendix. 
2.1 Individual choice under uncertainty 
Most economic investigations of uncertainty describe or explain the 
choices of individuals or firms (Diamond and Rothschild, 1978; 
Lippman and McCall, 1981). Social choice when outcomes are uncer-
tain has been relatively neglected, and is treated as analogous to individ-
ual choice. 
Choice under uncertainty involves selecting an action which has a num-
ber of possible consequences. Two suppositions underpin the main-
stream theory of choice under uncertainty: firstly, a probability measure 
is used to describe the likelihood of possible consequences; secondly, in-
dividuals behave as if they are maximizing the mathematical expectation 
of a 'utility' indicator defined over the possible consequences (Arrow, 
1970; Schoemaker, 1982; Machina, 1987). 
20 
2.1.1 The probabilistic supposition 
The concept of a probability measure is mathematically clear-cut, but its 
meaning and use are disputable (Faden, 1984; Schoemaker, 1982). 
Objective definitions 
Some schools define probability 'objectively': as being external to any 
observer. The frequency school defines probabilities as the observed or 
extrapolated long-run likelihoods of the outcomes of repetitive trials. A 
problem is that exact replication seems to call for the same outcome. 
This concept is inapplicable to unique events, including most (perhaps 
all) events of economic interest, such as the size of a coal reserve, or fu-
ture oil prices. 
The classical (Laplacean) postulate is that there is an exhaustive set of 
'elementary' outcomes. The 'Principle of Insufficient Reason' applies: 
if there is no reason to believe that any elementary outcome is more 
likely than the others they are all equiprobable. The standard conjunc-
tive rule gives the probability of any compound outcome. Taking 
elementary outcomes to be equally probable makes this definition of 
probability appear circular. 
A third objective view is that probability is a weak form of logical state-
ment: a relationship between the truth of a proposition and the weight 
of evidence in support of it. However, no satisfactory objective measure 
of 'weight of evidence' has been found. 
Subjective definitions 
Economic theories of choice usually invoke subjective probabilities. 
These personal mental properties amount to 'degrees of belief in the 
truth of propositions, whether the propositions are about coin-tossing or 
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future oil prices. The primitive concept is 'belief - it is postulated that 
any 'coherent' structure of beliefs satisfies axioms which give degrees of 
belief the same properties (summing to one, conjunctive and disjunctive 
rules) as a probability measure. 
Supplementary postulates about learning, or the modification of beliefs 
by experience, are necessary to 'explain' why different people attribute 
the same probabilities to such things as coin-toss outcomes. Coherent 
sets of degree of belief satisfy the 'laws' relating joint, marginal and con-
ditional probability distributions: Bayes Rule governs envisaged updat-
ing of beliefs over time (Savage, 1954; Pratt et al., 1964). 
Other positions 
'Risky' situations are where the assumptions of the frequency school are 
met, or the law of large numbers operates, and in other situations intui-
tive estimates, and intuitive judgements as to the reliability of those esti-
mates, are used in making choices (Knight, 1946). Intuition is not 
subjective probability - entrepreneurs must contend with unknowable 
change. Profits are the reward of successful 'uncertainty bearing'. 
Knight (pxiv) is " ... puzzled at the insistence of many writers on treating 
the uncertainty of result in choice as if it were a gamble on a known 
mathematical chance ... ". 
An alternative postulate is that agents attach a degree of 'surprise' to 
each possible outcome. Potential surprise is a mental property measur-
ing (ex-ante) how surprised the agent thinks he or she would be if the 
outcome happened. The surprise of a set of outcomes is the smallest 
surprise of an outcome in the set, so surprise is not subjective prob-
ability: their conjunctive properties are different (Shackle, 1949-50). 
Surprise is deficient because it does not match probability in repetitive 
situations (Arrow, 1951b, p419). Shackle and the 'Post-Keynesian' and 
'Austrian' schools now treat surprise in a context of 'historical', 'subjec-
tive', or 'real' time, where the perceived past and future are properties 
of the present, and action is a creative process (Shackle, 1972; Ford, 
1983; Bausor, 1982-83, 1984; O'Driscoll and Rizzo, 1985). 
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The behavioural view of uncertainty also emphasizes that in the evol-
utionary human situation qualitatively new situations are always occur-
ring. In addition the limited reasoning powers of humans provide only 
bounded rationality, which is insufficient to sustain a consistent prob-
ability-based picture of the future (Simon, 1959; 1983). 
Psychological research indicates humans do not form consistent prob-
abilistic beliefs, and better corroborates other theories on belief forma-
tion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Schoemaker, 1982; Machina, 1987). 
2.1.2 The expected utility maximization supposition 
The maximization of mathematical expectation has a long history as a 
basis for choice theories (Arrow, 1951b). Axiomatic versions demon-
strate that if agents meet 'rationality' axioms on preferences, then a 
utility function over consequences exists, such that choices maximize 
the mathematical expectation of the utility of consequences (von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954; Pratt et at., 1964). This ap-
proach is labelled subjective expected utilitarian (SEU) choice. 
The utility function is not the classical economic measure of 'pleasures 
and pains'. It represents the agent's 'attitude to risk' as well as to the 
prospects. This is illustrated in the Appendix. 
The axioms are only met by monotonically increasing utility functions, 
bounded to prevent existence of gambles of 'infinite' expected utility 
(Arrow, 1970). If agents are risk-neutral or risk-averse over the entire 
range of consequences, utility functions are concave (Pratt, 1964). Func-
tions with inflection points are needed to 'explain' the coexistence of 
gambling and insurance (Friedman and Savage, 1948). 
Other positions 
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Many theories of choice have been proposed. Some have been ex-
pounded for financial or income consequences only, although their cen-
tral criterion may apply equally well to the utility of consequences. 
Examples are: 
• Stochastic dominance: eliminating inferior (dominated) 
decisions. A decision is first degree dominated if there is 
another decision which has better (utility of) consequences 
under all possible futures, and second degree dominated if 
another decision has a higher probability of exceeding every 
possible (utility of) consequence level (Lippman and McCall, 
1981; Bawa, 1982). 
• Approaches not using probabilities (beyond requiring 
bounded possible consequences) deal with a situation dubbed 
'total ignorance'. Under the maximin criterion the preferred 
action maximizes the (utility of the) consequences occurring in 
the worst possible case (Wald, 1950). Maximax is analogously 
defined, and these are generalized under the Hurwicz 
criterion where the preferred action maximizes a linear 
combination of best possible and worst possible (utility of) 
consequences (Arrow and Hurwicz, 1972). The minimax 
regret approach postulates that the preferred action 
minimizes the maximum 'opportunity cost' which could occur, 
given that action. The Laplacean criterion takes 'elementary' 
outcomes as equiprobable and seeks the action which 
maximizes the expected value of the (utility of) outcomes. 
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Sets of axioms providing foundations for these approaches are 
discussed in Maskin (1979). 
• Mean-variance approaches maximize the mean outcome of 
the gamble minus a multiple of the variance of the gamble. 
The size of the multiple supposedly captures the attitude to 
risk. In general this is not equivalent to expected utility 
maximization (Markowitz, 1959; Porter, 1973). 
• The safety-first approach minimizes the probability of a 
defined set of bad outcomes (Roy, 1952; Telser, 1955; Arzac, 
1976). 
• Shackle an surprises of defined absolute losses and gains can 
be used to form a 'focus loss' and 'focus gain' on the basis of 
which the agent's preferred actions can be identified (Shackle, 
1949-50; Arrow, 1951b). Similarly the probabilistic expected 
loss may be the focus for choice (Fishburn, 1984). 
• The behavioural theory of satisficing postulates that the first 
action which is found to meet specified minimum standards of 
consequences is adopted (Simon, 1983). 
• A currently active research field is the exploration of the 
variants of SEU theory given by weakening the axiomatic 
foundations. 'Prospect theory' (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979), 'regret theory' (Loomes and Sugden, 1982), and 
'generalized EU theory' (Machina, 1982), all envisage that 
individuals have preferences about the probabilities of 
outcomes, which are not fully captured in forming an expected 
value measure. 
25 
2.2 Social choice under uncertainty 
Prescriptive economic investigations of social choice under uncertainty 
use analogies of the theory of the individual agent. 
2.2.1 Description of consequences 
According to the individualistic view of societal welfare, the socially 
relevant consequences of an action are (in principle) the resulting flows 
of commodities and experiences of all individuals. With uncertainty, a 
(possibly infinite) set of fully described flows represents the set of 
possible consequences of an action. 
It is not clear whether the possible ex-post effects, or the ex-ante effects 
including individuals' experiences of uncertainty, are more appropriate 
as the basis for social choice (Diamond, 1967; Dreze, 1970; Starr, 1973; 
Guesnerie and Montbrial, 1974; Mirlees, 1974; Harris and Olewiler, 
1979; Hammond, 1981). This is further discussed below. 
Probabilities over the ex-post possibilities cannot be objectively based, 
but it is not clear whose subjective probabilities should be used as the 
basis for ex-post social choice. Expert opinion is often judged to be ap-
propriate, but like any other belief, expert opinion can only ever be 
tested (before the fact) for its coherence. 
2.2.2 Social welfare criteria 
It is well known that with or without uncertainty, constructing a social 
welfare function from individual preferences requires judgemental 
input: social and individual spheres of preference must be specified; 
the Arrow Impossibility results must be circumvented; if individuals' 
utilities are the basis, the measurability and comparability of utility must 
be established (Arrow, 1951a). 
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Further, different actions lead to future people having different natures, 
and eventually being genetically different people. The social welfare 
judgements therefore cover choices between different existences, and 
not only different consumption or utility levels for the same people. Un-
settled ethical issues are involved here (Parfit, 1982). 
A social criterion covering uncertainty requires in addition an assess-
ment of the relevance of the uncertainty experienced by individuals, and 
perhaps a statement on the appropriate social attitude to (aggregate) un-
certainty. There are two major positions: 
Ex-ante 
Here, individuals' initial experience of uncertainty is judged relevant. 
The individual's preference order or expected utility covers the individ-
ual's view of their whole future. Aggregating initial expected utility 
over individuals to form a measure of social welfare includes the expec-
tation in the 'mental' welfare of the individual. 
Ex-post 
Here individuals' experience of uncertainty does not influence the so-
cial evaluation. Individual preference orderings or utility functions over 
'delivered' ex-post outcomes are the basis for aggregation. The exist-
ence of such orderings in an uncertain world, and their relation to the 
expected utility orderings, are open questions. 
It is not clear that maximizing the expected value of an ex-post measure 
is appropriate. A 'risk-averse' approach might maximize the minimum 
possible level of the social welfare measure, perhaps because gambles 
here are not 'affordable'. There is some ethical disagreement on this 
issue (Rawls, 1971, 1974; Harsanyi, 1975). 
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Comparison 
The merits of the ex-ante and ex-post positions are the subject of debate 
(Harris and Olewiler, 1979; Hammond, 1981). The ex-ante position is 
generally adopted in extending the 'efficiency' (Pareto Optimality) crite-
rion to uncertain situations. 
The welfare theorems can be extended to show that an intertemporal 
equilibrium under uncertainty is ex-ante efficient, and that ex-ante effi-
cient equilibria can be supported by a price system under certain condi-
tions. These theorems use much weaker axioms on choice than those 
supporting SEU choice (Debreu, 1959). 
However, ex-ante efficiency is questionable on several grounds. It takes 
agents' likelihood judgements as parameters whatever they may be. 
These judgements seem questionable in ways tastes are not: should be-
liefs which are demonstrably irrational count in determining the social 
allocation?; are individuals' choices of how informed to be, to be re-
spected? Similarly, agents attitudes to risk are parameters, and are 
questionable: must society respect the wishes of (say) extremely risk-lov-
ing individuals? 
If equity is considered on the basis of ex-ante judgements, further issues 
arise. Individuals with pessimistic beliefs (Hey, 1984) must be given 
correspondingly high weight. 
Ex-post efficiency can be defined over the full set of agents, by event 
(Starr, 1973). A less demanding criterion is the "Allais optimum": the 
expected value, over events, of a function of agents' ex-post utilities 
(Mirlees, 1974). The latter makes use of the questionable 'social prob-
abilities' referred to above. 
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Neither ex-post criterion can in general be achieved by a decentralized 
price system with transfers. The exception is when the ex-post social 
welfare function is linear in individuals' ex-post utility, and 'social' prob-
abilities coincide with all individual probabilities. In general, the trans-
fer mechanisms which seek to support the ex-post target create the 
potential for ex-ante gains from trade, and, if acted on, these prevent the 
ex-post target from being reached (Harris and Olewiler, 1979). 
Intertemporal inconsistency (see below) is a possibility for both ex-ante 
and ex-post approaches to social choice. The ex-post approach can be 
limited to using consistent social welfare judgements or preferences, but 
this does not alter the ex-post implementation problems. 
Aggregate models 
Directly aggregated models also require extra judgements to cover un-
certainty. Optimal growth models generally allow for uncertainty by 
maximizing the expected value of the original certain objective, which is 
often the sum over time of discounted utilities. 
This is most easily interpreted as an ex-post position: the expected value 
of a measure of 'delivered' social satisfaction is maximized. The ques-
tions applying to ex-post social welfare functions apply here also: whose 
probability judgements are used, and why is the neutral attitude to ag-
gregate risk appropriate? 
2.3 Uncertainty over time 
The approaches above do not distinguish between 'static' and 'dynamic' 
uncertain situations. In the former the chosen action is immediately fol-
lowed by resolution of all uncertainty as the consequences become 
known. In the latter the chosen action is followed by a sequence of res-
olutions over time, perhaps with intervening further actions. 
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2.3.1 Solution concepts for intertemporal models 
'Dynamic' or intertemporal models cover sequences of time periods. 
The concerns of decision-makers are likely to extend beyond the im-
mediate period. Decision-makers preferences will likely distinguish be-
tween future actions as well as current actions. 
Some terminology is required to identify types of intertemporal sequen-
ces. An arbitrary 'plan' is a sequence of actions, one for each time peri-
od. An arbitrary 'strategy' is a collection of actions, one for each 
possible state of the system in each time period. 'Policy' is sometimes 
used for 'strategy', particularly where the strategy comprises a time-in-
variant function from the state to the optimal action. A precommit-
ment plan or strategy is a plan or strategy discussed or selected by the 
initial decision-maker as if all decisions were within the power of the in-
itial (version of the) decision-maker. 
A 'commitment' is an action a decision-maker can irreversibly adopt. A 
commitment extends from the moment of adoption until the first time 
at which the action can be reassessed, and changed if then desired. A 
'recourse' is a future action which may be resorted to if some specified 
outcome happens. A 'forecast' is a consistent belief structure covering 
all future actions and outcomes, perhaps represented by a probability 
tree or a stochastic process. 
2.3.2 Intertemporal consistency 
Economic approaches to intertemporal choice under uncertainty gener-
ally examine one decision-maker's choice of pre commitment strategy. 
This strategy is intertemporallY inconsistent if foreseeable changes to 
preferences lead to revision of the strategy (Strotz, 1955-56; Pollak, 
1968). That is, it is foreseen that at some time an action which was in-
itially discarded will come to be preferred and adopted. This might 
occur because a later (version of the) decision-maker, with different 
preferences on later actions, makes later decisions. 
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A sufficient condition, for an optimal pre commitment strategy to be in-
tertemporally consistent, is that all preferences are consistent. That is, 
later choices are the same as those preferred by early decision-makers. 
Only a time sequence of preference positions can be intertemporally 
(in)consistent, but it is sometimes stated that a single preference struc-
ture is intertemporally (in)consistent. What is meant is that using the 
preference structure in each period, over outcomes dated relative to 
that period, eventually leads to (in)consistent choices. Non-exponen-
tial discounting procedures, and risk attitudes which may vary with the 
time until the risk, are possible bases for preferences which are inter-
temporally inconsistent. 
Two approaches have been considered for intertemporal choice when 
preferences are inconsistent. Neither explicitly allows for uncertainty. 
The first approach, 'naive' choice, consists of ignoring the inconsistency 
and repeatedly implementing the initial action of the optimal precom-
mitment plan. Clearly, a 'naive' decision-maker adopts a plan despite 
knowing it will not be followed, so 'naive' choice does not seem rational. 
The second approach, 'sophisticated' choice, involves selecting the best 
plan according to initial preferences, from among the plans which will 
be carried out. This approach seems more rational, but can present ana-
lytical difficulties, as decision-makers may well face non-convex, and 
perhaps open, sets ofimplementable plans (Peleg and Yaari, 1973). 
The approach has also been criticized as amounting to "a desire for in-
flexibility", because it need not favour keeping future options open 
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(Kreps,1979). Hammond (1976) considers sophisticated choice is a 
questionable way of achieving consistency, because the resulting choice 
mapping may be 'incoherent'. This means that addition of options can 
lead to a switch in the chosen plan within the original option set, im-
plying that sophisticated choice is not equivalent to an order, or to 
maximization of a utility function, on the intertemporal plans. This 
does not seem to be a compelling criticism, because the full set of plans 
is not the option set for any decision-maker with a place in time. 
2.3.3 Multi-period SEU choice 
When there is uncertainty, the multi-period extension of the SEU ap-
proach (MPSEU) deals with choice between pre commitment strategies, 
by maximizing the expected value of a utility function defined on the 
time-streams of outcomes. Whether the strategy is intertemporally con-
sistent depends on whether the future objectives are consistent with the 
first. 
MPSEU takes no account of the timing of uncertainty resolution. Each 
strategy leads to a set of outcome possibilities, which is gradually re-
duced with time. MPSEU uses the outright probability of each member 
of the set, but ignores the structure of its resolution over time. 
A number of approaches seek to generalize MPSEU. Choice proce-
dures can be constructed so as to separately reflect time and risk pref-
erences (Selden, 1978), or to reflect a preference for flexibility 
(Koopmans, 1964; Jones and Ostroy, 1984). 
Since the SEU rationality axioms apply to static choice under uncer-
tainty, they also apply to the initial choice in any multi-stage context. 
Therefore, if the axioms are accepted, a utility function defined on the 
whole forecast future (following each initial event) exists, such that in-
itial choices maximize the expected value of this function. Many non-
MPSEU choice procedures are therefore in full agreement with the 
SEU axioms. 
2.3.4 Social risk-aversion over time 
32 
In aggregate formulations, the convention is to label society 'risk neu-
tral' when uncertainty is accounted for by employing the expected value 
of the measure of delivered social welfare. The linear function in 
Figure 2.1 depicts this social risk attitude: the expected value of social 
welfare is not affected by the transformation. By contrast society is la-
belled 'risk averse' when social welfare is taken to be an increasing, 
strictly concave function of the integral measure. Here, as the concave 
function in Figure 2.1 shows, the risk attitude lowers the expected value 
of the welfare measure whenever uncertainty is present. This is further 
illustrated in the Appendix. 
social welfare 
contribution 
of the utility 
program 
o 
concave: 
risk-averse towards 
utility programs 
Figure 2.1: Social risk attitudes 
linear: 
risk-neutral towards 
utility programs 
integral of discounted 
program of utility 
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There is a need, when using utilitarian objectives, to distinguish be-
tween types of risk aversion. The standard integral of discounted con-
cave instantaneous utilities is a risk-averse utility indicator with regard 
to each time's outcome: the integral is concave with respect to each 
time's utility argument. Similarly, for stationary utility and stationary 
profiles of utility argument, the integral is concave in the profile level 
and in this sense is risk-averse over outcome sequences: a mean-preserv-
ing spread in the uncertainty about the profile level will decrease the ex-
pected value of the integral. 
However, the expected utilitarian form exhibits no risk-aversion about 
total discounted utility levels: the overall objective is linear in this level, 
and hence risk neutral towards it. In this study, this property is referred 
to as 'program risk-neutrality'. When it appears, a mean-preserving-
spread in the possible integral values leaves the overall measure of 
worth unchanged. 
2.4 Conclusions 
The economic approaches to choice under uncertainty are questionable 
on many grounds. Investigations of non-renewable resource use which 
employ these approaches are equally questionable. 
The model of individual choice is not well-developed for multi-period 
situations and is at odds with empirical evidence from static situations. 
Much of the richness of attitudes, towards risks of different sizes at dif-
ferent times, cannot be explored with the standard MPSEU approach. 
No model yet allows that preferences change with time in an uncertain 
way: the position in time of decision-making is poorly reflected. 
These limitations apply equally strongly to the economic approaches to 
social choice under uncertainty. Social choice is likely to require con-
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sideration of long time periods, so the largely static nature of the theory 
is a serious weakness. Long time periods might be expected to require 
consideration of changing preferences, and of complex attitudes to un-
folding possibilities. Neither of these can currently be explored: ex-ante 
approaches deal with individuals' 'once and for all' selections, and both 
ex-post and aggregate approaches employ social objectives of MPSEU 
type, which ignore the timing of uncertainty resolution. 
Ethical questions about the two approaches to aggregation (ex-ante cf. 
ex-post), and about how to treat potential persons, remain unresolved. 
This weakens the recommendatory power of investigations using the ap-
proaches. 
Despite the limitations of the economic approaches, there is currently 
no alternative which offers a more complete way to explore resource 
use issues with long-run uncertain consequences. 
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Chapter Three 
Depletion Under Uncertainty: 
The Economic Literature 
Economic approaches predominate in theoretical investigations of non-
renewable resource use under uncertainty. These studies are reviewed 
below, so as to establish their current potential for informing decision-
makers. 
The theory is grouped firstly by approach, and within this largely by 
what is uncertain. In all cases the studies build on investigations of a 
fully known situation; that is, uncertainty is always treated as an 'addi-
tional complication'. 
The first group, the descriptive or 'positive' examinations, are relevant 
to optimal societal resource use for two reasons. Firstly, an under-
standing of how resource allocation systems operate is an important pre-
requisite to achieving many societal goals. Secondly, the societal goal 
may be ex-ante efficiency, or, almost equivalently, consumer sovereignty 
may be deemed to be appropriate. It is well-known that these stand-
ards are often satisfied by the decentralized systems studied in 'positive' 
approaches. 
The investigations in the second group are directly normative. They use 
a modified optimal growth theory approach: an aggregate technology 
and resource base limit the consumption possibilities, and an explicit so-
cietal objective is specified, so that optimal resource use patterns can be 
derived. 
The conclusions assess the literature as a whole, and identify the chief 
limitations of the theory to date. 
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3.1 Early views on depletion and uncertainty 
Prior to 1974, prescriptive economic investigations of non-renewable re-
sources use deterministic approaches. The view commonly adopted in 
early 'positive' work is that uncertainty about future prospects compels 
producers of non-renewable resources to speed-up early extraction 
(Paish, 1938; Watkins, 1944). 
One pathbreaking work briefly mentions uncertainty in connection with 
a social optimum based on consumer surplus. In questioning whether 
the interest rate should be used as a discount rate, it is claimed that the 
view that" ... future pleasures are ethically equivalent to present plea-
sures of the same intensity ... " must be tempered with the facts that capi-
tal is productive (a partial equilibrium framework is used), and future 
pleasures are uncertain (Hot elling, 1931, p145). The nature of this un-
certainty is not further explored, and there is no indication of which of 
the possible "pleasures" should be evaluated, or if the appropriate dis-
count rate varies with the risk. 
If the social objective is to maximize net present revenue from the re-
source, risk and uncertainty can be taken into account as deductions 
from revenues and additions to costs, according to Ciriacy-Wantrup 
(1944). This adjustment is thought to make it possible to treat resource 
use plans as finite, since the additions to costs and deductions from 
revenues at some distant date make use after that date appear worth-
less. 
A third view is that projections of the distant future become so nebulous 
that the best approach is to assume the net benefit function does not 
change after" ... some finite year in the future after which changes are 
too vague to project..." (Burt and Cummings, 1970, p589). The uncer-
tainty before and after this finite year is to be treated by using the best 
deterministic approximation available. 
37 
These three views account for uncertainty by adjusting the deterministic 
evaluation procedure. In each case a single specified outcome is evalu-
( 
ated. There is no explicit examination of strategy, or foreseen need to 
adjust plans given new information. 
3.2 Descriptive investigations 
Until recently 'positive' economic investigations assumed resource 
owners and consumers had sufficient knowledge of the future to estab-
lish and follow an intertemporal equilibrium with no need for strategy 
(Hotelling, 1931; Herfindahl, 1967; Peterson and Fisher, 1977; Crabbe, 
1977; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Withagen, 1981). 
Uncertainty weakens the validity of the 'partial equilibrium' assump-
tion, which is relied on in considering the resource sector in isolation. 
Risky extraction decisions depend on which other risky activities are 
available. A portfolio of activities may be adopted to reduce risk. 
Agents may share risks or obtain insurance. These possibilities affect 
the appropriate risk-attitude for a resource extracting company. 
3.2.1 Expectations: the base case 
A fully known, or perfect, expectation structure underpins the determin-
istic partial equilibrium results, such as the well-known Hotelling's rule 
(that the equilibrium net price, or rent, of a constant cost non-renew-
able resource, rises at the rate of interest over time (Gordon, 1967; Lev-
hari and Liviatan, 1977; Devarajan and Fisher, 1981». The perfect 
expectations cover all future resource demand functions, the resource 
quantity and extraction cost, interest rates, and the continuance of the 
competitive situation including the resource ownership rights. 
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It is not necessary that all agents have perfect expectations. A full set of 
futures markets for the resource enables information to be shared and 
the whole equilibrium path to be established at the initial time (Kemp 
and Long, 1980). Without futures markets, to sustain the intertemporal 
equilibrium some agents must have sufficient foresight to be able to ar-
bitrage across the spot markets for the resource. This is true if resource 
owners have perfect foresight of the demand functions, or if consumers 
know future demand functions and can store the resource costlessly 
(Weinstein and Zeckhauser, 1975). 
With non-renewable resources myopic perfect foresight is not sufficient 
to sustain the full perfect foresight equilibrium. Infinite foresight, or a 
set of futures markets covering an infinite future, is required if the in-
itial price level is to allow the perfect foresight terminal condition 
(stock exhaustion as choke price is reached) to be satisfied (Stiglitz, 
1974). 
3.2.2 Competitive extraction under uncertainty 
The investigations of intertemporal equilibrium resource use when 
there is uncertainty are now reviewed. They are grouped according to 
which item is treated as uncertain. 
Price uncertainty 
When there is no current price uncertainty, but future prices follow a 
stochastic process so price expectations increase in variance over time, 
equilibrium resource patterns can be found by discrete (Weinstein and 
Zeckhauser, 1975) or continuous (Pindyck, 1980, 1981) stochastic dy-
namic programming approaches. The extractor adjusts output to the 
current situation as prices are revealed. The extractor's attitude to pro-
gram risk may be captured in a utility function over the asset value of 
the resource stock. 
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When extraction is costless and owners are program risk-neutral, the ex-
pected price rises at the interest rate. Extraction falls over time on aver-
age. Under risk-aversion the increasing uncertainty reduces the 
contribution to expected utility of later extraction, so early extraction in-
creases, and the equilibrium rate of increase in the expected resource 
price exceeds the interest rate. 
If costs are convex in the extraction rate, an increase in price uncer-
tainty causes the cost increases in high price periods to outweigh the 
cost decreases in low price periods, and induces risk-neutral owners to 
increase early use. Concave costs reverse the effect. 
Alternatively, there may be current and future price uncertainty. Ex-
traction is decided each period before price is revealed, and the prob-
ability distribution over prices is a stationary function of aggregate 
supply (Lewis, 1977; Burness, 1978). Owners are now assumed to 
maximize the expected sum over time of the discounted utility of net 
profit, with the utility function reflecting risk attitudes. 
This reformulation of price uncertainty reverses the impact of risk-aver-
sion found above. The price 'risk' increases in proportion with the ex-
traction quantity, so risk-averse owners reduce initial resource 
extraction by comparison with the risk-neutral rates. The heuristic pro-
cedure of allowing for risk, by increasing the discount rate applied to 
the expected net profit stream, in this case produces faster extraction 
and exposure to more risk. 
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Tenure uncertainty 
At equilibrium, risk-neutral owners who attribute some likelihood to fu-
ture nationalization of their resource holdings extract faster than those 
who perceive secure tenure (Long, 1975). Risk-aversion increases the 
tendency to faster extraction, but expected compensation can counter-
balance the result. 
Substitute development date uncertainty 
The possibility of substitute development speeds the extraction of risk-
neutral and risk-averse owners. The impact of uncertainty about the de-
velopment date is ambiguous (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1976, 1981). An 
increase in this uncertainty can lead to higher initial extraction rates 
when the stock is small and lower initial extraction rates when the stock 
is big, if the (stationary) demand function is elastic enough at high 
prices. This is because very high rents are immediately attainable when 
there is a small stock, and these are foregone if and when the substitute 
appears. 
Resource uncertainty 
Most investigations of uncertainty about resource holdings use formula-
tions involving maximization of a societal utility function, with no men-
tion of markets or demands (Cropper, 1976; Kemp, 1976, 1977; Gilbert, 
1979; Hoel, 1978a; Loury, 1978; Heal, 1979). These investigations are 
reviewed in section 3.3. If the utility function is interpreted as a concave 
utility of profit function, analogies give some insight into extraction be-
haviour. 
When there is no warning of impending exhaustion, risk-neutral owners 
slow use in general and risk-averse owners slow use even more under 
reserve uncertainty. The extraction pattern adopted depends strongly 
on the probability distribution over reserves. Increasing the discount 
rate may result in increased exposure to risk. 
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Different results are found if there is no current reserve uncertainty, 
but future reserves fluctuate according to a stochastic process, so ulti-
mate reserves are unknown. The terminal extraction time is when aver-
age profit first falls to zero - perhaps because of lack of reserves - and is 
unknown initially. With risk-neutral resource owners the expected rate 
of change of the equilibrium price is the same as under certainty, if ex-
traction costs are linear in reserves. The extraction levels adopted by 
risk-neutral owners may be affected through the impact of uncertainty 
on the terminal condition. Risk-averse owners speed extraction (Pin-
dyck, 1980). 
Exploration 
The equilibrium for the certain case provides a basis for comparison. 
When the increase in reserves given by 'exploratory' effort is fully 
known, the cost savings from postponing exploration are traded off 
against the cost savings in extraction which are assumed to follow from 
maintaining large reserves by exploration. 
If initial reserves are small, equilibrium extraction initially increases as 
reserves are developed by exploration and hold down extraction costs. 
Eventually, as the returns to exploration worsen, reserves fall and extrac-
tion decreases over time (Pindyck, 1978). The associated price path is 
V-shaped. Large initial reserves lead to a monotonically decreasing ex-
traction rate equilibrium paralleling the Hotelling rule result. 
The 'rule of capture' aspect of exploration, whereby resource property 
rights are given to the finder of the resource, has been examined in a 
simulation approach (Peterson, 1978). Free entry to homogeneous un-
explored territories leads to more exploration, a higher reserve-extrac-
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tion ratio, and faster extraction, than for the surplus maximizing case. 
Monopolistic rights to exploration territories lead to the opposite effect. 
Uncertainty about exploration results can lead to an increase or de-
crease in both exploration efforts and initial extraction at equilibrium 
(Devarajan and Fisher, 1982). Under risk-neutrality, and current uncer-
tainty about exploration results, expected marginal discovery cost ex-
ceeds rent at equilibrium if extraction productivity is increasing in 
reserves. The competitive equilibrium is not efficient if the resource in-
dustry as a whole faces a risk, due to the scarcity of exploration pros-
pects, which is overlooked by firms in deciding on exploration levels. 
With no current uncertainty about discoveries, and risk-neutral re-
source owners, uncertainty has no effect on the expected rate of change 
in the resource price. Exploratory efforts, extraction rates, and the 
price level at equilibrium may change. The direction and size of these 
effects is sensitive to the discovery function (Pindyck, 1980). 
3.2.3 Uncertainty and market structure 
Under uncertainty about the development date of a resource substitute, 
imperfect market structures conserve resource stocks by comparison 
with the competitive case (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1976, 1981; Stiglitz 
and Dasgupta, 1981). The market power prevailing over the substitute 
is important: the prospect of a resource/substitute duopoly may lead a 
resource monopoly to extreme conservation. Therefore, an attempt to 
introduce competition to a monopolised non-renewable resource mar-
ket by creating substitutes may not have the 'natural' outcome of lower-
ing prices and increasing output. Strategic behaviour by the resource 
owners (delaying) and prospective substitute suppliers (bringing for-
ward) is important in determining the substitute development date and 
the non-renewable extraction patterns, whether or not uncertainty is 
present (Dasguptaet at., 1982, 1983). 
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When the returns to exploration are uncertain, risk-neutral firms with 
market power in non-renewable resources explore less than competitive 
firms, since the discovery of extra reserves depresses future resource 
prices (Solow, 1977; Stewart, 1979). However, 'rule of capture' may 
alter this result if there is free entry to exploration prospects. The firm 
may over-explore to protect its monopoly in the resource, and by main-
taining high resource prices may induce over-exploration by others. 
3.2.4 Expectations and disequilibrium 
In the formulations above, agents' beliefs about uncertain elements are 
modelled as exogenous stochastic processes which the elements are 
'known' to follow. These processes are not explicitly related to hypo-
theses about agents' observations (e.g. of the extraction rate), or to the-
ories the agent accepts (e.g. that prices will support an intertemporal 
equilibrium), or to empirical observations of belief formation. The sto-
chastic processes are not learnt about as the agent gains experience. 
The exogenous stochastic processes are therefore arbitrary as theoreti-
cal foundations. They are misleading if real expectations formation can-
not support the results. This is more critical when, as in reality, there 
are few futures and contingent markets in which expectations can be ex-
pressed and developed. 
The formulations assume instantaneous adjustment to equilibrium - no 
lags, and no disequilibrium trading. If the results are not reasonably 
stable under real-time adjustment, then they are misleading for the real 
world. Investigations of these issues, in depletion context, specify an ex-
pectational and lag structure, and then derive simulated dynamic out-
comes for comparison with the equilibrium perfect-foresight path. 
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In three different adaptive (i.e. extrapolative) expectations formulations 
the short run price path is sensitive to the elasticity of demand and the 
parameters of the expectations form. The paths are unstable; a small 
perturbation initiates an increasing cycle of fluctuations, or an increas-
ing trend away from a 'well-behaved' path. The resource markets are 
more stable when owners' expectations are influenced by quantity sig-
nals such as consumption rates and resource stocks, rather than purely 
by past prices (Heal, 1975, 1981). 
More sophisticated adaptive expectations formulations lead competitive 
markets for non-renewable resources to a constant-price equilibrium in 
the short run. These paths do not even asymptotically obey Hotelling's 
rule. Therefore, the perfect foresight paths cannot be supported, even 
in the short-run, by adaptive expectations (Marks and Sweeny, 1982). 
'Rational' expectations about non-renewable resource use are largely 
unexplored to date. In this context resource owners must decide about 
extraction rates and about holding resources or other assets. If owners 
have rational expectations they foresee and take account of the impact 
of these decisions on the intertemporal price path. 
A unique intertemporal equilibrium exists for the competitive case with 
non-renewable resources, spot markets, an infinite horizon, demand un-
certainty, and risk-neutral resource owners with rational expectations 
(Orosel, 1985). At equilibrium the resource price paths are expected to 
increase over time at the discount rate. Prices therefore satisfy a sto-
chastic version of Hotelling's rule. 
The price at each time is largely determined by the rational expectations 
of resource suppliers, so shocks do not have much influence, even 
though there are only spot markets. As Orosel states: "It may be that ac-
tual short run demand fluctuations have too much influence on the oil 
price and that this price fluctuates 'too much' .... to be compatible with ra-
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tional expectations, in the same way as stock prices move 'too much' ... 
In fact, the importance of rational expectations may lie in their showing 
the basic principles of economic theory are difficult to reconcile with ob-
servations."{p712). 
However, the resource price movement which might be expected in a 
world of cartel members, fringe suppliers, and consumers, all of whom 
have rational expectations about that price movement, has yet to be 
determined. Empirical research into expectations forms is required be-
fore the impact of uncertainty on non-renewable resource supply can be 
determined with any confidence. 
3.2.5 Ex-ante efficiency and market depletion 
The two fundamental welfare theorems relate competitive equilibria to 
Pareto optimal social states, i.e. ex-ante efficient outcomes (Koopmans, 
1957; Debreu, 1959). Section 2.2.2 discusses ex-ante efficiency as a so-
cial goal, but there are many well-known reasons why market outcomes 
may not be efficient. Many of these reasons are relevant to non-renew-
able resources, and may not be amenable to solution by (say) govern-
ment involvement. 
Market inefficiencies 
Property right structures, market concentration, and the policy environ-
ment are all possible sources of inefficiency which are widely discussed 
in the resource economics literature (Herfindahl and Kneese, 1974; 
Howe, 1979; Fisher, 1981; Hartwick and Olewiler, 1986). 
Private and social risks 
If agents face uninsurable risks which have no equivalent at the social 
level, then market outcomes are inefficient. For example, a perceived 
risk of nationalization of resource holdings induces inefficient market 
outcomes (Long, 1975). The reverse is that society faces a risk about 
the total resource endowment, and if this risk is ignored by firms the 
market exploration levels are sources of inefficiency (Devarajan and 
Fisher, 1982). 
Risk attitudes and uncertainty 
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The efficiency of market outcomes under uncertainty when resource 
owners are risk-averse is a subject of dispute. Weinstein and Zeck-
hauser (1975), Heal (1975), and Hoel (1978a) claim that risk-averse 
firms' reaction to uncertainty is a source of inefficiency. Kemp and 
Long (1980) counterclaim that this result follows from inconsistent as-
sumptions about shareholders and consumers, and that the competitive 
outcomes are efficient. Kemp and Long also claim that a competitive 
situation and resource base uncertainty are mutually contradictory, be-
cause owners must anticipate the possibility of monopoly and this in-
fluences extraction. 
Availability of markets and uncertainty 
When the probability an agent attributes to possible states-of-the-world 
depends on the agent's actions the Arrow-Debreu proof of efficiency of 
a full set of contingent commodity markets does not apply (Debreu, 
1959). Extraction from uncertain resource stocks involves such depend-
ence. To ensure efficiency the usual contingent markets must be 
augmented by a set of contingent markets in the uncertain resource 
stocks in situ (Kemp and Long, 1984). 
Private and social discounting 
There is disagreement about which discounting procedures must be 
used by individuals, firms, and the state, if efficient outcomes are to be 
achieved (Lind et al., 1982). 
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When there is no public sector, and given the usual assumptions (endow-
ments, preferences, technology, enough foresight and/or markets, and 
contract enforcement) a competitive equilibrium over intertemporal 
markets brings about equality between: each individual's consumption 
rate of interest (CRI), the social rate of time preference (SRTP), the 
market interest rate, the marginal rate of return to private sector invest-
ment, and the social opportunity cost of capital (SOC) at each time. 
Taxation of company income is a widely discussed reason for a 'wedge' 
between the SRTP and the SOC (generally it is thought that 
SRTP < SOC): firms only undertake investments with a pre-tax margi-
nal rate of return that is higher than the CRI by an amount which covers 
company income tax and the tax paid by the individual shareholder on 
dividends. "Since consumers and firms are facing different rates of re-
turn, there is presumptive evidence of inefficiency ... " (Arrow, 1982, 
p117). The wedge causes a bias against long-term investments, and a 
lower level of investment. Where there are such taxes, therefore, mar-
ket outcomes may not be efficient - non-renewable resource use may be 
too fast. 
3.3 Prescriptive investigations of substitute uncertainty 
The current desirability of non-renewable resource use is affected by 
the future availability of substitutes. In any period this availability can 
be summarized in an opportunity cost curve, analogous to a supply 
curve. 
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The future locations of this curve are uncertain, and depend on the 
preceding success at invention and innovation, resulting from research 
and development efforts. These vary with the perceived rewards, which 
are likely to increase as resource use rates, and the remaining stock, fall. 
Therefore, in reality, choice of resource use rates both affects and is af-
fected by estimated future substitute availability. 
Only the impact of substitute uncertainty on resource use is investigated 
in the prescriptive economic literature. As Table 3.1 summarizes, uncer-
tainty about substitute availability is approximated by an uncertain 
amount available, or production cost, or invention date. 
Table 3.1: Investigations of uncertainty about substitutes 
Uncertain 
item 
Future 
Substitutes 
Uncertain 
attribute 
size of flow 
production cost 
existence 
date available 
3.3.1 The nature of substitutes 
Type of 
uncertainty 
exogenous 
exogenous 
exogenous 
exogenous 
influenced 
Optimal pre commitment strategies for non-renewable resource use 
have been derived for several situations where uncertainty about a sub-
stitute is fully resolved at a time T. 
3.3.1.1 Uncertain substitute 'costs' 
An exact substitute for a non-renewable resource becomes available, 
without limit, at a fixed 'cost' h, at date T. Only a probability distribu-
tion over possible cost levels is available before T (Hoel, 1978b). 
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Letting t index time, the society must decide on the rate a(t) at which 
the resource is extracted from the stock Q( t) before T, and the extrac-
tion rate b(t) and substitute use rate m(t) after T. The resource and sub-
stitute use rates determine each times' level of utility U(.), and the 
substitute cost is a charge on utility. The social objective is to maximize 
the sum over time of utility, discounted exponentially at rate r. Uncer-
tainty is accounted for by maximizing the expected value of this objec-
tive. 
Letting E denote the expectation operator, this is formulated as an opti-
mal control problem: 
T 
max I e-rtU(a(t» dt + 
o 
E G(Ql,h) 
h a(t) 
subject to: O(t) = -a(t), O:::;t <T 
Q(O) = Qo 
Ql = Q(T) 
Q(t), a(t)~O, O:::;t<T 
where 00 
G(Ql,h) = maxI e-rt [U(b(t) +m(t» - h.m(t)] dt 
T 
b(t) 
m(t) 
subject to: O(t) = -b(t), T:::;t 
Q(T) = Ql 
Q(t), b(t), m(t)~O, t~T. 
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Let U(.) be continuous and twice differentiable with 
U'>O, U"<O, lim U'(a) = 00. 
a~O ' 
The cost distribution is bounded allowing derivation of bounds to sub-
stitute use rates, which eventually will equalize the substitute cost and 
marginal utility; by assumption some substitute use is always worthwhile. 
The optimum strategy 
The optimum pre commitment strategy reduces to two deterministic ex-
traction paths: one before T, the other calculated at T when the cost 
becomes known to society. Depending on the size of the initial stock 
and on the uncertainty about the substitute cost, a jump in resource use 
may occur at T. Before T, the optimum balances the current marginal 
value of resource use with the expected marginal value of resource use 
after T, satisfying: 
aG 
E [ ], (a constant), all O::;;t::;;T. 
aQl 
h 
Possible optimal strategies are illustrated in Figure 3.1. The range K-L 
of possible optimal substitute use rates is derived from the range of 
possible costs, and it is assumed that the cost h revealed at T makes use 
rate H optimal. 
AA'HJ is optimal for a small initial stock, exhausted at T. Along AA' 
the resource use falls, but the discounted marginal utility of resource 
use is constant. 
rate of use of 
stock resource 
or substitute 
B 
L~------------~~---+~~--------------
J 
A 
K ~ ____ ~~=-________ -+ ________________ __ 
A' 
o 
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initial 
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Figure 3.1: Optimal depletion with uncertain substitute cost 
BB'DD'] is optimal for a larger stock, exhausted at D'. Along BB' the 
discounted marginal utility of resource use is constant, and resource use 
falls. High initial use rates do not exhaust the resource stock before T: 
it is better if some stock is kept for use after T. The optimal resource 
use after T depends on the substitute cost. Any remaining stock is used 
to keep discounted marginal utility constant for as long as possible. The 
optimal resource use drops to zero from D' when the resource stock is 
exhausted. Substitute use then begins, and continues at rate H. 
Reactions to risk-aversion and uncertainty about costs 
Because G is convex in h for all Ql, a mean-preserving increase in cost 
uncertainty increases optimal resource use before T for a program risk-
neutral society. Program risk-aversion reduces extraction at all times 
before T. 
The optimal strategic use of stocks may be faster or slower than if the 
mean cost outcome is assumed. 
33.1.2 Cost uncertainty resolved at a chosen time 
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Alternatively, T is a variable. The substitute cost is discovered when 
and if the initial stock is exhausted. The value of the remaining pro-
gram is, like G, positive, decreasing and convex over costs. Assuming 
risk-neutrality, uncertainty about costs at the exhaustion date translates 
into a higher expected reward than if the mean cost occurred with cer-
tainty. Therefore, optimal extraction is larger and ends sooner under 
cost uncertainty (Oren and Powell, 1985). 
33.13 Cost uncertainty with capital accumulation 
When capital and the resource are inputs to production of a capital-
consumption good, which may also be required in producing the sub-
stitute, uncertainty about costs is captured with a probability 
distribution over the input requirements for substitute production. 
Under risk-neutrality the optimum initial resource use and capital for-
mation are greater under uncertainty than under certainty with the 
same mean. However under extreme risk-aversion (which avoids worst 
possible outcomes) the optimum initial resource use and capital forma-
tion are lower than under risk-neutrality (Hanson, 1977). 
33.1.4 Uncertainty about substitute flows 
Uncertainty about substitutes can focus on physical availability instead 
of cost. In one case, the level met) equals a constant k, which is initially 
uncertain and becomes known at T, rather than being chosen. If the 
substitute is costless, the deterministic optimal value function G(Ql,h) 
is replaced with F(Ql,k) in the initial objective function, where: 
00 
F(Ql, k) = max f e-rtU(b(t) + k) dt 
T 
b(t) 
subject to: 6(t) = -b(t), T~t 
Q(T) = Ql 
Q(t), b(t)~O, T~t 
At optimality, before T, resource use a(t) satisfies: 
aF 
E [-] , O~t~T. 
k aQl 
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Under risk neutrality, a mean-preserving increase in uncertainty about k 
reduces optimal non-renewable resource use at all times before T 
(Heal, 1979). This effect is opposite that for cost uncertainty. 
3.3.1.5 Conclusions 
When uncertainty is focused on substitute costs the value of the remain-
ing program at T is a positive, decreasing, convex function of the sub-
stitute cost. By Jensen's inequality, a mean-preserving increase in 
uncertainty about costs increases the expected value of the remaining 
program at T, so it appears less worthwhile to keep stocks for use after 
T. Therefore use rates before T increase as substitute cost uncertainty 
increases. 
However, when uncertainty is focused on physical availability, the value 
of the remaining program at T is a positive, increasing, concave function 
of the level of substitute availability. By Jensen's inequality a mean-
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preserving increase in uncertainty about availability makes it appear 
more worthwhile to keep stocks for use after T. Use of the resource be-
fore T decreases. 
There is no explicit contradiction between these cases, but either cost or 
availability level could be used to approximate uncertainty about sub-
stitutes. The findings are extremely sensitive to the dimension chosen 
in this approximation. Not even the sign of the impact of uncertainty 
can be inferred with generality. 
Under program risk-neutrality the optimal pre commitment strategy is 
intertemporally consistent, because the objective form here is station-
ary, and the linear risk transformation does not alter the order over 
possible programs. The pre commitment strategy under program risk-
aversion is intertemporally inconsistent, assuming that later generations 
before T apply the same risk transformation: the continuations possible 
from t < T are ordered differently at t than at t' < t. 
3.3.2 The substitute arrival date 
Optimal non-renewable resource use, when at some exogenously uncer-
tain time T a technological change provides a substitute for the re-
source, has been investigated using several different sets of assumptions 
on technology. 
3.3.2.1 Date uncertainty with capital accumulation 
In one set of technological assumptions a positive non-renewable re-
source input a(t), and capital stock K(t), are necessary for production of 
a consumption-capital good at a positive rate F(K(t),a(t)). The con-
sumption rate c(t), and additions to the capital stock, use all production. 
At T, a new technology provides a constant flow m of a perfect sub-
stitute for the resource. 
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The previously specified discounted utilitarian objective is applied here 
to c(t). Given the technology, and the unbounded marginal utility of 
consumption, any strategy which has a chance of exhausting the non-re-
newable resource before the substitute arrives cannot be optimal. To 
avoid this leading to the non-existence of an optimal strategy it is as-
sumed that the substitute is certain to arrive eventually (Dasgupta and 
Heal, 1974). 
Letting the probability density function on arrival times T be n(T), the 
resource use problem is in formal terms: 
00 
max f n(T) 
o 
a(t) 
c(t) 
subject to: 
where 
T 
( [e-rtu(c(t» dt + e-rT W (K(T), Q(T» ) 
K(t) = F(K(t), a(t» - c(t) all t~O 
O(t) = -a(t) all t~O 
Q(O) =Qo, K(O) =Ko 
K, c, a, Q~O all t~O 
00 
W(K(T)~ Q(T» = max 
b(t) 
f e-r(t-T) U(c(t» dt 
T 
subject to: K(t) = F(K(t), b(t» - c(t) all t~T 
O(t) = -b(t) + m all t~ T 
K(T) , Q(T) given 
K, b, c, Q, ~O all t~T 
dT 
56 
The nature of an optimal strategy 
The optimal strategy consists of two time-streams of resource use rates: 
one is followed until the arrival time T, when the resource use rate 
jumps to the other. 
For a linear homogeneous production function, resource use and con-
sumption at each time before arrival satisfy the equations: 
c FK-r+(n/N).«WK- U/(C»/U/(c» 
= 
c -CU"(C)/U/(C) 
x = z.f(x).(1 + (WKn/N)/(U/(c).f/(x» + (WO n/N)/(xf"(X)U/(C» 
where x=K/a, 
f(x) =F(K/a, 1), 
z = -f/(x)(f(x)-xf/(x»/xf(x)f"D(x) , 
the elasticity of substitution between K and a, 
and N(t) is the probability of arrival no sooner than t. 
"The nature ofthe path (these equations) define is far from obvious ex-
cept in some special cases." (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974, p21). Given spe-
cific functional forms and values for all the parameters it would be 
difficult to compute the time-streams a(t) and c(t) which satisfy these 
conditions. The complex optimal strategy must be simplified by as-
sumptions before any insights are available. 
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An 'unlimited energy' assumption 
If the existing stocks of capital and resource become worthless at T, the 
equations become: 
c f'(x) - (r+nJN) 
= 
c -cU"(c)/U'(c) 
i. = zf(x) all t~O 
Further specifying an iso-elastic utility function, and a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, gives the optimal time-streams of Figure 3.2. 
consumption 
rate 
resource use 
rate 
Cl 
o L-__________________________________ -+ 
initial 
time 
time 
0L-________________________________ __ 
initial 
time 
time 
Figure 3.2: Optimal resource use before substitute arrival 
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Before T the high resource use rates provide high consumption rates (c1 
or c2), which may increase for a time (c2) if capital is sufficiently produc-
tive. The rapid drawdown of the stock must eventually decrease, be-
cause reserves must be conserved against the chance of non-arrival of 
the substitute. Eventually, if the substitute does not arrive, consump-
tion must fall. When the substitute arrives the time-streams depicted 
are abandoned and the consumption rates are dictated by the new tech-
nology. 
Approximating uncertainty by augmented discounting 
The optimal strategy above is the same as the optimal strategy when 
there is no substitute but the discount rate is augmented by n/N, which 
may well vary over time. Therefore, the conditions which give 
augmented discounting for uncertainty some theoretical justification are 
most stringent. If the resource has value after the substitute arrives, 
augmenting the discount rate for risk is likely to wrongly increase initial 
resource use and consumption rates. 
Approximating uncertainty by the expected situation 
Deterministic optimization based on the expected arrival date T e can be 
compared with the strategic result. If resource and capital stocks 
become worthless with arrival, the strategic cumulative resource use 
must be less than the deterministic cumulative resource use at and after 
T e: at T e the stock is exhausted in the deterministic case but in the 
strategic case allowance must be made for possible non-arrival of the 
substitute. 
Before T e things are less clear: " .. .leaving a resource underground allevi-
ates society from the risk of facing a resource scarcity in the near future, 
there is an incentive to postpone extraction,... But leaving the resource 
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underground is risky, because the invention will reduce its value ... 
There is then an ambiguity in the implications of uncertainty about the 
invention date on socially efficient extraction rates. It transpires that 
whether such uncertainty ought to lead the economy to extract it at a fas-
ter or slower rate depends on the size of the initial stock." (Dasgupta 
and Heal, 1979, p396). This dependency has been demonstrated with 
no capital accumulation, and where the resource remains valuable after 
discovery of a substitute (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1976, 1981). 
The bias inherent in using the deterministic optimum for the expected 
situation, in place of the strategic optimum, can cause initial resource 
use to be too fast or too slow. 
3.3.2.2 Date uncertainty and Rawlsianjustice 
The 'justice' of the pre commitment strategy, for resource use before 
substitute arrival, can be examined with versions of the Rawlsian 
maximin criterion. According to one definition the strategy is 'just' if: 
J(O)sJ(t), allt>O 
where J(t) is the expected value of generation t's objective, under the 
pre commitment strategy. 
When every generation's objective is to maximize the expected value of 
total discounted future utilities, and the objective is stationary, the pre-
commitment strategy is 'just' if the initial resource stock is smaller than 
a critical level which is increasing in the post-discovery inflow level 
(Riley, 1977). 
Illustrative time-streams of expected objective levels, J(t) imposed by 
the precommitment strategy, are shown in Figure 3.3. After T objec-
tives are maintained at level A by the substitute. Time-stream B corre-
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sponds to an initial stock below the critical level, so the strategy is 'just': 
J (t) increases because the underlying fall in planned resource use (given 
non-arrival of the substitute) is more than offset by the decreasing likeli-
hood of non-arrival of the substitute. 
expected 
level of 
generation's 
objective 
o 
c 
D 
B 
initial 
time 
Figure 3.3: Justice and expected objective levels 
A 
time 
A strategy which violates the 'justice' constraint underlies time-stream 
C. Here, a high initial resource use (given non-arrival) falls so fast that 
J(t) falls as well- the decreasing likelihood of non-arrival of the sub-
stitute is not enough to offset falling planned resource use. 
When the initial generation's strategy is constrained to be 'just', a time-
stream like D results. The underlying resource use is initially lower and 
falls more slowly over time, so that J (t) is constant for some time before 
eventually increasing with the increasing likelihood that the substitute 
inflow has arrived. 
This implies that intergenerational 'justice' might require early gener-
ations to slow resource use, even when their objective covers future 
generations and even though a substitute is certain to arrive eventually. 
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The 'justice' constraint on expected values is less stringent than one on 
(say) minimum possible levels. 
3.3.2.3 The possibility of non-arrival 
The distribution of arrival dates can be explicitly conditioned on the 'ex-
istence' of the substitute technology. The initial probability that the sub-
stitute exists decreases as the substitute fails to arrive, until the 
substitute does arrive if ever (Bhattacharya, 1984). 
For the production framework, the optimal initial use of the resource 
(given non-arrival) increases with the initial probability of existence. 
Also, the optimal initial use decreases as the instantaneous utility func-
tion becomes more risk averse, across the class of instantaneous utility 
functions. 
3.3.2.4 Conclusions 
The theoretical invest!gations demonstrate that the optimal precommit-
ment strategies are 'not obvious' when the arrival date of substitute tech-
nology is uncertain and beyond influence. Optimal strategies depend in 
a complex way on the societal objective, the conception of 'justice', the 
production possibilities both before and after the discovery, and the way 
the uncertainty about the arrival date is resolved over time. 
In the optimal precommitment strategy, the impact on the initial re-
source use of increasing uncertainty about the arrival date is unclear, 
but increasing the initial probability that the substitute will never be 
available decreases the optimal initial resource use. Basing social 
choice on a deterministic approximation is unlikely to be justifiable on 
theoretical grounds. Augmenting the discount rate to allow for possible 
substitute arrivals is likely to produce a deterministic resource use opti-
mum which is initially larger than the strategic optimum. 
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As for uncertainty about the nature of substitutes, the investigations 
here maintain intertemporal consistency of the pre commitment strategy 
by using only stationary utilitarian objectives. 
3.3.3 Research and development 
Real world substitutes are created by research and development 
(R&D). These activities use resources with an opportunity cost. The 
uncertainty in R&D can be approximated by assuming that a stock of 
'knowledge' about the substitute is accumulated, and at an uncertain 
level of this knowledge the substitute becomes feasible. Various input 
assumptions can be made. 
3.3.3.1 A stock input to R&D 
If some capital Kn(t) is devoted to research, which increases the knowl-
edge stockx(t) by D(Kn(t», the formulation is: 
00 
Max f n(X) 
o 
aCt) 
c(t) 
Kn(t) 
subject to: 
!l:~tU(C(t)) dt + e "r'IXW(K(Tx),Q(Tx)) 1 dX 
K(t) = F(K-Kn(t), aCt»~ - c(t) all t~O 
G(t) = -aCt) all t~O 
x(t) = D(Kn(t» all t~O 
Tx is defined by x(Tx) = X 
Q(O) = Qo, W given 
Q, a, K, Kn, c, x~O all t~O 
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W = the value of the program after arrival where 
and n(X) = the probability density of arrival at knowledge level X. 
Letting N(X) be the probability of arrival at a knowledge level no smal-
ler than X, the necessary conditions for optimality can be expressed as: 
d 
- log Fa = FK + WK(n/N) DjU', 
dt 
(-V'/cV") 
c(t) = c(O) [ e-rt NFa/Fa1t=o] 
FKD 
dt 
d 
[log Fa D'/FKD ] = D'.(n/N) [U-r W + W] jU'. 
This optimal control formulation is difficult to solve analytically because 
it has three state and three control variables. Results can be found if 
the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the arrival level distribution 
function is negative exponential, and the knowledge production func-
tion is linear. Under these assumptions, before discovery, the optimal 
pre commitment resource use rate falls over time, as do consumption 
and the capital devoted to R&D. Knowledge grows until a cutoff date 
after which no R&D is performed and there is no further chance of dis-
covery. The R&D cutoff date advances as the discount rate rises. If the 
initial knowledge level is low enough, it may be optimal to never per-
form R&D (Davison, 1978). 
3.3.3.2 A flow input to R&D 
An alternative formulation is that the R&D input is a flow d( t) of pro-
duced goods rather than a capital stock. Decreasing returns to the com-
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pression of R&D effort are captured with a concave knowledge produc-
tion function D( d( t)) (Kamien and Schwartz, 1978; Dasgupta et al., 
1977). 
The revised equations of motion are: 
K(t) = F(K(t),a(t)) - c(t) - d(t) all t~O 
and 
x(t) = D(d(t)) all t~O 
The optimal pre commitment strategy is very different: R&D need not 
begin immediately, R&D will always eventually begin, consumption and 
R&D effort may initially increase before tailing off as discovery fails to 
occur, some R&D will always be continued. The optimal R&D effort 
falls faster when the discount rate is higher, and falls more slowly when 
the assumed instantaneous utility function is more risk averse. 
Simulation experiments indicate that the optimal R&D start date is ex-
tremely sensitive to the productivity of the R&D effort: an immediate 
R&D start jumps to an arbitrarily late R&D start with a small decrease 
in productivity. The productivity level at which this jump occurs is 
lower for lower discount rates and lower when non-renewable stocks 
are plentiful (Pand, 1975 reported in Dasgupta et al., 1977). The impli-
cation is that societies with low discount rates will optimally do early re-
search at low productivities whereas societies with high discount rates 
would optimally wait. Also, societies with plentiful stocks will optimally 
do early research at low productivities whereas societies with few stocks 
would optimally wait. 
3.3.3.3 Comparison 
The eventual termination of R&D of the stock input formulation is not 
found for flows, because the latter does not use a linear knowledge pro-
duction relation which places an upper limit on productivity at low ef-
fort levels. 
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The optimal pre commitment is sensitive to the functional form and par-
ameters used: "Clearly the most appropriate formulation can only be 
determined by empirical research, and at the moment there seems to be 
little work of relevance to this question. Indeed, one of the striking fea-
tures of this area is the lack of empirical information about the appropri-
ate functional forms and distributions." (Dasgupta et ai., 1977, p503). 
The uncertainty about R&D investigated in the theory is of the 'risk' 
type only. It is clear that beyond this there is a "fundamental conceptual 
problem... Many of the most important products of research activities 
have been concepts and techniques that were completely unknown only 
a quarter of a century prior to their discovery ... modelling the rational al-
location of resources to the discovery of ideas and techniques that we 
cannot even conceptualize at present, and of whose potential existence 
we are completely unaware, is obviously a far more challenging prob-
lem. Indeed, it might well prove impossible - though such research, and 
its results, are obviously an important element in social progress." (ibid, 
pS04). 
As above, intertemporal consistency of the pre commitment strategy is 
maintained by the stationary utilitarian objectives used. 
3.4 Prescriptive investigations of resource uncertainty 
The current desirability of use of a non-renewable resource depends on 
its future availability, which is uncertain. Availability depends on how 
much more will be found, when it will be found, and what opportunity 
costs will be incurred if and when the find is extracted. 
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Availability therefore depends on exploration efforts, and efforts in de-
velopment of extraction technology. These are likely to vary with the 
perceived rewards, which are likely to increase as resource use rates and 
stocks fall. In reality, resource use rates both affect and are affected by 
estimated future resource availability. 
Most of the prescriptive literature consists of investigations of the im-
pact of uncertainty on resource use. The reverse impact is covered as 
well in a few investigations incorporating exploration. The uncertain 
availability is approximated by an uncertain discovery size, or extraction 
(opportunity) cost, or discovery date, as Table 3.2 summarizes. 
Table 3.2: Investigations of uncertainty about the resource base 
Uncertain 
item 
future new 
reserves 
current 
reserves 
Uncertain 
attribute 
size of stocks 
extraction cost 
discovery date 
stock size and 
discovery date 
stock size, and 
so exhaustion 
date 
Type of 
uncertainty 
exogenous 
exogenous 
exogenous 
size exogenous, 
date influenced 
size exogenous, 
exhaustion date 
influenced 
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3.4.1 Two deposit approaches 
The simplest way to investigate resource base uncertainty is to assume 
that a non-renewable resource stock Qo is available and an additional 
amount Ql of the same resource will later become available (Heal, 
1979). Either the additional amount or discovery time T is uncertain; op-
timal pre commitment strategies are sought: the objective is to maximize 
the expected value of total discounted societal benefits from consuming 
the resource. This stationary utilitarian form ensures the optimal pre-
commitment is intertemporally consistent for all the two deposit ap-
proaches. 
Uncertain second deposit size 
When the size of the second deposit is uncertain the optimal control for-
mulation is: 
T 
Max J e-rtU(a(t» dt + E G(Ql,QT) 
o 
aCt) Q1 
subject to: 6(t) = -aCt) all O::;t < T 
Q(O) = Qo, QT = Q(T) 
Q, a~O all O::;t<T 
where 00 
subject to: 
Max J e-rtU(b(t» dt 
T 
bet) 
Q(T) = QT+Ql 
6(t) = -bet) all t~T 
b,Q~O all t~T 
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At optimality, if possible given the parameters (Qo, T, and the distribu-
tion on Q1): 
so 
e-rtUI(a(t» = E 
01 
aCt) - rU'(a(t» 
= 
aCt) a(t)U"(a(t» 
for O::;;t::;;T, 
and this is a constant proportional rate of decline if U exhibits constant 
marginal elasticity of resource use. 
After T, a deterministic problem is solved for the optimal use of the dis-
covery plus whatever remains of the initial reserve. These use rates 
maintain constant discounted marginal utility and in the limit exhaust all 
resources. 
Before T, initial use rates also provide constant discounted marginal 
utility. The rates are (if possible) set to equate the discounted marginal 
utility of initial use with the expected discounted marginal utility after 
discovery. When equality is achieved optimal resource use jumps up or 
down at T depending on the size of Q1. The jumps in use rate from A'to 
B, C, or D illustrate this adjustment in Figure 3.4. 
If Qo is too small to equate the initial discounted marginal utility and 
the expected gain, then Qo is exhausted at T, and resource use jumps up-
wards then as at E'. When marginal utility is unbounded it is not opti-
mal to take a chance on running out at T, although the reserves held as 
'insurance' at that date may be very small. 
If it is optimal to exhaust Qo at T then a mean preserving increase in un-
certainty about Q1 may have no effect on the optimal strategy, since Qo 
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may remain 'too small'. If the uncertainty increases so that an empty dis-
covery becomes possible, a slow down in initial resource use is optimal. 
resource 
use rate A 
E 
o L-__________________ ~ ____________________ ~ 
initial 
time 
discovery 
date (T) 
Figure 3.4: Optimal resource use: uncertain second deposit size 
time 
If it is not optimal to exhaust Qo at T then a mean-preserving increase in 
uncertainty about Ql decreases optimal initial use levels, if the expected 
marginal value of extra units for later use" .. .is a convex function (the 
most likely case as it is bounded below)." (Heal, 1979, p132). 
Second deposit revealed at exhaustion of the first 
A different formulation assumes that T is a variable to be chosen. The 
size Ql and extraction 'cost' c of the second deposit are uncertain and 
are revealed when the first deposit is exhausted at T (Hoel, 1978b). 
Costs are a charge on utility. 
The overall objective is now: 
T 
Max f e-rtU(a(t)) dt + 
o 
E G(Ql,C) 
(Ql,C) a(t) 
T 
where 
G(Ql,C) = 
subject to: 
00 
Max ~e-rt (U(b(t)) - c.b(t) ) dt 
b(t) 
Q(t) = -b(t) all t~ T 
Q(T) = Ql 
Q, b~O all t~ T. 
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Two deterministic paths for~ the solution: one for the known reserve, 
and one for whatever additional reserve is discovered. It may be optimal 
not to exhaust the known reserve if the discovery may be empty. 
It is most plausible that G is concave in Ql, so that a mean-preserving in-
crease in uncertainty about Ql reduces the expected value of G(Ql,C), 
and consequently the optimal initial extraction path is lower and T is 
larger. Similarly, if G is convex in c, a mean-preserving increase in un-
certainty about c increases the expected value of G(Ql,C), and conse-
quently the optimal initial extraction path is higher and T is smaller. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3.5. 
resource 
use rate 
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A 
/ 
c 
~---t---i/ 
0L-__________ ~ __________ ~ __________ ~ __ _+ 
initial 
time chosen exhaustion times 
time 
Figure 3.5: Optimal resource use: uncertain second deposit size or cost 
The optimal path tends from A towards B as the uncertainty about the 
'cost' of the discovery increases, and tends from A towards C as the un-
certainty about the discovery size increases. The conclusion parallels 
that for flow discoveries: 
" ... uncertainty with respect to the size of the resource stock may affect 
the extraction path in a way which differs from uncertainty with respect 
to the future extraction cost. [ ... ] Economic models with a fixed and fi-
nite supply of a homogeneous natural resource are sometimes regarded 
as a simplified representation of the more realistic case where the natu-
ral resource is becoming more costly to extract as it is depleted, but it is 
never completely exhausted. [ ... ] when uncertainty is treated the two de-
scriptions of natural resource scarcity have different implications."(ibid, 
p645). 
Uncertain second deposit discovery date 
The framework can be used to investigate the discovery of a known 
amount Q1 of resource at an unknown time T: 
00 
Max J neT) 
° aCt) 
subject to: 
where 
( 
T 
J e-rtU(a(t» dt + e-rTW(QT) 
° 
6(t) = -aCt), all t~O 
Q(O) = Qo, QT = Q(T), 
Q,a;;:::.O, all t~O 
00 
W(QT) = Max J e-r(t-T) U(b(t» dt 
T . 
subject to: 6(t) = -bet) all t~ T 
Q(T) = QT + Q1 
Q, b~O all t~T 
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After T, remaining reserves QT plus Q1 are used so that they are ex-
hausted in the limit and the discounted marginal utility of resource use 
is constant. 
Before T the optimal precommitment use rates at all times satisfy: 
a r n/N (1- W'/U') 
= -+ -----
a m m 
where 
-aU" (a) 
m=---
U'(a) 
the marginal elasticity of utility 
of resource use. 
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Given that n/N is the chance of a discovery in the next instant when no 
discovery has yet been made, at times with no chance of discovery n/N is 
zero, and the discounted marginal utility is constant. 
Otherwise, uncertainty augments the effective discount rate by an 
amount which depends on V, and W'. This augmentation will only be 
constant where the discovery time possibilities follow a negative ex-
ponential distribution, so that n/N is constant, and Ql is so large relative 
to the initial stock that discovery renders any remaining initial stock va-
lueless (W'fU' = 0). 
Optimal consumption monotonically declines whatever the chance of 
discovery. Also, the initial reserve can only be exhausted at a finite time 
along the optimal time-stream if the discovery is certain to have oc-
curred by this time. 
Heal (1979) claims that a mean-preserving increase in uncertainty about 
the discovery date causes the optimal initial resource use to be smaller. 
This result does not hold for at least one mean-preserving increase: 
from certainty to a negative exponential distribution. 
3.4.2 Gradually resolved resource uncertainty 
3.4.2.1 Cake-eating under uncertainty 
One widely investigated model assumes that the current uncertainty 
about the size of the resource stock is resolved at exhaustion, when it is 
discovered that the unit just used was the last unit which will ever be 
available (Cropper, 1976; Kemp, 1976; Loury, 1978; Gilbert, 1979; 
Heal, 1979; Kasanen, 1982). An alternative interpretation is that the ine-
vitable waste disposal associated with production and consumption is 
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using up a finite 'sink' of the environment's assimilative capability. This 
sink will eventually be filled to capacity and economic activity will have 
to cease, but the capacity itself is uncertain (Cropper, 1976). 
Stock sizes and exhaustion dates 
The central optimal control formulation is: 
00 
Max J e-rtU(a(t» P(Q(t» dt 
o 
a(t) 
subject to: 6(t) = a(t) all t;;::O 
Q(O) =0 
a(t);:::O all t;;::O 
where Q is now cumulative consumption and P(Q(t» is the initial 
(prior) probability that the resource stock is at least as big as Q(t). 
The optimum precommitment strategy a(t) is followed until the initial 
stock is exhausted, at which time resource use drops to zero and re-
mains there. Given the probability distribution over possible initial 
stock sizes, every strategy produces a probability distribution over dates 
of exhaustion. 
The usual stationary utilitarian objective is assumed, but it is critical that 
instantaneous utility is bounded below as consumption falls to zero. 
Otherwise, no chance of the resource running out can be taken, and the 
solution involves spreading a known minimum amount of the resource 
(if there is one) over an infinite time, which is a deterministic problem. 
The optimal strategy 
The optimal strategy ensures that at all t the discounted marginal utility 
of resource use equals the expected value of the discounted average 
utility of resource use at T, the end of the program (Loury, 1978). The 
expectation is taken over the probability distribution on T conditioned 
on reaching t. Formally: 
e-rt U'(a(t)) = E [e-rT U(a(T))/a(T) : T~t] 
T 
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At any t a marginal increase in aCt) has the payoff e-rt U'(a(t)). A margi-
nal increase in aCt) advances T, given that the optimal path is followed 
subsequently. Suppose exhaustion would have occurred at time s ~ t . 
Then the reduction in the duration of the program due to a unit in-
crease in aCt) is l/a(s). The associated societal loss is e-rs U(a(s))/a(s) . 
At t the time s is unknown, so the expected discounted utility loss over 
possible values of s is balanced with the payoff. That is, along the opti-
mum time-stream, the marginal gain to increased consumption at each 
time is just balanced by the expected marginal cost due to lost consump-
tion at the end of the life of the resource. 
Equivalently, suppressing the time arguments of a and Q, it is necessary 
that at all times: 
a 
- = 
a 
( [(U(a)/a - U'(a))/U'(a)].a.P(Q) ) - r 
mea) 
where P is the conditional probability density on the reserve running 
out at Q, given that it is at least as big as Q. 
For concave utility functions that are bounded below the term in square 
brackets is always positive, as must be P. The right-hand-side can there-
fore be positive and/or negative at times along the optimal path; uncer-
tainty can reduce the effective discount rate. Optimal resource use may 
rise - especially when P, the probability of running out on the next unit, 
is large - or fall. This is in contrast with the deterministic cake-eating re-
sult that optimal resource use falls monotonically over time. 
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Increasing the discount rate to allow for risk, while dealing with the best 
deterministic approximation to the resource size, cannot reproduce an 
optimum involving increasing consumption, and so does not have 
general theoretical backing. 
Solution sensitivity 
An increase in r makes optimal resource use rates fall faster when they 
are falling and rise more slowly when they are rising. Cumulative use 
along the optimal time-stream always tends in the limit to the largest 
possible resource size (Loury, 1978, p62S). Increasing the discount rate 
therefore shifts the strategy for optimal use from later times to earlier 
times. 
When an uncertain resource base is compared with a resource stock 
equal to its mean, the optimal pre commitment strategy ensures that the 
expected stock on hand in the uncertain case is always as big as for the 
certain case. The optimal initial use rate will be less for the uncertain 
case, but in general use rates for the uncertain case can be larger or 
smaller than for certainty. The eventual drop to zero resource use can 
be avoided with known reserves, so this uncertainty may be said to una-
voidably impose losses on future generations (Cropper, 1976; Loury, 
1978; Gilbert, 1979). 
Results are unclear when two uncertain resource stocks are compared. 
For mean-preserving increases in uncertainty about stock sizes the in-
itial optimal use for the more uncertain case can exceed that of the less 
uncertain case. Heal (1979, p140) wrongly claims that this is a general 
result. Loury demonstrates that it can occur (1978, p629), but refers to it 
as a "perverse effect" occurring under unusual circumstances, presum-
ably because it goes against the usual intuition that more uncertainty 
should lead to more cautious use. 
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3.4.2.2 Alternative objectives 
It is well accepted that: "Custom condones the choice of the sum of dis-
counted expected utilities as maximand. However, custom is based on 
considerations of tractability rather than plausibility ... " (Kemp 1976 
p301). Two other objectives have been examined. The first allows that 
utility may depend on cumulative past consumption as well as current 
consumption: U == U(Q,a). The optimal strategy for resource use then 
may also produce a time-stream of resource use rates which rises and 
falls over time (ibid). 
The second objective is a version of the Rawlsian maxi-min criterion: 
Maximize Min E[U(a(t»] = MAX MIN [U(a(t».P(Q(t»] 
aCt) t s aCt) t 
where 
E is the expectation operator, 
s is the possibility space: 'still going', or 'run out', 
a is planned consumption at t, 
Q is planned cumulative consumption before t, 
P is the probability that the resource runs out at or 
after reaching cumulative consumption Q(t). 
Kemp states: "along the optimal path, 
U(a(t».P(Q(t» = U(Q(t».P(Q(t» = a constant 
implying that consumption is either zero or is growing. [if the stock size 
possibilities are bounded above] ... then optimal consumption is zero. 
Only when there is a positive probability of the cake being of any size, 
however large, is it optimal to consume any of it - and in that case con-
sumption must grow." (ibid, p302). 
This is not correct, since the objective attains the same value for all 
paths which reach zero resource use (with probability one). If no path 
can avoid this then all use paths are alternative optima along with the 
zero use path. The maximin maximand, as formulated by Kemp, has 
little discriminatory power for this problem. 
3.4.2.3 Multiple uncertain deposits 
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Few results have been derived for situations with multiple uncertain de-
posits. The optimal control formulation and solution methods apply, but 
the complexity of the situation means clear analytical results are unavail-
able. Optimal precommitment resource uses can increase and decrease 
over time in the general multiple uncertain deposit case (Kemp, 1977). 
Optimal use of a number of uncertain deposits which must be taken in 
fixed order is a cake-eating problem under uncertainty. The same utility 
bounds are required, and the same generally conservative outcome 
relative to certainty is found (Gilbert, 1979). 
The impact of uncertainty on the optimal pre commitment sequence for 
use of multiple deposits cannot be easily characterized except in some 
special cases (Robson, 1979; Hartwick, 1983). If there are two costless 
deposits, one of known size and one uncertain, the uncertain deposit 
should be used to exhaustion before the known deposit is used at all, ir-
respective of the utility form and the probability distribution covering 
possibilities. This follows from the value of being able to make in-
formed plans when exhaustion of the uncertain deposit occurs. When 
both deposits are of uncertain size it is the exception for it to be optimal 
to completely exhaust one deposit before the other, and no simple char-
acterization of the depletion policy is available. 
Throughout the cake-eating investigations, intertemporal consistency of 
the pre commitment strategy is ensured by the stationary utilitarian ob-
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jective in all cases but one, and that maximin objective has no discrimi-
natory power for the cake-eating situation. 
3.4.3 Exploration 
In reality, resource base uncertainties are resolved gradually and de-
liberately by exploration, which cannot be discussed in pure cake-eating 
models. 
3.4.3.1 Extraction in advance of need 
If extracted resource can be stored then a type of 'exploration' can be in-
troduced to the cake-eating problem: uncertainty is resolved when no 
further extraction is possible, just after cumulative extraction reaches 
one of a finite number of possible sizes. Exploration involves extracting 
resources in advance of need, to determine whether exhaustion is about 
to occur (Gilbert, 1979). 
The exploration 'costs', a charge on utility, consist of the interest cost of 
extracting resources before they are used, plus a storage cost. Explora-
tion benefits result from having some stock in storage when extraction 
becomes impossible, so that utility levels can be maintained to some ex-
tent after the resource is exhausted. 
The optimal pre commitment utilitarian strategy always involves 'explor-
ation' if the storage cost is zero, or if the marginal utility of resource use 
is unbounded. Other storage cost and marginal utility combinations can 
also make exploration worthwhile. An increase in the cost of extraction 
or storage delays the time at which exploration will start. 
3.4.3.2 Exploration with unlimited territory 
Exploration can be treated as an activity which transforms unexplored 
territory into reserves of a non-renewable resource. 
Assumptions 
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Two exploration uncertainties have been investigated: an uncertain 
time until a discovery is made, and discoveries of uncertain size. Prob-
ability distributions over timing and size, conditional on the exploratory 
effort, are exogenously given. In one investigation the distributions are 
independent of unexplored territories, so the resource base is implicitly 
inexhaustible. Exploration costs are a charge on utility. 
The formulation assumes that discoveries form a Markov process, and 
shows that the reserves level Q(t) does also, for exploration and use 
policies which are stationary functions of the reserve level: x( Q( t» and 
a(Q(t». Markovian decision theory then allows the optimal policies to 
be identified. 
Letting h be the exploration cost function, Y be the set of policies 
(x(Q),a(Q», and Ey be the expectation given the Markov process in-
duced byye Y, the objective is: 
00 
Max Vy(Qo) = Ey [f e-rt [U(a(Q(t» - h(x(Q(t»] dt] 
° 
yeY 
subject to: Q(O) = Qo, 
Q, a, x~O all t~O 
Also, 
dQ = -a dt + B(x( Q),' ), all t ~ O. 
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where B is the (stochastic) discovery rate for finds of various sizes when 
exploring at level x. Dynamic programming arguments establish that the 
optimal policyy* is associated with an optimal value function V(Q). 
The nature of an optimal strategy 
The optimal pre commitment strategy here is open-ended: in the 'typi-
cal' case exploration will be building up reserves through an occasional 
discovery, and consumption will be using up reserves through extrac-
tion, at all times. 
The optimal extraction rate is a non-decreasing stationary function of 
the reserve level, and the optimal exploration rate is a non-increasing 
stationary function of the reserve level (Deshmukh and Pliska, 1980, 
1983). 
The extraction, exploration, and reserve level paths which might result 
are illustrated in Figure 3.6. 
A small discovery is made at A, a larger one at C, and a still larger one 
at B: the discovery is added to proven reserves, and this extra security 
allows the consumption rate to be increased and the exploration rate to 
decrease, with the big discovery at B allowing a temporary cessation of 
exploration. Between discovery times consumption steadily lowers 
proven reserves, which leads to a steady increase in the exploration rate, 
and a steady decrease in the consumption rate. 
The outcomes attainable depend greatly on the utility, exploration cost, 
and probability measure forms. The optimal strategy might involve ex-
traction rising to an upper limit and remaining there, or falling to zero 
and remaining there (U'(O) may be finite). More specific results on the 
shape of the optimal policy require more assumptions on the underlying 
functional forms. 
proven 
resource 
level 
resource use/ 
consumption 
rate 
exploration 
rate 
o 
o 
o 
initial 
time 
A B c time 
Figure 3.6: Optimal paths with stationary uncertain exploration 
Economic interpretation 
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At optimality U'(a(Q(t») = V'(Q), i.e. the marginal utility of resource 
use is equal to the shadow rent on proven reserves, that is the increase 
in the expected discounted return given another unit of reserves. Also, 
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the marginal exploration cost is equal to the marginal expected increase 
in the discounted return from using discovered reserves. 
With strictly concave utility and strictly convex exploration costs, the ex-
pected marginal value of proven reserves, and hence the marginal utility 
of extraction/consumption, is expected to rise exponentially at the dis-
count rate whenever reserves are positive: 
lim 
t~o 
Ey* [VI(Q(t)) IQ(O) = Qo ) - V, (Qo) 
t 
= rV' (Qo) 
This expected increase is " ... a sort of local phenomenon, but does not 
necessarily imply that the [actual expected marginal value of proven 
reserves] will grow indefinitely (in any probabilistic sense) as time goes 
on."(ibid, p 193). The expected marginal value of proven reserves is re-
normalized by a downwards jump every time a discovery is made. 
3.4.3.3 Exploration with limited territory 
Two state variables are required to investigate the exploration of a 
limited territory: the level of proven reserves and the level of unex-
plored territory. Learning is limited to establishing how many deposits 
(each of known size) are present in each piece of territory. 
Three other assumptions are critical: no upper bound is placed on the 
level of exploration effort; exploration costs and the discovery rate are 
proportional to the exploration effort. Exploration 'costs' are a charge 
on utility, and a stationary utilitarian objective is adopted (Arrow and 
Chang, 1982). 
The policies yare now stationary functions in two state variables 
(a(Q,L), x(Q,L»; where L is the remaining unexplored territory, and 
the objective is: 
find 
V(Qo,Lo) = maxEy 
yeY 
00 
J e-rt (U(a(t» - h.x(t» dt 
° 
so that by dynamic programming arguments, at optimality (given suit-
able differentiability): 
r.V(Q,L) = max [ U(a)- h.x- Vo (Qo,L).a- VL(Q,Lo).x+pxdV] 
yeY 
where 
dV = V(Q + 1,L) - V(Q,L) 
and p is the discovery rate parameter. 
Interpreting the optimal exploration strategy 
84 
The optimal exploration rate is at each time either zero or infinite. One 
interpretation of 'infinite' exploration is internally consistent. At any 
time an 'exploration event' may be undertaken. With each such event 
one deposit will certainly be found if one or more remains in the re-
maining unexplored territory. Exploration is undertaken only to the ex-
tent required for one deposit to be found, so the reduction in 
unexplored territory due to an exploration event is a random variable 
with outcome equal to the amount of territory which must be explored 
to find one deposit. The remaining unexplored territory drops in a jump 
at each exploration time. 
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However, a property of events governed by the Poisson distribution 
(that the number of events occurring in a very small time interval is 
either zero or one) is frequently used in this analysis. This property is in-
consistent with an 'infinite' exploration rate. The analysis must be 
" .. .largely heuristic ... " (ibid, p2). 
The optimal strategy: suggested nature 
Given the above rider, the optimal extraction rate is positive whenever 
proven reserves are positive, decreases over time between exploration 
events, and jumps up with each increase in reserves. Figure 3.7 illus-
trates this. 
proven 
reserve 
level 
(tonnes) 
region 1: no exploration 
initial state 
region1 ---
region 2 
region 2: exploration invoked 
o ~-----------------------------------------
unexplored teritory (area) 
Figure 3.7: State transitions with optimal exploration 
In Region 1 of the state space no exploration is undertaken and extrac-
tion reduces reserves over time. Eventually the state enters Region 2, 
exploration is invoked, the reserve level jumps up and in unexplored ter-
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ritory jumps downwards. This jump returns the state to the no-explora-
tion region where the optimal strategy provides a new extraction level. 
There is no passage of time in any state transition with a horizontal ele-
ment in Figure 3.7. The reserve threshold for exploration increases as 
unexplored territory decreases, so the boundary between the regions 
slopes downward. 
Economic interpretation 
The expected marginal value of proven reserves (EMVPR) increases 
exponentially over time at the discount rate while the state is in Region 
1. The EMVPR jumps downwards with each exploration: "The [overall 
shift in the EMVPR] will show fluctuations with little upward trend 
when [the amount of unexplored territory] is large; presumably the up-
ward trend is stronger as [the amount of unexplored territory] ap-
proaches zero." (Arrow and Chang, 1982, plO). 
An extension 
The exploration policy might require more than one exploration event 
to return the state variables to Region 2. Also, the EMVPR and the ex-
pected marginal value of unexplored territory are both expected to fall 
at the time of each exploration event. Exploration can be sufficiently 
unlucky, through having to explore a large amount of territory, to lead 
to an upwards jump in the EMVPR. The last exploration event, which 
exhausts the unexplored territory, certainly causes an upwards jump in 
the EMVPR, because the reserve level is not increased but the hope of 
finding more reserves is eliminated (Lasserre, 1984). 
Throughout the investigation of exploration intertemporal consistency 
of the pre commitment strategies is ensured by use of stationary utilita-
rian objectives. 
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3.5 Numerical investigations 
Some investigations which seek to inform decision-makers about princi-
ples for use in non-renewable resource decisions are on the boundary 
between theoretical and applied modelling. Most of this work centres 
on energy supplies. Here numerical solutions are obtained by mathe-
matical programming methods. 
3.5.1 Sectoral optimization models 
Sectoral models employ the partial equilibrium assumption and op-
timize resource activities, subject to constraints on resource availability 
and so as to meet demand for end-use products. Demand levels or cur-
ves are exogenously given, and the respective objectives are to minimize 
total discounted costs or maximize total discounted consumer plus pro-
ducer surplus. By comparison with the approaches of sections 3.2 these 
models ignore resource ownership, but consider more technological de-
tail. Resource scarcity enters through constraints, and uncertainty is 
generally explored with scenarios. 
Issues in uranium use for electricity generation are explored with a li-
near programming model (ALPS) of nuclear activities in the United 
States extending into the next century (Manne et ai., 1979). For many 
scenarios covering exogenous electricity demands, and costs for capital, 
fuel, and operations, the minimum-cost nuclear activities are deter-
mined. The long time horizon, and the representation of uranium availa-
bility, cover depletion effects to an extent. 
A broader, linear programming approach is taken in the dynamic energy 
sector model DESOM (Hoffman and Jorgenson, 1977). Energy resour-
ces, technology and end-use demands are covered with scenarios, and 
the minimum cost of operating the whole energy sector, so as to meet 
these demands, is sought. Resource availability constraints introduce de-
88 
pletion effects. A similar approach, widened to cover country-to-country 
variation and hence trade, is employed in empirical investigation of the 
world energy situation (Nordhaus, 1973). 
Price elastic demand assumptions are employed in a largely linear inter-
temporal energy sector model (ETA), constructed to examine long-
term technological change (Manne, 1976). The non-linear objective can 
be interpreted as the discounted sum of consumer plus producer sur-
plus, and is maximized subject to technological and resource con-
straints, which introduce depletion effects. 
An efficient solution algorithm for price sensitive depletion models has 
been developed (Modiano and Shapiro, 1980). A resource-directed de-
composition scheme allocates the non-renewable resource across time 
periods, solves a 'value of supply' problem in each time period to derive 
the marginal value of the resource, reallocates the resource, and so on 
in a convergent sequence to the optimal resource use. The approach is 
applied to the U.S. coal sector, and employs an interesting resource de-
scription. 
This is a set of long-run supply curves for coals of various types and loca-
tions, which constitutes an economic resource endowment measure 
(Zimmerman, 1977). Geological data and the input requirements for 
mines are combined to form extracted-cost/quantity relationships. 
These are sorted to produce approximate long-run supply curves. Econ-
omic endowment measures have been called for in discussions of re-
quired theoretical advances (Smith, 1980; Harris and Skinner, 1982; 
Bohi and Toman, 1984). 
The price-sensitive depletion model has been extended to the uncertain-
substitute-arrival context. The exhaustion of low-cost uranium while 
"Waiting for the Breeder" is investigated with a probabilistic linear pro-
gram (Manne, 1974). This is structured like a decision-tree; at several 
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dates in the future the reactor may arrive, or not, with 'known' prob-
ability. The surplus maximizing outcomes have low sensitivity to uncer-
tainty for the range of probabilities and discount rates examined. The 
expected value of perfect information is low for this situation (Chao, 
1981). 
3.5.2 National models 
The ETA model can be linked to a macroeconomic production function 
which represents the rest of the economy, to form ETA-MACRO. In 
this approximate general equilibrium model, rising energy costs and 
dwindling resource availability affect the growth rate and hence the en-
ergy demand curve (Hudson and Jorgensen, 1974). A further extension 
embeds ETA-MACRO in a decision-tree framework covering breeder-
reactor program uncertainties. Depletion effects are captured to some 
extent by the cumulative resource cost functions and long horizon. 
A different approach to forming a national depletion model is to add a 
non-renewable resource characterization to a macro-econometric 
model (Motamen, 1983). This investigation of the depletion of U.K. 
North Sea oil reserves takes an optimal control approach: the extraction 
rate and domestic and foreign investment rates are chosen so as to 
maximize 'national wealth'. The optimal control settings are numeri-
cally approximated for each deterministic scenario as to world oil prices 
and other parameters. The optimal depletion rate is sensitive to world 
oil prices. 
3.5.3 Discussion 
The modelling exercises above apply existing theories to more realistic 
situations. Discounted utilitarian objectives, usually based on consumer 
surplus, are used. Risk-neutral attitudes to uncertainty are adopted. The 
solution is always a pre commitment plan or strategy. 
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The exercises do not widen the theoretical base for principles guiding 
non-renewable resource use. The exercises have a mostly umealized 
potential to test the relevance and sensitivity of existing theory to more 
realistic assumptions. The exercises also suggest that numerical explora-
tion of theoretical issues is feasible: objectives and attitudes to risk 
which are otherwise analytically intractable could be numerically ex-
plored. 
3.6 Conclusions 
Theoretical investigations of many kinds contribute to the development 
of principles which guide decisions about non-renewable resource acti-
vities. This chapter has reviewed the theoretical economic investigations 
which are directly concerned with these principles for uncertain con-
texts. Many shortcomings of these investigations are discussed above, 
and more general limitations of the economic approach to uncertainty 
are discussed in Chapter Two. An overview of the shortcomings, and an 
elaboration on some of them, is now presented, emphasizing those with 
particular importance for non-renewable resource use. The chief limita-
tions are that: 
• extreme simplifications of institutional structures and 
technology are employed, 
• a narrow range of ethical positions and objectives are 
examined, 
• pre commitment strategies are always derived, so the position 
in time of decision-making is poorly represented. 
Non-renewable resource actions are in reality strongly influenced by the 
prevailing institutional structure, comprising the system of property 
rights, the market power of the participants, and the general policy envi-
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ronment including the taxation structure. Institutional structures are 
either extremely simplified, or ignored entirely, in the resource investi-
gations. The descriptive analysis generally assumes competitive re-
source ownership and demand, with the exception being the treatment 
of strategic behaviour in substitute development. The prescriptive inves-
tigations are sometimes presented as problems for a societal planner or 
a command economy, but only physical attributes of the resource are 
modelled. 
Some aspects of the neglect of the institutional structure are more im-
portant for non-renewable resources than for other issues. Institutions 
which help shape beliefs about the future resource situation are among 
these aspects. Central and decentralized ways of providing individuals 
with good information about resource possibilities, substitute possi-
bilities, and demand possibilities are important, but are outside the in-
vestigations. The impact on resource use of expectations and of 
contingent markets has been discussed. Whether and how these influen-
ces are to be improved or impeded has not been discussed. Most of the 
descriptive investigations' conclusions are called into question because 
they rely on the presence of institutions which are not available. 
The description of the resource base and the technologies for resource 
extraction, conversion, and use are extreme simplifications. For 
example, resource use inevitably results in waste creation, which may be 
costly or detract significantly from welfare, but which is ignored in the 
investigations. The sensitivity of the conclusions, to these simplifica-
tions, is unknown. The partial equilibrium assumption assumes a limited 
dependence between the resource sector and other activities. There is 
no allowance that resource activities may affect income and shift re-
source demand curves in 'positive' models. In prescriptive models the 
resource sector is totally independent, which seems untenable. The con-
clusions may therefore not extend to situations with realistic depend-
encies between activities. Similarly, interdependencies between 
environmental influences and human activities may be important, but 
are ignored. 
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The resource investigations employ or are consistent with a narrow 
range of ethical positions/objectives. The 'positive' investigations focus 
on ex-ante efficiency. As Chapter Two discusses, ex-post efficiency may 
be an equally compelling societal objective. Its achievement, or other-
wise, when there are non-renewable resources and uncertainty, is un-
known. 
Two prescriptive investigations consider Rawlsian maximin objectives. 
Expected discounted utilitarian objectives are otherwise used, and the 
rationale for discounting is rarely stated. It can be justified on grounds 
that other sectors are providing increased consumption, or that there is 
a chance of 'Armageddon'. These grounds are quite different from dis-
counting as an ethical position, and deserve exposure. 
The dynamic, uncertain context of the non-renewable resource use issue 
severely tests the economic approaches. The 'positive' approaches large-
ly side-step the issue by examining only ex-ante criteria. It seems likely 
that much of the following discussion would be pertinent to 'positive' 
examinations of ex-post objectives. 
The prescriptive investigations are not clear about the decision-maker's 
position in time. Optimal plans or strategies cover all time periods, but 
are optimal with respect to one objective only. This objective covers all 
time periods, so must be interpreted as the objective of the initial time 
periods' decision-maker. 
The choices of later decision-makers are not explicitly incorporated via 
their objectives, or via constraints on the later possibilities. The optimal 
strategies produced as solutions must therefore be optimal pre com-
mitment strategies; i.e. strategies which are optimal conditional on their 
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being followed in later periods, although derived in the first. Such a 
strategy must either be able to be imposed on later decision-makers, or 
be a strategy all later decision-makers would voluntarily adopt, to make 
sense as a solution. 
If neither property holds, the strategy is inconsistent as an optimum set 
of actions: initial actions are optimal conditional on the later 'optimal' 
actions, but these are not expected to be followed, so the initial actions 
cannot be optimal. That is, the strategy only appears optimal to the in-
itial decision-maker because of the systematic mistake of thinking that 
later actions in the strategy will be followed. This wishful thinking is not 
compatible with a rational approach to identifying appropriate actions. 
There appears to be no way of forcing later decision-makers to adopt 
set actions, so a pre commitment strategy is only justifiable if it is (be-
lieved to be) adopted voluntarily by all later decision-makers. This effec-
tively assumes that the different decision-makers' orderings, of 
continuations of the program of actions, are the same. Equivalently, de-
cision-makers objectives can differ only in ways which do not lead to a 
difference in choice. 
This 'same ordering' assumption is very strong given the long times in-
volved in non-renewable resource investigations, and casual observation 
of changing real objectives. The assumption underpins the 'expected in-
tegral of discounted utilities' objective used throughout the investiga-
tions. It appears this objective is used largely because it can be 
interpreted as fulfilling the 'same ordering' assumption: a precommit-
ment strategy which is optimal for this objective is optimal without wish-
ful thinking, for one imaginable sequence of decision-makers. The 
sensitivity of the conclusions to a change in this sequence has not been 
investigated to date. 
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The reliance on the utilitarian objective is reinforced by limiting the 
concept of a solution: pre commitment strategies are derived in all inves-
tigations of non-renewable resources and uncertainty to date. These 
strategies are found with the analytically tractable techniques of stochas-
tic dynamic programming and stochastic control, which admit only one 
objective. 
However, analytical convenience is not a justifiable reason for restrict-
ing investigations to pre commitment strategies when this restricts the 
sets of objectives which can be examined. There is a need for analytical 
procedures which derive consistent (no wishful thinking) sets of optimal 
actions for arbitrary sets of objectives (differing orders). 
The concentration on pre commitment strategies and their associated 
analytical techniques may 'explain' other restrictions in the range of in-
vestigations performed. Only one investigation applies a non-technologi-
cal constraint in derivation of an optimum solution (Riley, 1980), 
although society might be expected to rule out many actions as being 
unethical a priori. Only one investigation employs an unobservable state 
variable (Battacharya, 1984), although in general the state is a 'state of 
belief, best represented by a probability distribution or stochastic pro-
cess. 
Pre commitment strategies may also obscure the fundamental purpose 
of the investigation: to generate insight or principles which guide ac-
tions, which are always taken in the here-and-now. The relationship be-
tween current beliefs (about the future and 'the good') and appropriate 
current actions is not the clear focus of a pre commitment strategy, be-
cause this consists of an optimal action for each future circumstance. In 
Chapter Four recursive decision programs which avoid the consistency 
issue, allow investigation of arbitrary sequences of objectives, and focus 
on initial actions, are developed. 
95 
Chapter Four 
Recursive Decision Models 
The chapters above show that existing economic approaches for investi-
gating non-renewable resource use have serious limitations. The dy-
namic, uncertain nature of the issue is poorly dealt with. The position in 
time of the decision-maker is not well understood. 
These limitations will persist while pre commitment strategies are em-
ployed as solutions. These overstate the initial decision-maker's power 
to determine the course of events. The overstatement seems likely to be 
most seriously misleading where actions have traceable long term conse-
quences so the eventual sequence of decision-makers is likely to have va-
rying concerns. 
Non-renewable resource use is a case in point; the impact of future 
changes in concerns, on current 'best' resource use, cannot be explored 
with existing approaches. The concentration on pre commitment 
strategies limits the investigations in other ways as well. Many possible 
attitudes towards future wellbeing cannot be explored with precommit-
ment approaches, because the associated 'solutions' are intertemporally 
inconsistent and therefore have little meaning. Attitudes towards risks 
of various sorts, at various times, are particularly circumscribed by the 
pre commitment approach. 
In this chapter a recursive decision approach is developed, so as to 
widen the investigation of non-renewable resource use. The deeper un-
derstanding of resource use issues that this approach potentially offers 
may enable decisions influencing resource use to be made in a more in-
formed way. 
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The approach developed here extends the decision-theoretic model of 
choice. The 'solution' sought is a set of actions consistent with the 
choices of a sequence of decision-makers. This requires that each decisi-
on-maker fixes their commitment actions only. 
Later decisions about action, whether undertaken by a later version of 
the initial decision-maker, or by later different decision-makers, are 
among the consequences of initial choice, and must be forecast not pre-
determined. The forecast of later actions needs to take account of how 
later decisions might be made by later decision-makers. This in turn re-
quires a forecast of later decision-makers' forecast and preferences. 
The structure of the recursive decision model is first developed heuristi-
cally as an extension of a decision-theoretic model, so as to emphasize 
where the structures differ. A more rigorous discrete formulation of the 
recursive structure is then developed, so that the following discussion 
can be more precise. The existence of 'solutions' for the discrete model 
and for feasible extensions, and the assumptions implicit in the structure 
are then dealt with in turn. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the advantages and disadvantages of the recursive decision approach. 
4.1 Heuristic development 
This section heuristically introduces the key features of a recursive deci-
sion model. If these features are not explicitly present, in a prescriptive 
investigation of a dynamic }lncertain situation, then the implications of 
the investigation are either mistaken or are based on implicit assump-
tions. The well-known decision-tree model is gradually modified until 
all the features are present. 
4.1.1 Decision trees 
In an evolutionary system, actions occur at different times and 
uncertainties about what will occur are gradually resolved. Let there be 
a set T = {1,2,3 ... } of time periods t: at the beginning of each time t an 
action at is selected from a finite set At. For the moment At is inde-
pendent of the history of the system. 
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Some uncertainty is resolved instantaneously immediately after the deci-
sion, when St, one of a finite set St of possible uncertain events, is ob-
served to occur. St is for now independent of the system history. 
The possible futures form a decision tree structure as in Figure 4.1, 
which takes Ai = {A,B}, A2= {C,D,E}, Sl = {1,2}, S2= {3,4}. The hori-
zontallines depict the passage of real time, while the 'branching out', 
representing actions and events, occurs 'instantaneously' at the start of 
each period. Each possible future is one path through the tree, that is, a 
sequence of actions and events of form { ai,S 1,a2,s2, ... }. There are 24 
possible futures for the two-period time span covered in Figure 4.1, be-
tween {A,1,C,3, ... } at the top and {B,2,E,4, ... } at the bottom. The letters 
and numbers on the branches of the tree are labels, not measurements 
of any underlying property. 
During each time period a state of affairs qt, from the possible set Qt, 
prevails. Each qt is uniquely determined by the preceding actions and 
events. The set of possible futures is the set of sequences of actions and 
outcomes which can be formed. 
When At and St are independent of the history then Ht, the set of his-
tories ht which might be observed by the end of time t, is defined as: 
Ht == 
[ < ai, Si> i ~ 1,2,3.,,( all ~: 1,2,3 ... t ] 
alll-1,2,3 ... t 
By definition, qt = ft(ht). 
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Figure 4.1: A tree of possible futures 
x 
y 
98 
3 
3 • 
4-. 
4-. 
4 
3-. 
3--e 
4 
action 1 event 1 
1_ t=2 
99 
The actions are the subject of inquiry and are chosen. Known (subjec-
tive) probabilities govern the possible events. The probabilities pt(St) of 
the possible events at each time sum to one: 
L Pt(St) = 1, all te T. 
SteSt 
No probabilities are specified in the figures in this section, but they are 
assumed to be available for each uncertainty resolution illustrated. 
A strategy is a set of actions, one for each decision node in the tree. 
Therefore, a strategy contains an action for each possible history of the 
system, up to each time. The explicit tree structure helps the decision-
maker identify the preferred strategy - the one with the preferred ac-
tions, events and outcomes. 
All actions are chosen by the one decision-maker. Usually, the assumed 
measure of success enables this to be done by backwards recursion, in 
accordance with the "Principle of Optimality" or "Maximum Principle" 
which underpins the analytical methods of dynamic programming (Bell-
man, 1957) and optimal control theory (Pontryagin et at., 1962). This 
states that in any optimal strategy, regardless of how a history comes 
about, the decisions from then on must be made optimally. 
In backwards recursion a terminal time r is set first, perhaps because 
nothing after this time matters to the decision-maker. The preferred ac-
tion at time r-1 is found then for every history hTf-leHTf-l. If in Figure 
4.1 r is set to two, the first decisions addressed are at w,x,y and z. 
These decisions take into account only one remaining resolution as to 
events. Each history'S optimal actions at r-1, and value of the program 
after that date, are then regarded as fixed. 
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The procedure then examines the decisions at T-2, on the basis of the 
T-2 variables and the T-1 fixed values. As the procedure continues 
backwards through time, each examination deals with only one resolu-
tion of uncertainty. When the optimal action for the initial decision in 
the tree is found, the complete optimal strategy is available. Under the 
optimal strategy, most of the branches in the tree are no longer possi-
bilities. 
The assumption that At and St are independent of ht-l is generally un-
tenable, and the backwards recursion solution method is not limited to 
this case. Redefining, let At(ht-l) be the set of possible actions given a 
history ht-leHt-l (to be redefined accordingly below). 
The set Jt of paths jt preceding a resolution at time tis: 
Jt = [jt = < ht-l, at> I ht-leHt-l, ateAt(ht-l)], all te T 
The resolution's dependence on jt is captured by defining the possible 
events to be members of the finite set StUt). The conditional probability 
of an event St, given a history jt is defined to be pReSt, jt), so that, 
2, pRe St, jt) = 1, all jte1t, all te T. 
SteStUt) 
In Figure 4.1, for example, Hl = {(A,1),(A,2),(B,1),(B,2)} and 12 = {(A,-
1,C),(A,1,D),(A,1,E),(A,2,C), ... (B,2,E)}, A2(A,2) = {C,D,E} and 
Sl«B» = {1,2}. 
Redefining Ht to account for dependence, let B = { 1,2,3 ... t }: 
all ieB; 
all ieB}. 
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In approximating 'reality', the decision tree has each resolution of uncer-
tainty occurring instantaneously immediately after a decision. If in re-
ality the resolution (and the decision) occurs gradually throughout the 
time period, an equally valid approximation model places the whole res-
olution immediately before the decision at the start of the period. 
The former structure is 'under-anticipative', or pessimistic since at the 
decision time none of the 'period's-worth' of uncertainty resolution is 
known. The latter is 'over-anticipative', or optimistic since at the deci-
sion time the whole 'period's-worth' of uncertainty resolution is known. 
With long time periods the strategies derived from either structure may 
be sub-optimal. The problem disappears with continuous time tech-
niques, such as stochastic control and some forms of stochastic dynamic 
programming. 
4.1.2 Rolling planning 
In a rolling planning scheme an optimal plan or strategy covering sev-
eral time periods is derived, perhaps with a decision tree, but only the 
first period's optimal action is implemented. Next period, a whole new 
decision tree and optimal strategy are derived and the first period's ac-
tion is implemented. Each new decision tree takes account of new be-
liefs, gathered in the course of the period just passed. 
Any decision-tree must be intended to help some particular decision-
maker. Humans exist in time; they cannot adopt the view available to an 
hypothetical 'extratemporal' observer. A decision-tree therefore applies 
at a point in time, and only influences decisions not yet made, so the 
structure is constructed by or on behalf of the entity charged with mak-
ing the first decision, for the primary purpose of helping with that deci-
sion. 
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Logically, only the initial (present) actions can presently be undertaken, 
so only initial decisions cari presently be implemented. Future decisions 
captured in present optimal plans or strategies are reconsidered in new 
trees when these decisions have, in their turn, become the initial deci-
sion. The present optimal strategy may provide a starting place in this 
later examination. 
The extent to which each new tree differs from the last depends on how 
well understood the processes of change are. The new tree may be es-
sentially a reaffirmation of a previous sub-tree, or it may be radically dif-
ferent. New trees cannot always be 'completely different', if they do in 
fact amount to worthwhile forecasts. To the extent that human beliefs 
capture reality, the tree informs the initial decision-maker. 
4.1.3 Choice versus forecast 
The actions which can be implemented by the initial decision-maker are 
termed commitments, to distinguish them from later actions termed re-
course. In disagreement with the decision-tree view, since recourse can-
not be presently implemented, recourse must be forecast, and not 
chosen, by the initial decision-maker. 
This position is the only one consistent with locating the whole decision-
tree at a point in time as an analytical tool of the decision-maker at that 
time. If recourse actions do not need to be forecast this can only be be-
cause they can be committed-to at the initial time, in which case they 
are not in the recourse set: the idea of recourse which does not need to 
be forecast is internally inconsistent. 
Depending on the time interval involved, the decisions about recourse 
might be expected to be made by a later version of the initial decision-
maker, or made by someone else. If the initial decision-maker expects 
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to remain the decision-maker the best forecast of the recourse choice 
may well centre on the initial decision-maker's current choice. The best 
forecast might then be to 'choose as the initial decision-maker would', 
so that the decision-tree structure is recovered. 
In general, there is uncertainty about which choice procedure Vt from a 
possible set Vt will be applied at time t. This is captured by augmenting 
the uncertainties in the tree structure as shown in Figure 4.2. Here it is 
initially thought that choice procedure G1 or G2 will be applied in the 
second period. 
Maintaining the under-anticipative formulation, the uncertainty about 
Vt + 1 is resolved instantaneously at the end of period t, just before at + 1 
is decided on. In Figure 4.2 uncertainty about recourse is independent 
of the history, but this is generally untenable. 
The new augmented structure is a recursive decision model. Redefine 
the set Ht of histories ht which are a priori observable before the end of 
time t: 
Ht = ht = < ai,si,vi+ 1 >iEB la1EA1; 
si E SiC a1,sl,v2,a2,s2, ... ai) all iEB; 
ViE Vi(a1,sl,v2,a2,s2, ... Si-1) all iEB, i¢ 1; 
aiEAi(a1,sl,v2,a2,s2, ... Vi) all iEB, i¢ 1; 
where Vt(kt-1) is the set of choice procedures which might be adopted 
at t given history kt-1 = (ht-2, at-1, st-1), drawn from the possible set Kt-1. 
1 
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Figure 4.2: Forecasting later choice procedures 
The probability ofvt, conditional on kt-l, is pW(Vt,kt_l), so that 
2: pW(Vt, kt-l) = 1, all kt-leKt-l, all t = (2,3,4, .. ). 
Vte Vt(kt-l) 
In Figure 4.2, for example, Kl = {(A,1),(A,2),(B,1),(B,2)} and 
V2(B,1) = {Gl,G2}. 
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It may be necessary to augment the tree structure to cover actions, 
events and outcomes which are important in recourse decisions, al-
though not directly important to the initial decision-maker. Such hap-
penings may affect later actions and so indirectly become important to 
the initial decision-maker. 
Further, the tree may need to be augmented to reflect initial beliefs 
about later beliefs. By assumption here, the tree represents the knowl-
edge of a fully 'rational' decision-maker, which is taken to mean that the 
subjective probabilities placed on all future occurrences conform to 
Bayesian standards. 
If the initial decision-maker believes later persons are similarly rational, 
then no augmentation to cover future beliefs is necessary, because it 
must be believed that future beliefs will amount to one or another sub-
tree of present beliefs. Augmentation is necessary if it is believed that 
future persons may be 'irrational', or that their arbitrary judgements 
about irreducible uncertainties may differ from present arbitrary judge-
ments. 
Thinning 
If all forecast later choice procedures are sufficiently well-defined and a 
terminal time r is specified, the information now in the tree eliminates 
all decisions except the first. By backward recursion from r, for each 
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history ht, the associated Vt + 1 (and not initial preferences) selects an ac-
tion at + 1, on the basis of the probabilistic tree of consequences. 
In Figure 4.2 illustrative selected actions for each hi are starred. The re-
sulting 'thinned' tree in Figure 4.3 demonstrates that each initial choice 
leads to a sub-tree branching only on uncertain events. Each sub-tree is 
the initial decision-maker's full forecast of future actions and events, 
conditional on an initial action. Only the initial decision is still to be con-
sidered. 
4.1.4 Choice procedures 
A rational decision-maker determines which action to take on the basis 
of some or all of the information in a thinned tree, by applying a choice 
procedure to this information. 
The procedure works by elimination of all but one of the possible ac-
tions. Elimination may take several stages, but must eventually identify 
a single 'best' action. Consequentialist choice procedures identify ap-
propriate actions on the basis of any aspect of the envisaged tree exclud-
ing the initial actions themselves; these procedures are concerned with 
what is brought-about by action, and commonly concentrate on the 
possible states of affairs as measured by qt. However, the initial actions 
themselves are within the tree, and may be arguments in choice proce-
dures. 
Elimination of actions takes place in two ways. An action may be re-
jected because it does not meet a standard the decision-maker believes 
in. Standards may be absolute, as when certain types of action are 
judged to be wrong in themselves, or relative, as when an action does 
not fall in (say) the top half of the set on a measure of performance. Al-
ternatively, the optimization of a measure of performance eliminates all 
actions except the optimizing action. 
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Because one action must be adopted, the choice procedure must in-
clude a back-tracking routine to identify an appropriate action when no 
action can meet an absolute standard. The procedure must also be de-
cisive, and select one action. A final arbitrary selection, from a set of ap-
propriate actions, may be treated by replicating the following tree once 
for each appropriate action, and adding a uniform distribution on corre-
sponding 'dummy' choice procedures to the preceding choice procedure 
possibilities. 
As outlined in Chapter Two, the choice procedure usually employed in 
economic theorizing is to maximize the subjective expected utility 
(SEU) of consequences. When the consequences are further tree struc-
tures of uncertainty resolution, the utility measure is generally applied 
to paths within the tree rather than to sub-trees. A utility indicator 
U( ql,q2,q3, ... ) is adopted, a terminal time Z is specified, and the set Hz 
of paths hz in the thinned tree is identified. Denote by Hz( al) the sub-
set of Hz containing alEA1. The probability pHz ofh'ZEHz(a1), which 
is only defined if al is chosen, is the product of the probabilities of the 
resolutions in h'z: 
pHZ(h'Z) = 
where if 
h'z = (al,s'1,V'2,a'2,S'2, ... v'z,a'Z,s'Z,v'Z+ 1) 
then 
k't = (al,s'1,V'2,a'2,S'2, ... v't,a't,s't) 
and 
j't = (a1,s'1,V'2,a'2,s'2, ... V't,a't). 
Also, the sequence of consequences occurring with h'z is 
< q't = ft(k't) > for all t = (1,2, ... Z). 
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Therefore, letting U(h'z) = U(q'l,q'2, ... q'z), the expected utility of an 
action a1 is: 
2. pHz(hz) xU (hz). 
hzeHz(a1) 
The action a1 * eA1 which maximizes this measure is to be adopted, ac-
cording to the usual presentation of SEU choice. 
This procedure takes no direct account of much of the information in 
the tree. A decision-maker can, consistent with the axioms of SEU, in-
clude as arguments of the utility indicator any aspect of the thinned tree 
except the initial action a1 and the initial event Sl. 
As envisaged, the commitment is followed by a time stream of situ-
ations, each of which involves a future person contemplating an ap-
proaching decision. The initial decision-maker may believe the 
experience of unresolved uncertainty in those situations is relevant to in-
itial choice, irrespective of whether those uncertainties 'turn out well' or 
not: this belief cannot be acted on in the usual SEU version. 
The future choice procedures Vt may concern the initial decision-maker: 
he/she may be more interested in bringing about 'morally sound future 
persons' than in bringing about 'wealthy' material states of affairs. This 
may still be true when the decision-maker envisages continuing to make 
decisions; the initial concern may be to avoid evolving into a user of 
those Vt which are currently seen as 'corrupt', even though it is envis-
aged that the choices made would be enjoyed. 
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4.1.5 Irreducible unknowns 
Some uncertainties about the future can only be represented by prob-
ability measures if these are arbitrary, that is not based on observations 
and theories. Given this, a set of thinned trees would better represent 
the ramifications of action, where adopting one tree over another would 
require purely arbitrary judgements. Therefore, for each initial choice 
procedure there may be a set of appropriate initial actions; one initial 
action for each thinned tree. To decide that one of these actions is best 
because its tree is most likely is a purely arbitrary judgement. 
The decision-maker can be more fully informed by considering how ap-
propriate each action is in each tree. Further, arbitrary likelihoods of 
the trees sum to one if it is maintained that only one tree is 'true'. If the 
choice procedure is extended to cover an imaginary initial resolution of 
the irreducible uncertainty, the 'appropriate' actions for each arbitrary 
judgement can be found. 
! Similarly, the set of arbitrary judgements which indicate that each action 
is appropriate can be found. Some actions may thereby be eliminated 
because they are not appropriate for any arbitrary judgement. Exposure 
of the interdependence of beliefs and appropriate actions in this man-
ner is the most that can be done to inform the decision-maker about the 
merits of action, for each given choice procedure. 
There is no single morally compelling choice procedure. Adoption of a 
choice procedure is therefore arbitrary to some extent, and there is con-
siderable symmetry between this arbitrariness and the arbitrariness in 
uncertainty judgements. Therefore, for each thinned tree there may be 
a set of actions which are indicated to be appropriate; one action for 
each of the set of justifiable choice procedures. 
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The decision-maker can be more fully informed by considering how ap-
propriate each action is for each justifiable choice procedure. For 
measurable choice procedures it is possible to derive the appropriate ac-
tion for each possible weighting over procedures. Also, the set of weight-
ings over procedures which is consistent with adopting an action may be 
identifiable. Some actions may be eliminated because they are not ap-
propriate for any weighting over the choice procedures. 
As with irreducible uncertainties, exposure of the interdependence of 
beliefs and appropriate actions is the most that can be done to inform 
the decision-maker about the merits of action, for each tree. Recogniz-
ing both forms of limit requires that an informed decision-maker is 
aware of the merits of each action as this is judged by each choice proce-
dure for each tree. 
4.1.6 Features of a sound approach to dynamic choice 
Any model from which principles are to be drawn to guide action must 
distinguish between initial actions (commitments) which can be im-
plemented at the initial time, and later actions (recourse) which may be 
chosen later. The later choices must be forecast, which may require fore-
casting choice procedures. 
Each tenable forecast must be a thinned tree structure of gradual uncer-
tainty resolution over time. The subjective probabilities of all events 
must be Bayesian consistent. A set of such trees is required to reflect 
the irreducible uncertainties. 
Each justifiable choice procedure must have as its arguments aspects of 
actions and their consequences which are drawn from a thinned tree, so 
as to eliminate wishful thinking. A set of choice procedures is required 
to reflect the non-existence of a single morally compelling procedure. 
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A fully informed decision-maker is aware of the dependence of appro-
priate actions on the beliefs represented by the set of thinned trees and 
the set of justifiable choice procedures. 
4.2 Recursive trees 
A formal representation of the recursive decision approach is now de-
veloped, to allow more precise discussion of its features. The situation 
the formal model approximates is one where each decision-maker 
makes a commitment to one of a number of actions. Before the commit-
ment, the decision-maker believes the consequences of each action are 
best represented as a stochastic process with known parameters. 
The possible evolutions of this process indicate which future decision-
makers, actions, and events are believed to be possible, and what their 
relative likelihoods are believed to be. The decision-maker believes fu-
ture decision-makers will believe likewise, so the imagined conse-
quences are recursive. The model developed here employs discrete 
time, actions, events, and choice procedures to represent a fully recur-
sive belief structure. 
4.2.1 Branches and nodes 
Time consists of a number of discrete periods indexed t = 1,2,3 .... Let a 
sequence of happenings before period t be temporarily denoted ht. At 
the beginning of each period a decision-maker selects and undertakes 
an action at from a finite set At(ht) which depends on the history ht. Fol-
lowing this, a 'random' event St occurs, from a finite set St(ht,at) which 
depends on the history. 
A set of circumstances qt from the set Qt then prevails until just before 
the next period; qt may be a function ft on at, St, and ht. At the end of the 
period a further 'random' event Vt from a finite set Vt(ht,at,st) resolves 
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the uncertainty about the next decision-maker's choice procedure. Vt 
may depend on previous happenings. Note that Vt in this construction af-
fects choice in t + 1. 
The points of decision about action, and of resolution as to events, are 
the nodes of a recursive tree. At each decision node selection of a 
branch at is equivalent to selection of the next resolution node. At each 
resolution node occurrence of the branch St or Vt amounts to a 'choice 
by nature' of the next resolution or decision node. 
Let the set of decision nodes be D, generic member dED, the set of 
exogenous resolution nodes be R, generic member rER, and the set of 
choice procedure resolution nodes be W, generic member WE W. Define 
the total node set N = D u R u W, with generic member n. Let there be 
a unique initial node noED. 
Define D(n), R(n) and Wen) as the sets of decision, exogenous resolu-
tion and choice procedure resolution nodes following n in the tree, 
augmented to include n if n is of the respective type. This defines 
N(n) = D(n) u R(n) u Wen). 
It is fundamental to the tree structure that branches do not rejoin, so if 
ni EN(n2) then N(nih:N(n2). 
Also, ifni, n2EN(n3) then either 
N(ni)cN(n2) or N(n2)cN(ni) or N(ni)nN(n2) = 0. 
Let, Df(w) be the set of decision nodes immediately following choice 
procedure resolution node w, Rf( d) be the set of 'exogenous event' res-
olution nodes immediately following node d, and Wf(r) be the set of 
choice procedure resolution nodes immediately following node r. Nf(n) 
is the set of resolution nodes or decision nodes which immediately fol-
low node n, depending on the type of n. The decision at each d is to 
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choose a member r eR f( d), the resolution at each r amounts to 'selec-
tion' of one We Wf(r), and the resolution at each w amounts to 'selec-
tion' of one deDf(w). 
The collection: 
<N(n»neN 
represents the whole tree structure. 
4.2.2 Sequences and strategies 
For the time being the impact of Vt on choice in period t + 1 is ignored. 
Histories and possibilities for the system can be equally well expressed 
as sequences of nodes or of branches. A branch is now identified with 
the node it leads to. 
The conceivable infinite sequences of actions at form a set A with 
generic member a: 
A = a= <a*t>t=1,2,3 ... I for all t= 1,2,3 ... 
there exist w* e Wand d * eD, such that: 
The infinite sequences of random events St, Vt form a set S, with generic 
members: 
S = s= <s*t,V*t>t=1,2,3... S*leWf(r*) for some r*eRf(no) 
S*te Wf (r*) 
for some r* e Wf(V*t_l), 
for all t = 2,3,4 ... 
w*teDf(s*t) for all t = 1,2,3 ... 
The overall histories form the set: 
H= h= < h\h\hVt> t= 1,2,3 ... h a1eRf(no) 
h\eRf(hVt_1) 
hSte Wf(hat) 
h VteDf(hSt) 
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for all t=2,3,4 .. . 
for all t = 1,2,3 .. . 
for all t = 1,2,3 .. . 
At each node n the preceding actions and events are given; the set A(n) 
is defined to contain all sequences of action which are still feasible at n, 
so that each sequence aeA(n) contains the fixed actions preceding n. 
S(n) is the set of sequences of events which are still possible as at node 
n, so each sequence seS(n) contains the events which preceded n. Each 
history heH(n) c~mtains the actions and events which precede n. For-
mally: 
A(n) = a*eA 
S(n) = S*eS 
ifneR then a*t=n 
if neD then a*teRf(n) 
if ne W then a*teRf(d*) 
ifne W then s*t=n 
for some t = 1,2,3 .. . 
for some t = 1,2,3 .. . 
for some d* eDf(n) 
and t = 1,2,3 ... 
for some t = 1,2,3 ... 
if neD, n~no then v*t = n for some t = 1,2,3 .. . 
if neR, then S*te Wf(n) for some t = 1,2,3 .. . 
ifn=no then S*eS 
H(n) = [heH I <hat>t=1,2,3 ... e A(n), <hSt,hVt>t=1,2,3 ... eS(n)] 
From the branching condition defining the tree it follows that if 
Also, A(no) =A, S(no) = S, and H(no) = H. 
The whole tree structure is captured in the collection: 
<H(n»neN. 
Strategies 
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In the tree structure a strategy is a collection of actions - one action Xd 
for each decision node deD. The set of all initially possible strategies, 
denoted X, is the set of collections: 
X = [x = < Xd > deD I such that xdeRf( d) all deD ] 
For each strategy XeX there are several associated mappings from S. 
The sequence of eventual actions a is uniquely determined for each 
S*eS: 
a(s*,no,X) = < at > t = 1,2,3, ... , such that 
a1 =XnO 
at = Xd for d =V*t-1 all t = 2,3,4 ... 
The total sequence h is also determined by x for each s* eS: 
h(s*,no,X) = <ha hS hV > _ t, t, t t -1,2,3 ... , 
such that < hat > t=1,2,3 ... = a(s*,no,x) 
and <hs hV > -123 = s* t, t t-" ... 
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Let RC(n) be the set of resolution nodes, and DC(n) the set of decision 
nodes, in the unique node sequence preceding n: 
A restricted strategy x(n), neN is defined as a collection: 
x(n) = <xd>deD, such that xdeRc(n) all deDc(n) 
and xdeRf(d) all deD(n), 
all deDc(n). 
The set X(n) is the set of all such collections; note that some decision 
nodes still have their actions fixed by x(n) even though knowledge that 
node n is visited means these other nodes cannot be visited. Also, knowl-
edge that n is visited and x(n) is followed limits the sets of feasible se-
quences: 
S(n,x) = {seS(n) f for all t = 1,2,3 ... , Ste W (Xd) for some deD} 
A(n,x) = {aeA(n) for all t= 1,2,3 ... , at=xd for some deD} 
H(n,x) = {heH(n) <hat>t=1,2,3 ... eA(n,x)} 
4.2.3 Probabilities 
The structure of the tree contains implicit likelihood statements. At 
the initial time the only sequences of future happenings which can be 
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attributed positive probability are the sequences heR, and if a pre com-
mitment strategy XeX can be enforced only the sequences heR(no,x) 
can be attributed a positive probability. 
Let MT(S(n,x» = u < s t,Vt> t=1,2,3 ... T. 
seS(n,x) 
This is the set of sequences observable before T, when strategy x is fol-
lowed and node n occurs. 
Let the probability of an event We W, conditional on occurrence of node 
r such that We Wf(r), be F(w). The probability of a choice procedure 
resolution deD, conditional on occurrence of We W such that deDf(w), 
is PW(d). Then: 
o < p W ( d) ::;;1, all deD, and L PW(d) = 1, all WeW 
deDf(w) 
also, 
O<F(w)~ 1, all WeW, and L F(w) = 1, all reR. 
We Wf(r) 
The probability of observing the initial elements of a sequence s *, up 
until time T, when strategy x is followed and node n occurs, is defined 
as: 
t=1,2,3 ... T 
if s* eS(n,x) 
II (pR(stlm).p W (vtlm»' 
meMT(S(n,x» t = 1,2,3 ... T 
0, otherwise 
where stirn and vtlm denote the random events at t in event sequence m. 
It follows that: 
s 
L P T(s,n,x) = 1, for all XeX, all neN, all T = 1,2,3 ... 
SeMT(S(n,x» 
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Therefore, the 'probability' of a sequence of happenings h, given that a 
decision Xd at each decision node deD is enforced and node n occurs, 
can be represented by the sequence: 
H S 
(P T(h,n,x»T=1,2,3 ... = (P T(s,n,x»T=1,2,3 ... 
where s = < h\h vt > t = 1,2,3 ... 
4.2.4 Recursive thinning 
Until now, the origins of the strategies XeX have not been specified. 
However, in the recursive structure, at each decision node deD the 
choice procedure v is fixed. By definition this identifies a single 'best' 
action on the basis of the actions and resolutions which are forecast to 
follow, and their likelihoods. This allows the tree specified so far to be 
reduced to 'choosable' possibilities, or thinned. 
If at a decision node d1 the 'best' action KdeRf( d) has been identified 
for each following decision node deD( d1) then the set of possible se-
quences of happenings can be identified for each action r1 eRf( d1). 
That is, the consequences of each action i are now a probability tree. 
The collection of actions 
y(r1) = < r1 < Kd > > 
, deD(d1),d;ed1 
contains an action for every member of D( d1). Therefore, the set of 
strategies X(y(r1),d1) employing these actions can be constructed: 
These strategies all limit the possible sequences after d1 in the same 
way: 
1 2) S(d,~ , 
1 2 A(d ,~ ), 
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Therefore, the set of possible sequences of happenings after d\ if r1 is 
adopted at d1, is the same set H( d1 ~,) as might occur if pre commitment 
strategy ~' eX(y(r1),d1) was enforced. Likewise (pHT(h,d\~I))T = 1,2,3 ... 
is the 'probability', conditional on occurrence of d1, that h will occur if 
r1 is adopted. The collection: 
contains the entire structure and likelihood of the outcomes h which are 
believed to possibly follow after each decision r1 at decision node d1. 
Since all actions after d1 are fixed, each action's collection amounts to a 
probabilistic tree over occurrences. Since each consequence qt is a func-
tion of preceding occurrences, a probabilistic tree over consequences is 
also available for each action. 
The choice procedure at d1 is given. This by definition identifies, on the 
basis of the probabilistic trees following the actions, an action 
Kd1eRf( d1) which provides the 'best' such tree. Equivalently, it is in-
itially believed that action Kd1 is adopted if and when decision node d1 
occurs. Therefore, if r e R f( d) but r ~ Kd1 then r will never be adopted, 
and no sequence of happenings in the sub-tree N(r) can occur. This sub-
121 
tree can therefore be discarded, or thinned, from the initial belief struc-
ture. 
4.2.5 The initial problem 
The full set of beliefs «N(n) >neRUDUC, <pw(d) > deD, 
< pR(w) > We w) therefore reduces, after recursive thinning, to belief 
that only the actions < Kct > deD will be adopted. The recursion can be 
extended to the initial choice by letting each possible initial choice pro-
cedure Ze Vo be a node preceding a copy of the whole structure from no. 
At the initial time there is, for each possible initial choice procedure z: 
• an optimal initial action rz, 
• a collection of 'choosable' actions y(rz) = < rd > deD(Dz) =D, 
• a set of 'choosable' strategies xeX(y(rz),z), 
• a set of possible sequences of happenings Hz = H(z,x), 
• a 'probability' of each sequence heHz, 
being (pliT(h,z,2f;)) T = 1,2,3 ... 
That is, the full set of possible future sequences of actions, events and 
choice procedures, and their likelihood, is fixed once the initial choice 
procedure z is known. The only 'decision' remaining is what the initial 
choice procedure is to be. Adoption of choice procedure z amounts to 
simultaneous adoption of the initial action rz, together with the belief 
that future occurrences are represented by the sub-tree Hz, and its as-
sociated probabilities. 
Provided thinning is possible, the recursive tree structure identifies 
'best' initial actions without pre commitment of future actions. These 
are forecast to be optimal with respect to later options and values. The 
initial (and later) choice procedures must determine which of a finite 
set of probabilistic trees is best, and in doing so may employ any atti-
tudes to aspects of the trees, without causing intertemporal inconsist-
ency. 
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The recursive tree structure therefore better represents the human posi-
tion in time. The notion of 'optimality' employed is more sound than 
that of pre commitment optimality. Wider choice procedures can be ex-
plored. The structure meets some of the criticisms of economic investi-
gations of non-renewable resources which are made in Chapters Two 
and Three. The structure has the potential to bring about a deeper un-
derstanding of such issues. 
4.3 On the existence of an optimal commitment-forecast 
The recursive decision tree is neither descriptive nor prescriptive for ac-
tual decisions. It is intended for theoretical investigations into how ac-
tions depend on beliefs, in simplified situations. The 'solution' to an 
exercise employing the recursive approach is knowledge of this depend-
ence, rather than just one optimal initial action and forecast. However, 
the approach requires that a thinned tree can be derived, and this may 
not always be possible. 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions to the 
precommitment special case have been widely investigated (Astrom, 
1970; Arrow and Kurz, 1970). Few theoretical investigations derive sol-
utions which are proven to meet sufficient conditions for pre commit-
ment optimality (Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1983). The conditions do not 
apply to recursive structures. Conditions ensuring that a recursive deci-
sion tree can be thinned are discussed in this section. 
4.3.1 The meaning of non-existence 
Among the later elements of any partly thinned tree are forecast ac-
tions, conditional on the system reaching a future decision node. A fore-
cast of non-existence of an appropriate action at some future node 
involves forecasting no action at that node, which is an umeasonable in-
itial belief given that some action must always be taken. A forecast 
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which involves non-existence of one appropriate action can be dis-
carded as irrational: the reasons for non-existence may provide clues as 
to why the associated beliefs are umeasonable. 
An optimal commitment must exist for each initial choice procedure for 
the same reason as with forecasts: one action must be taken, given that 
the 'do nothing' options (thinking, suicide) are defined to be actions. A 
choice procedure for which no optimal commitment exists is inadequ-
ate, and must be discarded. As with the forecast optima, non-existence 
is taken as evidence of an irrational belief rather than an intransigent 
problem. 
Fundamentally, an optimal commitment-forecast exists if two condi-
tions are met: firstly, the initial and all following choice procedures 
must be suitably discriminatory, capable of singling out one single ap-
propriate action on the basis of the nature of the action and its ramifica-
tions; secondly, the future possibilities must allow the thinning 
procedure to operate. 
4.3.2 Well-defined choice in recursive trees 
The recursive tree structure as defined provides each choice procedure 
with a finite set of options. Choice procedures on such a space are satis-
factory for use in recursive analysis if they always select one optimal op-
tion from any set of options. 
The usual economic conception of rational choice is that choices are 
made in accordance with a pre-order on the options. This leaves open 
the possibility of multiple optima. The assumption that a strong order 
prevails, so each optimum is unique, seems to unnecessarily limit the 
range of acceptable choice procedures for use in recursive tree analysis. 
It seems desirable to be able to investigate whatever choice procedures 
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might come to be used, irrespective of their conformity with the ration-
ality postulates of transitivity in choice, and so on. 
The standard adopted is therefore that the forecast choice procedure 
must be well-defined as opposed to rational, and must identify one ac-
tion for selection from a finite set. A choice procedure might fail to do 
this either because there are too many (more than one) or too few 
(none) of the options left in the 'appropriate' set, after application of 
the procedure. 
If non-existence is due to multiple optima, it must be possible to add 
extra discriminatory power (as when overtaking rules are used to decide 
between unbounded integrals), or to add a final arbitrary selection. If 
non-existence is due to the application of absolute standards which no 
option can meet, then relaxation is necessary. 
Well-defined choice procedures are therefore imagined to consist of a 
sequence of stages of elimination of inferior options, which are carried 
out stage by stage. Eventually either only one option is left, or all stages 
have been applied or application of the next stage eliminates all remain-
ing options. In the former case the one remaining option is selected. 
In the latter cases the initial decision-maker does not know how the ar-
bitrary future choice will be made. A forecast of uniformly distributed 
random 'choice' on the remaining set of options seems to best represent 
the possibilities. This can be incorporated in the existing recursive tree 
structure, by replicating the sub-tree following the choice procedure res-
olutions node which precedes the tied decision. Each replication con-
tains one of the tied actions, and follows a 'perturbed' choice procedure 
which selects that action. Uniform probabilities are attributed to the 
'perturbed' choice procedures at the preceding resolution node, to 
bring about the desired uniform forecast on tied choices. 
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4.3.3 Recursion feasibility in recursive trees 
If all choice procedures are well-defined then the backwards recursion 
solution technique, once started, can thin the tree and hence provide an 
optimal initial action for each initial choice procedure. This will be true 
if there is a date after which all possibilities can be thinned and before 
which backwards recursion can thin the transient possibilities. 
A finite horizon would comprise such a date. Setting a horizon T in a re-
cursive model requires not just that the initial decision-maker does not 
care about later occurrences. Instead the initial decision-maker must 
believe all decision-makers before T do not care about events after T. 
This may be unreasonable for decision-makers at times close to T. A be-
lief in an 'Armageddon' of some sort might supply an alternative ration-
ale for a finite horizon T. 
Full thinning is also possible if each history is eventually fully determin-
istic, or if no further (non-trivial) choice of action is required. In either 
case preceding decision-makers are presented with the required sets of 
probabilistic trees over which to optimize. 
If along each path the choice procedure and set of feasible actions are 
eventually stationary, and the events have become either stationary or 
Markovian, then standard decision-theoretic infinite horizon methods 
can solve for each path's concluding optimal actions. This provides a set 
of probabilistic trees on which recursion can begin. 
A mixture of the 'path-ending' conditions may be required to be ap-
plied. Also, it is not necessary that all paths be completed in this 
fashion before recursion can begin. If some decision-makers have 
limited horizons in their choice procedures over probabilistic trees, 
then some of their actions may well be eliminated before thinning be-
cause they are dominated by other actions. That is, the eliminated ac-
tion could not produce as good a tree as some other action, whatever 
happens during thinning. 
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It is possible that there are 'infinitely transient' paths which prevent re-
cursion from beginning, and so prevent the tree from being thinned. 
Forms of optimality in the limit, for these cases, are an area for future 
work. Further discussion of the types of paths which are sensible as ra-
tional belief structures, in an uncertain world, could also throw light on 
this issue. 
If the world really is always transient, in some non-dominated possi-
bilities, and in some attributes which matter enough to influence initial 
choice, then the only justification for any non-dominated action is that 
'something must be done'. In this case a fundamentally arbitrary choice 
(among the non-dominated actions which cannot be 'valued') is necess-
ary and not irrational in the usual sense of the word. 
An interesting implication of irreducible uncertainty is that very specific 
forecasts of the very distant future are very likely to be wrong. This sug-
gests introducing some vagueness by specifying actions, events and out-
comes only up to sets, which in general grow fuzzier with time. The 
beliefs about the system's membership of such sets may well eventually 
become stationary, and fulfil the horizon setting conditions. Vagueness, 
therefore, may underpin rationality, in that no consistency can other-
wise be guaranteed for a long-term Bayesian forecast which admits that 
there are future decision-makers. 
4.4 Extensions 
The recursive tree formulation is one of a suite of potential formula-
tions, each of which preserves the key features of the recursive decision 
approach. That is, each has an initial Bayesian rational set of possible 
intertemporal sequences, which is successively reduced by application 
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of a collection of decision-makers choice procedures. Eventually an op-
timal initial commitment-forecast is produced. This section discusses 
some of the difficulties to be overcome in formulating other members 
of the suite. 
4.4.1 Discrete time recursive programs 
If time is discrete, but actions, events, and choice procedures fall into 
continuous rather than discrete sets, then a recursive program rather 
than a recursive tree is required to represent a recursive set of beliefs. 
As before, wide sets of prior possibilities, ignoring choice consistency, 
contain sets of prior possibilities which are consistent with beliefs about 
future choice procedures. The latter sets cover the consequences of 
adopting an initial choice procedure. 
This recursive structure employs the convention that at each time the 
decision precedes the resolution as to events and new choice procedure. 
Other tenable conventions, which also take beliefs to be recursive, treat 
the two sorts of resolution (as to state-of-the-world) as being jointly 
determined, or as determined before the decision. 
The continuous action and event spaces assumed in recursive pro-
gramming structures provide each choice procedure with a continuous 
set of commitments. The arguments of each choice procedure, how-
ever, may range over the following commitment-forecasts, or stochastic 
processes, governed by later chosen actions. This option set may not in 
general be convex, or closed. 
As for the non-convex decision-tree formalism, well-defined choice pro-
cedures on such a space, for use in recursive analysis, need to ensure 
that they do not eliminate all options and that any final set of appropri-
ate actions is reduced to one by a random selection. Well-defined 
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choice procedures need not be rational in the sense of conforming to a 
(pre-)order on the commitment-forecasts. 
In practical optimization, and perhaps in recursion in belief structures, 
non-convex and open option sets cause analytical problems. One is dis-
cussed further below. As for discrete space representations, a starting 
time is necessary to allow backwards recursion to sequentially define 
the optimal forecast. The same ways of generating a starting position 
apply. 
4.4.2 Recursive and dynamic programs 
The recursive programs resemble stochastic dynamic programs (see e.g. 
Bellman, 1957; Sengupta, 1982), multistage programs with recourse (see 
e.g. Dantzig, 1963; Hansotia, 1980), and stochastic control models (see 
e.g. Astrom, 1970; Chow, 1975). These are all models of sequential 
choice, for which a backwards recursion procedure reveals or locates 
the optimal or appropriate values of decision variables. 
In general, however, the recursive program cannot be formulated in any 
of the latter three ways, because: 
• in the former there is a separate objective (or choice 
procedure) at each stage (or time) whereas in the latter there 
is one overall objective which may be separated stage by stage; 
• in the former, each objective in general extends over later 
times so that objectives 'overlap', whereas in the latter the 
value of the end-of-stage state carries all the information 
about the value of future possibilities; 
• the former finds the current and future actions which are 
appropriate in the light of current and future objectives, 
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whereas the latter find the pre commitment strategy which is 
best according to current objectives alone. 
As presented, the recursive program also differs from the usual form of 
the latter programs in that intertemporal relationships are not necessar-
ily Markovian, and a state space has not explicitly been defined, but 
these are not necessary points of difference. 
4.4.3 'Solution' existence and open sets 
The very general recursive program structure, as specified, does not en-
sure that each choice procedure is provided with a closed set of options 
(commitment-forecasts). In particular, for some histories, the mapping 
from current actions to future consequences may contain jump disconti-
nuities, even when all action spaces are closed, if there are threshold ef-
fects in future choices. This raises the possibility, for choice procedures 
of optimization type, that no 'best' action exists because the choice pro-
cedure supremum is on the (unattainable) boundary of the open set of 
possibilities. 
Such choice procedures (utility function maximization, etc) are not suffi-
ciently well-defined to qualify for use in (Le. to be forecast as possibly 
occurring in) recursive programs where the open set problem arises. To 
be tenable within such a forecast these procedures must be sup-
plemented with additional steps which determine the appropriate action 
whenever the open set problem arises. 
One such possibility is to append a 'quantum' assumption. If there is a 
smallest unit by which measurements of action can differ, then conti-
nuity is a convenient approximation to the underlying discrete action 
space. When continuity causes problems the representation reverts to 
the discrete space. 
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For non-renewable resource actions there are often 'natural' units 
which provide bases for a discrete representation. Molecules provide a 
lower bound to unit size, measurement technology may set a much 
higher lower bound, and current economic practice almost certainly 
adopts much larger units still. Achievable transformation rates are not 
continuously variable either, given the limitations of measurement and 
practice. 
4.5 The representation of beliefs 
The recursive tree is set up as a representation of beliefs about the fu-
ture, held by an hypothetical initial decision-maker. Adoption of the re-
cursive tree structure makes explicit some beliefs which are generally 
not considered, but limits the beliefs which can be investigated. The re-
lationship between the structure and possible beliefs is briefly discussed 
in this section. 
4.5.1 Bayesian rationality 
The primitive likelihood judgements in the recursive tree are the sets of 
pR and P w. The method of construction of probabilities of sequences s 
and h, conditional on a commitment-forecast x and occurrence of a 
node n, ensures that each well-defined set of probability judgements is 
consistent in the Bayesian sense. 
That is, for any commitment-forecast, the probability, at an early node 
n, of any set of sequences, is the probability of the set at a later node 
n' eN(n), multiplied by the probability at n that the transition to n ' will 
occur. 
The tree structure therefore represents beliefs as being rational in the 
Bayesian sense. This is a stringent requirement for any actual person's 
beliefs, given that people do not consistently form probabilistic beliefs 
131 
for simple gambling situations, as is outlined in Chapter Two. However, 
Bayesian rationality is a standard assumption in economic investiga-
tions, perhaps because alternative assumptions involving systematic de-
viation from Bayesian rationality do not yet offer equivalent analytical 
tractability. 
The tree structure incorporates only one set of Bayesian consistent 
judgements for the whole set of decision-makers. That is, the initial de-
cision-maker believes later decision-makers will adopt the same beliefs, 
appropriately conditioned to reflect the intervening occurrences. This 
seems to be the only internally consistent way of relating the beliefs of a 
sequence of Bayesian rational decision-makers. This is because if the in-
itial decision-maker believed future beliefs might drift, then this would 
be incorporated in initial beliefs as a possibility, restoring the full con-
sistency. 
In reality, a fully Bayesian rational forecast must be based on some to-
tally arbitrary judgements. For example, probabilities attributed to the 
outcomes of a new experiment must be arbitrary. Section 4.1 outlined 
how the existence of arbitrary judgements may mean that a set of recur-
sive trees better represents rational beliefs. 
4.5.2 Choice procedures, dynamics and uncertainty 
The choice procedures may be considered to be value positions, or ethi-
cal statements about what 'the good' might be. Therefore, the (stochas-
tic) evolution of choice procedures represented by the pathways in the 
recursive tree is a statement about the way values evolve; that is, about 
value dynamics. 
Taking a particular action is compatible with only some value positions. 
Given that value positions do not evolve exogenously, but rather in the 
light of experience and ethical explorations, then only some value posi-
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tions can consistently be forecast to follow from any action determined 
by a value position. The alternative is that the dynamics of value change 
are not restricted. The choice procedure can then change so 'fast' as to 
allow any future set of actions to be consistently forecast. 
The requirement for consistency, between the 'factual evolution' and 
the 'value evolution' highlights the importance of the assumptions about 
dynamics which underpin the recursive formalism. The consistency 
issue is foremost as the link between current values and future possi-
bilities is examined: is there a discontinuity between the present choice 
procedure (values) and future procedures, or does the future 'grow out 
of the present, and if so, how quickly can it mutate to new forms? 
The irreducible uncertainty about 'the good', as initially perceived, is 
partially represented. Each notion of the good is captured in one initial 
choice procedure which indicates one commitment-forecast is optimal. 
The set of initial choice procedures considered may range over the set 
of notions of the good which are considered justifiable to some extent. 
The initial 'decision' as to choice procedure is assumed to be arbitrary -
any initial choice procedure might be adopted without regard for the his-
tory. However, the set of choice procedures considered by the initial de-
cision-maker must implicitly be conditioned by history. The set 
considered presumably reflects the volatility in value positions felt by 
the initial decision-maker, who is aware of the value positions adopted 
in the recent past, and is likely to have been influenced by those value 
positions. 
This initial uncertainty about value positions is never resolved - rather, 
in adopting action, a 'decision' is made as to which ethical positions are 
most acceptable. This is akin to a definition of self on the part of the in-
itial decision-maker. 
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In every recursive tree structure, irreducible uncertainties about future 
conceptions of the good are ignored; all future choice procedures are 
covered with a subjective probability distribution. As for general uncer-
tainty a set of thinned trees may better represent a rational set of beliefs 
about future choice procedures. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The recursive decision approach appears to be a workable generaliza-
tion of the decision-theoretic approach. Forecasting the choice proce-
dures of future decision-makers enables a sequence of decision-makers 
to be modelled. Therefore the position in time of decision-making is 
better represented than in decision-theoretic approaches. 
The recursive approach more correctly reflects the initial decision-
maker's power to determine events. The 'implementable' initial com-
mitments are distinguished from later recourse actions, chosen and 
implemented by later decision-makers. The recourse actions are, in re-
cursive decision models, part of the forecast of the consequences of in-
itial action. 
Bayesian rationality must be attributed to the initial decision-maker, 
and the same beliefs must be adopted by later decision-makers, for the 
recursive tree structure to be fully specified. This demanding rationality 
postulate may be weakened by allowing that a set of recursive trees best 
represents situations where there are irreducible uncertainties. 
For the recursive tree to be 'solved' or thinned it is sufficient that all 
choice procedures are well defined, and a starting point for backwards 
recursion is available or able to be constructed. Recursion can begin, 
for example, if there is a horizon or if choice procedures are eventually 
intertemporally consistent along each possible path. 
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The recursive decision approach can investigate very general choice pro-
cedures, because each procedure is applied sequentially. There is there-
fore no need for the choice procedure to be consistent with any other, 
for a 'solution' to be obtained. There is also no requirement that the 
choice procedure conform to the usual economic conception of rational 
choice as a (pre )order on the option space. The recursive approach 
seems capable of underpinning investigations of choice in dynamic, un-
certain situations, where the choice procedures may both change with 
time and incorporate wide sets of attitudes to future outcomes. 
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Chapter Five 
Further Features of Recursive Choice 
The recursive decision structure is a conceptual framework which is 
potentially of use for investigations of non-renewable resources. This 
chapter seeks to further establish the nature and potential of recursive 
approaches. 
Firstly, a simple two-period representation of optimal non-renewable re-
source is used to bring out the differences between recursive ap-
proaches and the well-known decision-theoretic special case. This is 
followed by a discussion of choice procedures for use in recursive struc-
tures. Reference is made here to the SEU procedure, which predomi-
nates in pre commitment investigations. Analytical procedures for 
recursive structures are then briefly considered, before some ways of 
representing commitment-forecast solutions are outlined. Conclusions 
then follow. 
5.1 A two-period representation 
The differences between the pre commitment decision-theoretic and 
commitment-forecast recursive approaches can be illustrated for a 
simple context by expanding on the familiar two period diagram of opti-
mal resource depletion, as shown in Figure 5.1. 
Curves A and B represent the marginal net benefit of resource use from 
stock K in the first and second periods respectively, as seen by the initial 
decision-maker. That is, the curve B is as forecast and valued at the in-
itial time. In general the later net benefit is presented as a discounted 
monetary quantity, with the discounting representing the opportunity 
costs of investment (Le. holding stocks to the second period). 
marginal value 
of resource use 
(value units) 
o 
0-- period 1 resource use ----+. Xl*+--period 2 use---- K 
Figure 5.1: Optimal two-period resource depletion 
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Figure 5.2: Two-period uncertainty 
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The optimum initial use is identified at X*, where the marginal net 
benefits are equated so the sum of the benefits cannot be made any big-
ger by readjusting resource use patterns. 
5.1.1 Uncertainty 
Initial uncertainty about future events enters the diagram via the loca-
tion of curve B. Assuming the monetary evaluation is adhered to and 
that the perceived set of possible events, and their perceived likelihood, 
is independent of the initial resource use, a set of locations for B is in-
itially seen as possible, as is shown in Figure 5.2. 
Bl and B2 are seen as possible, and given their likelihoods, the marginal 
expected monetary value EB of second period resource use can be cal-
culated. The widely used risk-neutral objective employs this expected 
value in place of B, so the corresponding optimum is at Xl *. This initial 
choice procedure is event separable, so changing the likelihoods shifts 
EB and hence Xl *, which can therefore be derived as a function of the 
likelihoods. 
Figure 5.3 illustrates how the optimum varies with varying belief. Let Pi 
be the likelihood initially attributed to the outcome giving Bl in Figure 
5.2, and since by construction there are only two possibilities, 1-Pl is the 
likelihood attributed to the outcome giving B2. For each belief, that is 
each Pi, the risk-neutral optimum Xl * can be calculated, and will be 
somewhere between Xlmin (for Pi = 0) and Xlmax (for Pi = 1). 
The belief Pi is a point on a one-dimensional simplex in Figure 5.3. If 
there were n > 2 discrete possibilities here the belief-optimum mapping 
would be a surface over an n-1 dimensional simplex. There is one sur-
face (choice function) for each well-defined choice procedure. 
optimal initial 
resource use 
(Xl*) 
o 
~ (l-D simplex) 
1 
probability of situation 1 (pl) 
Figure 5.3: Optimum as a function of forecast beliefs 
optimal initial 
resource use 
(Xl*) 
Xlmax 
r2 rl 
discount rate 
Figure 5.4: Optimum as a function of initial choice belief 
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5.1.2 Choice procedures 
Initial uncertainty about which choice procedure to apply enters the 
original certain diagram (Figure 5.1) via the location and relevance of 
curves A and B. For instance, there is a class of choice procedures 
which all involve adopting that action which maximises a discounted 
monetary sum, but which vary in their discount rate. Assuming that the 
initial conditional forecast (of second period resource use and its conse-
quences) is invariant to the initial choice procedure adopted, the dis-
count rate possibilities give a set of positions for B and hence a set of 
Xl *. Figure 5.2 could represent two choice procedures, instead of two 
outcomes; Bl is the initial valuation (of the second period choices) 
using a higher discount rate procedure and B2 is the initial valuation for 
a lower discount rate procedure. 
If the choice procedure differences can be captured with a parameter 
(here the discount rate), then the initial optimum can be written as a 
function of that choice parameter. In Figure 5.4 the discount rate varies 
between a maximum of f1 and minimum of r2, corresponding to the valu-
ation curves of Bl and B2 in Figure 5.2 respectively, and hence the in-
itial optimum resource use of Xlmin and Xlmax respectively. 
The recursive approach differs from the decision-theoretic approach in 
that the second period resource use is forecast and then valued by the in-
itial decision-maker. That is, second period resource use is not initially 
chosen, although the second period possibilities may be influenced by 
initial actions. 
The curves Bl and B2 in Figure 5.2 could represent initial uncertainty 
about how the second period decision-makers will choose to use the re-
maining resource. The initial decision-maker attributes the higher 
value Bl to one sort of future use, and the lower value B2 to a different 
future use, but cannot dictate the future choice from the initial time 
period. 
5.2 Choice procedures for recursive decision models 
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This section briefly discusses the nature of the choice-procedures which 
are consistent with making decisions in time, recognizing that there will 
be a sequence of decision-makers. The decisions which arise in any re-
cursive structure are decisions between commitment-forecasts, such as 
probabilistic trees. 
5.2.1 Justifiable choice procedures 
To be justifiable for use in a recursive structure, a choice procedure for 
deciding between commitment-forecasts must satisfy two 'rationality' re-
quirements; beyond this arguments about scientific standards, and 
about ethical standards, apply. The first rationality requirement is that 
the objects of choice - those things which enter into the choice proce-
dure - must be drawn from a consistent recursive tree (or equivalent 
continuous structure). This tree captures the beliefs about the conse-
quences of possible commitments, in a form which has eliminated logi-
cal inconsistencies to the fullest extent possible. The tree prevents 
overstatement or understatement of each decision-maker's power to 
commit the system to action. 
The tree also eliminates from consideration 'possibilities' which violate 
the 'laws' the decision-maker. accepts as governing the system's beha-
viour. These laws are likely to be either generally accepted claims, such 
as that a thing cannot be in two places at the same time, or currently ac-
cepted 'scientific' knowledge, such as the thermodynamic laws. Because 
there is no way of proving scientific knowledge to be correct, the justifi-
ability of any internally consistent tree still remains a matter for argu-
ment. 
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The second rationality requirement is that application of the choice pro-
cedure always results in identification of a determinate (perhaps singu-
lar) set of appropriate - or adoptable - commitments, from which the 
adopted action may be chosen using a random procedure with known 
parameters. This requirement ensures that the choice procedure has 
sufficient content to be defined and hence discussed. Such choice proce-
dures as 'picking the commitment which is the third one to occur to me' 
are ruled out. The requirement makes rational choice a deliberate 
undertaking. 
The ethical justifiability of a choice procedure is an additional issue. 
Every choice procedure has an implicit moral community, and may im-
plicitly extend rights of various sorts, take various interests into account, 
and arbitrate conflicting rights and interests in various ways. The ethi-
cal consistency of the procedure (are like interests treated alike?) may 
sharpen argument on its justifiability, though not conclusively, it seems. 
5.2.2 Orders and utility functions 
It is standard in economics to assume that any 'rational' choice proce-
dure corresponds to a complete pre-order on the choice space (Debreu, 
1959). If this is applied here, a binary relation: 'sub-tree A is at least as 
appropriate as sub-tree B', written A;:: B, could be defined, which 
would satisfy: 
A ;::A, for all possible sub-trees A, 
and if 
A ;:: Band B ;:: C then A ? C, for all possible sub-trees A, B, and C, 
and either 
A ;:: B or B;:: A (or both), for all possible sub-trees A and B. 
If choice conforms to a pre-order there may be classes of sub-trees 
which are of indistinguishable appropriateness, including the 'most ap-
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propriate', or maximal set. To 'rationally' identify a uniquely appropri-
ate action the choice procedure must be more discriminating, and corre-
spond to a strong order. This defines a binary relation which satisfies 
the above properties, and also: 
if A::: B and A :s B then A = B, for all possible sub-trees A and B. 
The assumption of random choice from the maximal set seems more jus-
tifiable than assuming a strong order; the exact underpinnings of choice 
are not critical to the recursive structure as a rational model of the set-
ting for choice. 
It is well-known that a strong order cannot in general be represented by 
a utility function, and that a complete pre-order cannot always be repre-
sented by a utility function. The finite option sets of recursive tree mod-
els allow pre-orders to be represented by utility functions. However, 
choice procedures as heuristically outlined are not representable as a 
matter of course. 
It is usual in economics to assume that the arguments of preferences or 
utility are the outcomes qt (and their probabilities) only. Further argu-
ments for choice procedures are discussed below. 
5.2.3 Expected summed discounted utility 
In standard pre commitment formulations the decision-maker's choice 
procedure is to maximise the expected intertemporal integral of dis-
counted instantaneous utilities. These utility 'rates' are, in non-renew-
able resource use contexts, generally a direct function of the current 
resource use rate only. The utility 'rate' function is concave in the re-
source use rate, and so therefore is the integral and its expectation: the 
decision-maker is risk-averse towards each future time's resource use. 
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As between programs of utility delivery, however, the decision-maker is 
risk-neutral, as is outlined in section 2.3.4. 
In applying this choice procedure to commitment-forecast options for 
non-renewable resource use, the resource output of each time/state is 
valued and summed for each branch in the tree. The event probabilities 
are used only to form a branch likelihood measure, for calculating the 
overall expected value of the tree. The optimal commitment is the ac-
tion which maximises this measure. 
The discounting of future utility which is central to this choice proce-
dure is an ethical position which is subject to argument when certainty 
prevails, but these arguments are beyond the scope of this work. Dis-
counting when there is uncertainty introduces another ethical judge-
ment: the later discounted utility 'rate' functions are less concave than 
the early functions, so the decision-maker is less averse to later utility 
risks than to earlier ones, and may judge large later risks as less wor-
rying than smaller earlier risks. 
The choice procedure is a special case of the subjective expected utilita-
rian (SEU) procedures. Effectively, the SEU rationality axioms (which 
are powerful for the one-shot decision-event context) are applied here 
to vector consequences. That is, each whole branch is taken to be one 
possible consequence of action, rather than each sub-tree being a conse-
quence. The choice procedure is separable not just in sub-trees (initial 
events), as the axioms require, but in whole branches (states-of-the-
world), and in time. 
Use of expected value in the choice procedure is an additional ethical 
judgement. Given that only one eventuality can result, is it appropriate 
to attempt to make this eventuality a good one 'on average', at the ex-
pense of possibly making it a bad one? In this context there is no com-
pensation between people or between periods which can average things 
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out in actuality. The central ethical question is whether certain actions 
are justifiable, in the face of the possible outcomes and the outcomes 
possible from alternatives. It seems ethically easier to justify actions 
(which might turn out to lead to poor outcomes) when they are taken to 
prevent worse outcomes. That is, a risk-averse stance seems more easily 
ethically justifiable. 
5.2.4 Subjective expected utilitarian choice 
This choice procedure is reviewed in Chapter Two. The maximization 
of the expected intertemporal integral of discounted utilities, discussed 
above, is a special case of SEU choice. There the SEU axioms are ap-
plied to vector consequences and an intertemporally separable utility 
function is applied. Each of these assumptions can be relaxed while 
maintaining SEU rationality. 
First, an SEU procedure for valuing commitment-forecasts could dis-
card intertemporal separability. The utility measure might then be 
formed by multiplying together a time series of attribute levels, or by se-
lecting the minimum level over time of an attribute, for each branch. 
The full SEU measure for the tree would be formed as the expected 
value, over branches, of the utility measure. Choice with such a proce-
dure, over probabilistic trees within a recursive structure, will not lead 
to intertemporally inconsistent choice. 
Further, the state-of-the-world separability assumption could be weak-
ened to separability in initial events only. A corresponding SEU-ra-
tional choice procedure employs a utility function on the whole sub-tree 
following each initial resolution of uncertainty. A utility function which 
multiplies together the attribute levels of all branches, at each time 
after the initial resolution, meets the SEU axioms. The full SEU 
measure for the tree would be the expected value, over possible initial 
resolutions, of the utility measure. 
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5.2.5 Attitudes to uncertainty 
There is a suite of as yet unexplored choice procedures which represent 
attitudes to program risk, as opposed to risk at a point in time. The sim-
plest example involves maximising the expected value of a concave func-
tion of the value of the possible programs, with each program possibility 
(branch) taken as a whole. This is discussed in section 2.3.4. 
More extreme aversion to program risk would be reflected in a 
'maximin' choice procedure: adopt that action which has the best valued 
program under its worst possible outcome. A special case of this is 
maximin over possible situations. More generally, a choice procedure 
representing program risk attitudes might be averse towards risk on se-
quences of attributes at some dates and approving of risk on sequences 
over other dates. 
A further and different reaction to uncertainty, which can be captured 
in more general c~oice procedures, is 'aversion to (or love of) risky situ-
ations'. Here the decision maker has a desire to create or avoid more 
certainty, above and beyond his or her feelings about the possible out-
comes themselves. It is possible that the objects of choice here are the 
probability judgements themselves, or some measure of them such as 
their entropy, but this does not seem likely - surely the range of some 
underlying variable is required in estimating what levels of certainty are 
desirable. More reasonably, the decision-maker is likely to have atti-
tudes to learning and/or surprise which result in a non-neutral attitude 
to the temporal resolution of uncertainty. That is, some 'certain' utility 
will often be traded off for a change in the resolution pattern toward 
'knowing sooner', or 'not finding out till later' . 
Choice procedures which factor-in attitudes to program risk or to risky 
situations may be compatible with SEU choice, because the SEU utility 
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arguments need not be branches. That is, the choice procedure may 
conform to the SED axioms provided it is separable in the initial uncer-
tainty resolution. 
5.2.6 The arguments of choice procedures 
The choice procedure arguments used in economic investigations are in 
general physical quantities, and resource throughput rates are the most 
common in the current context. When the human position in time is 
made explicit, wider features present themselves as choice arguments. 
Ensuring the existence of some future persons may be paramount in 
some ethical systems and hence in some choice procedures. In resource 
context this has been approached obliquely by examining optimal re-
source use patterns when minimum consumption levels are required for 
survival. 
Other ethical systems may be concerned with the nature of future per-
sons. A corresponding choice procedure could employ future choice 
procedures as its arguments, since these presumably capture the value 
positions adopted by future persons. 
The experiences of future persons are possible arguments for initial 
choice procedures: these experiences are captured in the sequences of 
whole sub-trees which represent future persons' perceptions of unfold-
ing actions, events and outcomes. More restrictively, future wellbeing 
could enter initial choice procedures subject to a 'non-paternal' evalu-
ation of future positions. This would involve use of each future's own 
valuation measure (if such is believed to exist) applied to its own situ-
ation, relative to others. That is, the initial choice procedure would not 
assume to know 'what's good for future people' above and beyond 
weighting the expected evaluations made by future people. 
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The state of the non-human world in later times supplies an additional 
plethora of arguments for consistent choice procedures which reflect 
the initial decision-maker's values. Positions such as minimising human 
impacts, or maximising species diversity, might be found here. 
5.3 Analytical procedures 
The recursive decision structure is a conceptual framework which helps 
decision-makers become informed - it gives added precision to beliefs 
about the justifiability of possible actions. Knowledge of the structure 
helps clarify what meaning observations and investigations have. More 
actively, the structure can be the basis for new investigations. Its active 
usefulness depends on how easily applications of the structure can be 
analysed, and this is now briefly discussed. 
5.3.1 Analytical tools and their limits 
In actively using the recursive structure to give some precise content to 
beliefs about the justifiability of actions the general methodology of nor-
mative economic theorising is applied. Beliefs (about how the world 
operates) are formulated in set theoretic terms or as differential equa-
tions, with stochastic elements to express perceived uncertainty. Mathe-
maticallogic enforces internal consistency, and some of the perceived 
indeterminacy of the future is dispelled, by identifying how choices will 
or should be made. 
In general, this choice identification employs the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for some form of constrained optimization. The theore-
tical investigations based on pre commitment formulations are generally 
not specific about the equations used, beyond general assumptions on 
continuity and differentiability, and precise numerical specification is 
very rare. 
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Analytical or closed form solutions, in which the optimal choice is an 
exact function of the parameters of the formulation, are generally 
sought. Analytical solutions which can be readily interpreted can be 
derived only for the simplest models. If more than three or four non-li-
near equations characterize the solution then the implied dependencies 
remain obscure. 
5.3.2 Approximation procedures 
There are several ways of achieving a partial understanding of a com-
plex situation. Each way approximates the complex situation different-
ly. Clearly, one whole feature of the situation can be ignored, or held 
constant, so as to reduce the number of equations to be solved. The re-
maining features can then be examined, perhaps for each of several dif-
ferent assumptions about the fixed feature. 
A different approach is to make assumptions about the formulation 
which allow the complex situation to be treated for a special case. As-
sumptions of this sort which are widely used are that functions and their 
derivatives are continuous, or are linear or logarithmic. 
Another option, not widely used, is to use numerical analysis and mathe-
matical programming routines to explore special cases. If each case can 
be quickly solved an approximation to the analytical solution may be 
able to be built up in piecewise fashion. This method allows formula-
tions which contain or give rise to non-convex sets of possibilities to be 
treated, although perhaps at the cost of a coarse approximation. 
Which approximation is best depends on the purpose of the analysis. In 
general, an approximate solution to the right problem is more trust-
worthy than the exact solution to an approximate problem. If the aim in 
theorising is to help decision-makers by providing them with better prin-
ciples or by informing them, then the exact solutions for special cases 
must be checked for wider relevance. 
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Solution relevance might be checked by comparing the exact solutions 
with approximate solutions to situations capturing more complexity. 
Discrete numerical approximations offer the possibility of doing this. 
Systematic techniques for approximating high-dimensional problems 
are currently under investigation (Geoffrion, 1977; Zipkin, 1980; Grif-
fin, 1982). 
5.3.3 Standard problems 
A suite of standard problems could be established to provide some 
focus for the differing ways of approximating complex situations. These 
could be addressed in each fashion by each method in order to isolate 
points of difference and agreement. To an extent this would only for-
malise existing practice, but the formalisation seems to offer a way of 
keeping the purpose of theoretical analysis (informing decision ma-
kers), paramount. Dealing with a suite of standard non-renewable re-
source problems is a research program involving elements of (at least) 
economics and moral philosophy. 
For each standard problem the different approximations produce differ-
ent pieces of the belief-action mapping, and/or different suggestions 
about the nature of each piece. Comparisons, of the mapping implied 
by ignoring a factor with the mapping implied by coarse approximation 
of that factor, should identify those beliefs where the two mappings dif-
fer greatly. These differences help in judging the reliability of theoreti-
cal conclusions, and might indicate how future theorising should be 
directed so as to best guide actions; i.e. how complexity should be ap-
proached, if the goal is to produce a widely accurate belief-action map-
ping. 
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The disagreements about solution mappings are a way of obtaining the-
oretical advance in a situation where notional falsifiability is not work-
able as a criterion because the theory is inherently normative. The 
comparisons provide a way of eliminating theory which provides false 
precision, as against a way of giving precision (of unknown trustworthi-
ness) to a new area, or by a new analytical routine. 
In non-renewable resource context there are several 'natural' dimen-
sions on which standard problems could differ. Open and closed econ-
omies, with and without price-setting power, with and without backstop 
technology available, are some of the important cases. Other 'techno-
logical' assumptions might cover whether decision-makers are becom-
ing more or less concerned for the future, and whether they are drawing 
more or less relative satisfaction (choosing as if...) from consumptive or 
environmental experiences. 
5.4 Optimal commitment-forecasts 
In dynamic, uncertain situations the optimal initial actions are always 
the initial action of one commitment-forecast drawn from a thinned 
tree. 
It is useful to think of a mapping, from the initial belief to the optimal 
initial commitment as being 'the solution' sought. The structure of this 
mapping clarifies the content and meaning of solutions to fully specified 
formulations. The mapping also helps clarify the concepts of informed 
decision-making, and 'justifiable' action. 
Initial beliefs have two components: beliefs about future occurrences, 
and beliefs about 'the good', or the justifiable choice procedures. Rep-
resentations of these components, and of initial action possibilities, 
brings out the form of the mapping. 
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5.4.1 Representation of predictive beliefs 
In a recursive tree, all initial beliefs about future occurrences are cap-
tured in the thinned tree structure, and the conditional probabilities 
over events. When there is a finite number K of event possibilities, the 
conditional probability judgement can be represented as a point on a 
(K-1) dimensional probability simplex as Figure 5.5 shows. Irreducible 
uncertainty about a probability judgement can be represented as a set of 
points on the simplex as in Figure 5.6. If the irreducible uncertainty ex-
tends to the set of events (node structure), then K can be redefined as 
the number of events in the union of the possible events given possible 
structures, and the K-1 dimensional simplex representation of each res-
olution node still applies. 
If a set L of resolution nodes (indexed i) are initially thought possible 
(before fixing forecast or commitment actions) then the full set of be-
liefs can be represented as a corresponding set of points on probability 
simplexes, each of dimension Ki-1, ieL. If L is finite then an equivalent 
representation is as a point in the unit cube of dimension: 
2, (Kl- 1). 
ieL 
In either space a set of points or region can represent the compound ir-
reducible uncertainty. The simplex in Figure 5.6 is maintained here as a 
stylistic representation of an initial belief that a priori reasonable inter-
nally consistent sets of beliefs about future occurrences must fall within 
the space Bl. 
A 
(a) in tree form 
P(D/A) 
(b) in probability space 
P(D/A) 
(c) on a simplex 
B 
~--------------- C 
D 
P(B/A) 
1.0 
.y 
.J--------",;...---
1.0 
P(B/A) 
P(C/A) 
Figure 5.5: Conditional probabilities 
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P(C/A) 
P(B/A) 
P(D/A) 
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a priori justifiable conditional 
probabilities of the resolution 
at node A 
P(C/A) 
FigUre 5.6: Irreducible uncertainty about conditional probabilities 
Note that, for finite trees, the set of simplexes is constructed from the 
conditional resolution probabilities and so is collectively of higher 
dimension than the single simplex required to represent the prob-
abilistic beliefs as to the eventual result, that is the branch probabilities. 
The set captures the temporal resolution of uncertainty, whereas the 
single simplex does not - it must be supplemented with a sequence of 
partitions of the set of branches before it contains the information re-
quired to build the complete tree. 
For infinite trees, an infinite sequence of sets of simplexes is required to 
represent the temporal resolution of uncertainty; one set for each time 
period. This set may represent probabilistic beliefs as to the conditional 
resolutions in that period, or as to the likelihood of observable branches 
up to that period - each series is obtainable from the other given that 
Bayesian rationality applies throughout the belief structure. 
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Initial beliefs which vary in their probability judgements correspond to 
different sets in the probability space (Bl, cf. B2). Varying tree struc-
tures can be represented by allowing that some beliefs attribute zero 
probability to some events, and expanding the dimensions of the prob-
ability space to account for any event which is ever given positive prob-
ability. 
5.4.2 Representation of choice procedures 
Ethical beliefs, or preferences, are of interest here because they in-
fluence decisions, and therefore to the extent that they are applicable 
through initial choice procedures. If a finite number of initial choice 
procedures are under consideration, their range can be represented by a 
set ofindices. More generally, the set of procedures will vary over a 
number of parameters. The range of procedures can then be repre-
sented by the set V of possible parameter options. 
For example, the discount rate, a non-negative real number, is a par-
ameter for the standard pre commitment procedures which maximize 
the integral of discounted instantaneous utilities. 
If each VE V maximises a measurable 'utility' function over commitment-
forecasts, then the recursive structure provides a utility value for each in-
itial action. This provides a basis for sensitivity analysis: the scores of 
each action for each notion of utility v E V may indicate that some ac-
tions are dominated (another action always scores better) and can be 
discarded; the measurable utility provides an estimate of the 'distance' 
from optimality for each action combination. 
5.4.3 Representation of the 'solution' 
In a recursive tree the set of possible initial actions is finite, and may be 
represented by the set of indices. In other recursive structures with con-
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tinuous ranges of possible initial actions the introduction of parameters 
may allow the initial actions to be represented by a closed set, as for 
choice procedures. In either case the initial actions are members of a 
defined set A1. 
An internally consistent belief set beB1 and an initial choice procedure 
Ve V are sufficient to determine the optimum initial action a * eA1 and 
the associated commitment-forecast. Varying b and v over their respec-
tive ranges produces an initial optimum a* for each belief (b,v)eB1 xV. 
Collecting the optima provides the 'solution' mapping: f: B1 x V -+ A1. 
The form of f, as b1 and v vary, indicates which aspects of belief matter 
to the initial decision. 
For each fixed choice procedure v, the 'solution' mapping f captures 
how the optimal initial actions change with b, the probabilities at-
tributed to possibilities. 
For each fixed set of beliefs about consequences b, and assuming the ex-
istence of optimal initial actions a * in all cases, the 'solution' mapping 
links optimal initial actions to choice procedures, as Figure 5.7 illus-
trates. 
initial action 
or resource 
use rate 
o choice procedure 
( == discount rate) 
Figure 5.7: Choice procedures and optimal initial actions 
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In this figure the initial actions are optimal pre commitment non-renew-
able resource use rates for 'cake-eating' beliefs about the world. Curve 
A is derived for fixed beliefs that the stock (cake) is of a certain size, 
and curve B is derived for fixed beliefs that the stock is bigger. The 
choice procedures vary over discount rates: no utilitarian pre commit-
ment optimum exists for. a zero discount rate, and the optimum initial 
use increases rapidly as the future is increasingly discounted in the be-
liefs adopted. 
When the set Al of possible commitments is discrete, the joint belief 
space Bl x V can be partitioned according to the commitment aeAl 
which is optimal for each belief (b,v)eBl x V. Adopting a commitment, 
that is undertaking an initial action, is equivalent to adopting a belief in 
the region(s) identified with that commitment by the partition. The 
more contiguous and larger are the partitioned areas of Bl x V, the ea-
sier it should be to identify appropriate actions in the face of uncer-
tainty. Only one of the partitioned regions, not a single point, need be 
selected. If the set of commitments is continuous then the belief space 
may be contoured according to the prevailing optimal commitment, 
rather than partitioned. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The recursive decision approach focuses on initial choice, taking future 
choices as among the 'facts' which determine and constrain the conse-
quences of each option. This is apparent in reconsidering the nature of 
the future value curves used in a standard two-period model. The focus 
is further emphasized by the derived 'solution' mapping, which relates 
initial beliefs to initial optimal actions. 
A wide range of previously ignored choice procedures can be explored 
with recursive structures. Many of these can be found by relaxing the as-
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sumptions constraining choice procedures for precommitment formula-
tions. The assumptions are not necessary to guarantee intertemporally 
consistent plans or forecasts, if a recursive approach is employed. 
Routines for analysing recursive structures can be devised. If non-con-
vex sets of consequences arise in formulations employing continuous 
variables then numerical approximations can provide a solution proce-
dure. 
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Chapter Six 
Changing Choice Procedures 
Principles guiding non-renewable resource use should allow for the fact 
that future non-renewable resource use decisions will be taken by future 
decision-makers, who are likely to have objectives which differ from cur-
rent ones. This is because people's tastes, and the ethical positions they 
hold, change over time. Use of a non-renewable resource can extend 
over many generations, so a considerable change in objectives may 
occur. 
Changing objectives cannot be investigated with the pre commitment 
formulations used to date in prescriptive economic investigations of 
non-renewable resource use. These formulations are in general inter-
nally inconsistent when applied to changing objectives. It is not known 
whether the pre commitment solutions are close to solutions which 
allow for changing objectives. The recursive approach developed above 
is intended to incorporate changing objectives, without becoming incon-
sistent. 
In this chapter the recursive approach is applied to non-renewable re-
source use decisions when it is known that objectives will change. The 
application is made for two reasons. Firstly, it is an initial test of 
whether the recursive approach is workable, and is capable of adding to 
the theoretical results which underpin resource use principles. Second-
ly, the application seeks an indication of the importance of the fact that 
objectives change. If the results of the recursive approach do not differ 
significantly from the pre commitment results then the latter formula-
tions may safely ignore changing objectives. 
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A very simple extension of the well-known 'cake-eating' model is inves-
tigated. A three-period model is formulated, with changing objectives in-
corporated by giving each period's decision-maker a different discount 
rate, within the usual utilitarian objective. The finite horizon allows the 
recursive formulation to be solved by backwards recursion. The optimal 
initial commitment is derived as a function of the discount rates for a 
simple utility specification. This allows a comparison with the precom-
mitment 'cake-eating' results to be made. The chapter concludes by dis-
cussing the significance of the findings. 
6.1 Initial belief formulation 
An initial decision-maker believes that there will be a new decision-
maker in each future period, and that the future extends for three more 
periods, indexed t = 1,2,3. It is further initially believed that the deci-
sion-makers in the second and third periods believe in the same hori-
zon, so only three periods are under examination. There is no 
uncertainty in the beliefs. 
In each period the only action is the costless throughput (extraction, use 
and discard) of at units drawn from a stock of homogeneous units of a 
non-renewable resource. It is initially believed that the total resource 
use over the three periods must be no more than M units, and that later 
decision-makers think this too. The choice structure is illustrated in 
Figure 6.1. 
It is believed that future decision-makers will, like the first, adopt a dis-
counted utilitarian choice procedure vt, each of which takes each peri-
od's utility to be a set function U(.) of resource use in the period. 
It is believed that the choice procedures Vt change over time because 
each decision-maker adopts a different discount rate rt, as well as be-
cause the time remaining until the horizon differs. 
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E L CIt • • 
CIt • CIt ~ : : 
Q 
G R • • • 
S 
H T • • • 
I • • • ~ : : 
J • • 
Vi a2 e2 q2 V3 
Key to labels, all in resource units used: 
M = maximum stock available. 
A=M=>D=K=O.O 
B+E=M=>L=O.O 
C+H=M=>T=O.O 
C = G = J = P = S = W = Z = 0.0; lower limits 
A+D+K=M 
B+E+L=M 
B+P+N=M 
B+G+Q=M 
C+H+T=M 
C+J+X=M 
B,F,I,O,R,V, and Yare representative of the inftnite set of branches from these nodes. 
Figure 6.1: Stylistic representation of three-period resource use choice 
The initial beliefs correspond to an unthinned recursive formulation: 
subject to: 
subject to: 
subject to: 
al + a2 + a3 s; M 
al ,a2, M given 
a3:::::0. 
al + a2 + a3 s; M 
a3 solves V3 given al, a2, M 
al, M, given 
a2:::::0. 
al + a2 + a3 s; M 
a3 solves V3 given al, a2, M 
a2 solves V2 given al, M 
Mgiven 
al:::::O 
6.2 Derivation of optimal initial action 
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The recursive structure is thinned to find the optimal initial action by de-
fining a state variable Rt as the maximum resource use believed 
possible from period t onwards. The period 3 and period 2 optimal com-
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mitments can then be derived as functions of the state variable, which is 
then fixed by the first period optimum. 
To simplify the solution procedure, and avoid corner solutions, assump-
tions on the utility function and discount rates are useful: 
Let U(.): R+ ~ R be everywhere continuous and twice differentiable, 
with 
U,(.) > 0, U"(.) < 0, lim U'(a) = 00, lim U'(a) =0, 
a~oo 
and let O.:::;rl < 00 and 0 .:::;r2 < 00. 
The period 3 optimum a3 *, as a function f3 of the state R3, is found by 
inspection: 
a3* = f3(R3) = R3, all 0<R3.:::;M. 
Equivalently, application of V3, to the branches feasible at each period 3 
choice node, leads to thinning of the tree of possibilities. Only possi-
bilities where all resource available in period 3 is used in that period re-
main after thinning. In Figure 6.1 branches O,P,R,S,V,W,Y and Z are 
eliminated at this stage. 
Correspondingly, the initial decision-maker believes that the period 2 
decision-maker will believe that all inherited resource R2 which is not 
committed to second period use a2 will be used in the third period. The 
second period's choice procedure becomes: 
subject to: R2given 
a2 ~ O. 
The conditions on U ensure that the period 2 optimum satisfies 
0< a2* < R2 if R2 > 0, so at each V2 optimum it is true that: 
1 
U'(R2-a2) = 0, for all 0<R25M. 
1+r2 
Define the functions on the positive real line: 
inverse marginal utility 
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inverse discounted marginal 
utility 
addition of the inverses 
inverse of the addition; i.e. 
the marginal worth of R2 
to period 2. 
The existence of these functions is ensured by the conditions on U. 
Then, the period 2 optimal commitment a2* satisfies: 
Therefore: 
a2* = Kl(K4(R2)) = f2(R2), for all 0<R25M. 
The derivation of the functions and the optimal commitment is shown 
in Figure 6.2. Here K4 is the horizontal addition of the second period's 
marginal valuation of period 2 and period 3 resource use. For any R2, 
the optimal a2* and a3* can be derived by implicitly using the optimality 
conditions: the a2*/a3* split must use all R2, and must be such that each 
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period's use is, at the margin, contributing the same amount to the sec-
ond period's objective. 
utility K2(.) Kl(.) K3(.) 
units 
o 
Figure 6.2: Optimal second period commitment 
a2, a3, R2 
(resource units) 
Following this procedure for each 0 < R2~ M, as in Figure 6.3, gives the 
optimal commitment as a function of the resource availability: 
marginal 
values 
(utility 
units) 
a 
a2*, a3* 
(resource 
units) 
I 
I 
--/--
I 
I 
a2, a3, R2 I 
(resource units) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Figure 6.3: Optimal commitment as a function of resource availability 
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Similarly, the forecast of third period resource use a3 *, for a given sec-
ond period resource availability R2, is: 
or equivalently: 
The application of V2 further thins the tree in Figure 6.1. After thinning, 
only branches with resource uses in the proportions (M-R2, f2(R2) , R2-
f2(R2» remain viable. Vl chooses between these branches. 
1 1 
Max U(al) + - U(f2(M-al» + 2 U(M-al-f2(M-al» 
1 +f1 (1 +f1) 
subject to: 
Because the utility function ensures that the optimum al * is interior, at 
optimality it is true that: 
l+rl 
+ 
1-f2'(M-al) 
--"""2- U'(M-al-f2(M-al» 
(1 +rl) 
It is convenient to replace M with the variable Rl so as to find a general 
solution by the same procedure as before: 
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Define functions on the positive real line: 
1-f2'(R2) 
(1+n)2 
the marginal valuation by the 
first period of resource left 
for later use, 
the inverse marginal valuation, 
the addition of the inverse 
valuations, 
inverse of the addition; i.e. the 
marginal worth of the resource 
Rl to period 1. 
Using the same reasoning as before, the initial optimal commitment al * 
satisfies: 
Also, 
R2* = Ks(Ks(M)). 
The initial optimum al * is derived just as for the second stage, with Ks 
replacing (1 + r2r1U'(.), and Ks replacing 1<4. Note that Ks is a revalu-
ation, by period one standards, of the commitments forecast to be 
adopted in periods two and three. KS therefore need not be related to 
the second periods valuation (1<4) of the same actions: in this model Ks 
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differs from 1<4, by more than a proportional discount factor, whenever 
r2~r1. 
6.3 Suggestive results 
A specific utility belief allows a more detailed investigation. The follow-
ing increasing, strictly concave utility function, from the one parameter 
class of utility functions exhibiting constant relative risk aversion, satis-
fies the assumptions on utility listed above. Therefore all the required 
inverses exist. Also, the function has a convenient form for analytical 
manipulation. 
Letting U(at) = -at-1, 0 < at < 00, all t = 1,2,3. 
and adopting the positive solution for roots so the inverses are well-
defined, gives: 
1 
1+r2 
1 
2 ' (1 +r2)a3 
K1(I<4(R2)) = R2(1 +(1 + r2r 1/2r \ 
therefore: 
K1(.) = (.)-1/2 
K2(.) = «1 +r2)(.)r1/2, 
a2* =R2.(1 +(1 +r2yl/2y1= f2(R2) = g2(r2).R2. 
169 
As r2 increases from zero towards infinity, gz(r2), the fraction of in-
herited stock used in the second period, increases monotonically from 
1/2 towards the limiting value of 1.0, as Figure 6.4 shows. That is, the 
second period uses a larger and larger fraction for itself as its discount 
rate increases - a result fully in accordance with the standard two-period 
cake-eating results. No divergence from these pre commitment results 
is to be expected, because the two-period horizon prevents the dif-
ference between V2 and V3 from causing a difference between the a3 
period 2 sees as desirable and the a3 period 3 adopts. A positive diver-
gence from the pre commitment results does occur when three periods . 
are considered, as is shown below. 
use fraction 
g2(r2) 1.0 ---------------
0.5 
0.0 '--------------------
discount rate 
r2 
Figure 6.4: Second period use-fraction versus second period 
discount rate. 
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Restating: 
a2* = f2(R2) = g2(r2).R2. 
Supressing the argument of g2: f2' = g2, for all R2, 
therefore: 
[ 1 1 ] R -2 = + 
(1 +f1)2(1-g2) 
2 , 
(1 +f1)g2 
= hR2-2 
K6(.) = hi/2(.)-l/2, 
giving: 
ai * = Ki(Kg(Ri» = «1 + hi/2)2Rl-2rl/2 = (1 + hi/2ri.Ri 
That is, for initial beliefs as assumed, it is optimal for the initial decision-
maker to use a fraction gi of the initial stock. This fraction does not 
change with beliefs as to the size of the initial stock Rl. The fraction 
does however depend on beliefs about current and future attitudes to 
future welfare, as expressed in the discount rates ri and r2. The function 
gi can therefore be interpreted as a belief-optimum mapping, as dis-
cussed in section 5.5. 
171 
The nature of this mapping is now explored. gi can be expressed in full 
as: 
gl(fl,r2) = [1 + {(1 +flri (1 + (1 + r2rl/2) 
+ (1 +flr2(1 + (1 +r2)1/2)}l/2ri, 
where all roots are interpreted as positive. 
It is straightforward to show that: 
0.::;;gl(fl,r2) < 1, for all O'::;;fl < 00, 0.::;;r2 < 00, 
gl(O,O) = 1/3, 
lim gl(fl,r2) = 1, for all 0.::;; r2 < 00 
lim gl(fl,r2) = 0, for all O'::;;fl < 00 
r2~ 00 
Also, 
= 
giving: 
> 0, for all 0.::;; ri < 00, 0.::;; r2 < 00, 
dr i 
dg 
1 
dr2 
giving: 
= 
= 
dr2 < 
o as > n = r2, 
< 
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for all 0:::; rl < 00, 0:::; r2 < 00. 
Contours for gl in (n,r2) - space are shown in Figure 6.5, which is not to 
scale. 
r2 III rl =r2 
increasing gl 
o 
rt 
Figure 6.5: Contours for optimal initial fractional use in 
discount rate space 
Knowledge of the function gl allows the set of commitment-forecast op-
tima to be interpreted, and compared with the pre commitment solution 
(for which rl = r2): 
• The pre commitment optimum for a set discount rate involves 
a higher initial resource use than the commitment-forecast 
optimum for that initial rate followed by an increase or 
decrease in discounting. A pre commitment approximation to 
a changing situation is, to this extent, biased towards initial 
resource use. 
• A change in initial beliefs about the later discount rate 
changes the optimal initial use. Higher future discounting 
increases initial use if discount rates decline over time, and 
decreases initial use if discount rates increase over time. 
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• As in the pre commitment case, it is always true that an 
increase in the initial discount rate increases initial resource 
use, provided everything else (including f2 here) is held 
constant. However, if different periods' discount rates are 
related, so that a change in rl affects r2, the 'speed-up' result 
may not hold. That is, a decrease in optimal initial use is 
possible from an increase in initial discounting if this also 
leads to an increase or decrease (of sufficient size) in later 
discounting. 
6.4 Discussion 
The recursive approach successfully derived the optimal commitment-
forecast for a situation with changing choice procedures. The recursive 
structure ensured that this optimum is intertemporally consistent. Find-
ings which go beyond the pre commitment discoveries, and add to the 
existing knowledge about optimal non-renewable resource use, were ob-
tained. The recursive approach therefore proved workable and worth-
while in one resource investigation. 
The formulation employed is fairly restrictive. Temporally separable 
choice procedures, on the same utility function, with an invertible first 
derivative, are used. However, these same assumptions underpin those 
pre commitment investigations which use constant-relative risk aversion 
utility. Also, the assumptions are convenient but not necessary to the ex-
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istence of an optimum. They should be able to be weakened consider-
ably in future work. 
The results demonstrate that optimum non-renewable resource actions 
are sensitive to changes in future choice procedures, in a way not cap-
tured by the pre commitment approximation. The finding that the pre-
commitment optimum is biased towards the present, if discount rates 
increase or decrease over time, is particularly interesting. This shows 
that reliance on pre commitment results can introduce a systematic 
error. Further exploration of this finding seems important. 
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Chapter Seven 
Uncertain Choice Procedures 
The previous chapter found that initial optimum resource use is sensi-
tive to expected changes in choice procedures over time. These changes 
are in reality uncertain, because they are based on changes in individ-
uals' tastes and ethical judgements, which are poorly understood. Non-
renewable resource use may extend over a time period long enough for 
the uncertainty about future choice procedures to be significant: the un-
certainty may affect which initial actions are optimal, as judged by initial 
choice procedures. 
The pre commitment formulations used to date cannot investigate this 
issue. They assume that there is only one choice procedure, applied by 
an initial decision-maker, who has the power to initially determine later 
actions. The recursive decision approach developed above is intended 
to allow uncertain future choice procedures to be investigated. 
This chapter applies the recursive decision approach to a case involving 
uncertain future choice procedures and non-renewable resource deple-
tion. This is done so as to test the workability of the recursive approach 
in uncertain contexts. Hopefully, any serious problems with the ap-
proach, which do not arise for the 'certain' case, such as that of the pre-
vious chapter, can then be identified. As with the latter case the intent is 
also to add to the theoretical base for resource use principles. 
The application is not purely a test case. The importance of choice pro-
cedure uncertainty is to date unknown. The application may show 
whether and how this uncertainty impacts on optimal initial resource 
use, and may demonstrate that the assumption of certainty is or is not a 
good approximation. 
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The method adopted parallels that of the previous chapter. The formula-
tion is extended to allow that the discount rates adopted by future deci-
sion-makers are initially uncertain. As before the three-period recursive 
structure is solved by backwards recursion, and the optimal initial action 
is derived. This is a function of the expected value of a function of the 
discount rates. The impact of a mean-pres erving-spread in uncertainty 
can therefore be determined. Finally, the significance of the findings is 
briefly discussed. 
7.1 Initial belief formulation 
The three-period model developed in section 6.1 is now modified to 
allow each decision-maker to be uncertain about the discount rates 
which will be applied by future decision-makers. 
To simplify the presentation two assumptions are made. Firstly, the un-
certainty is captured by an initial probability distribution, for each peri-
od's discount rate, which is independent of previous choice procedures 
and actions. Secondly, all choice procedures are program risk-neutral; 
that is, they allow for uncertainty by using the expected value of an ob-
jective in place of its certain value. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates initial beliefs of this type. The second choice pro-
cedure V2 can be Cl or C2, and the third choice procedure V3 can be C3 or 
C4. When only three periods are considered and only discount rates are 
uncertain then C3 = C4, since the V3 do not involve discounting. The prob-
abilities are not represented in Figure 7.1. 
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Actions are labelled with upper case. At decision nodes, the top branch 
action involves using the maximum available stock, while the bottom 
branch action involves zero use. Thus the action labels can be resource 
use measures. For example, if M is the maximum initial stock: 
A=M, and Dl = D2 = Kl = K2 = K3 = K4 = 0.0 
B + El = M, and Ll = L2 = 0.0 
Actions between the top and bottom branches, such as B, Fl, and 01, 
represent the infinite set of branches emanating from decision nodes 
where the stock is not zero. Any course of action which entails positive 
use in all periods is in the set: 
{ (B,Fl,OI), (B,Fl,02), (B,F2,03), (B,F2,04) } . 
Letting E denote the mathematical expectation operator, the initial be-
liefs can be represented by an unthinned recursive formulation: 
V3: (given ai, a2, M) 
Max U(a3) 
a3 
subject to: 
V2: (given ai, M, r2) 
a2 
subject to: 
ai + a2 + a3 s; M 
ai, a2, M given 
a3;::::0. 
ai + a2 + a3 s; M 
a3 solves V3 (given ai, a2, M) 
ai, M given 
a2;::::0. 
Vi: (given M) 
Max E 
subject to: 
(
U(ai) + _1_ U(b(r2» + 
l+n 
1 2 U(c(r2» ) 
(1 +n) 
ai + b(r2) + c(r2) s; M, for all r2 
b(r2) solves V2 (given ai, M, r2) 
c(r2) solves V3 (given ai, b(r2), M) 
Mgiven 
ai;:: O. 
7.2 Derivation of optimal initial action 
Let the state variable Rt be the maximum resource use believed 
possible from period t onwards. The utility function U(.):R+ ~ R is 
everywhere continuous and twice differentiable, with: 
U'(.) >0, U"<O, lim U'(a) = 00, lim U'(a) = O. 
a~O a~ 00 
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Also, 0 s; f1 < 00 and 0 s; r2 < 00 for every realization r2 of the second peri-
0d discount rate. 
The period 3 optima are, as before, immediately available: 
The second period discount rate is revealed before the second period 
choice is made, so for each r2 and R2, as before: 
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V2: (given r2, R2) 
Max (U(a2) + _1_ U(R2-a2) ) 
1+r2 
a2 
subject to: 
At optimality: 
therefore: 
In Figure 7.1 these optima are the only branches remaining after thin-
ning the sub-tree following each V2 node. 
The period one problem is the first to face uncertainty. The problem 
can be rewritten using the formulae for the later optima: 
V1: (given R1) 
Max E (U(a1) + 1 U(F2(r2,R1-a1)) 
1+f1 
subject to: 
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At optimality: 
dF2 
dR2 . U'(F2(T2,Rl-al» 
r2,Rl-al 
r2 
1+f1 
1-
dF2 
+ 
The right-hand-side is the expected marginal value, to the first period 
objective, of resource left for future use (R2= Rl-al). For each given rl 
and realisation r2 there is a 'revaluation' curve Ks(R2) as in Chapter 6. 
For a given probability distribution on r2 the 'expected revaluation' 
curve K9(R2) can be formed: 
( Ks (R2) I r2 ) 
r2 
This is illustrated in Figure 7.2, where there are two equiprobable fu-
ture discount rates, r21 and rl. 
utility 
units 
o 
Figure 7.2: Expected value of unused resources 
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Continuing as before, the first period optimum can be obtained by inver-
sion and summation of the marginal value curves: 
:R + ~ R +, the future resource use level 
which brings about a 
marginal value level. 
Ku(.) = KlO(.) + K1(.) :R+ ~ R+, the total resource use which 
Therefore: 
a1 * = K1(K12(M)) . 
7.3 Suggestive results 
brings about a marginal 
value level. 
:R + ~ R +, the marginal value level 
resulting from set total 
resource availability. 
The specific utility belief employed in Chapter 6 is used again to pro-
vide solutions simple enough for analytical investigation: 
-1 
U(at)=-at, O<at<oo, t=1,2,3. 
Throughout the following roots are interpreted as positive, in accord-
ance with the function definitions, so that inverse functions are well 
defined over the positive real line wherever required. 
As before, 
U'(a2) = a2-2 , 
K1(.) = (.)-1/2 
K4(R2) = R2-2 [1 + (1 + r2r1/2 ] 2 
Therefore: 
a2* = Kl(K4(R2» = F2(rz,R2) = [1 + (1 +r2r1/2 r1 .R2 
Recalling that r2 is now a random variable, 
[ 
-1 dF2 2 
K9(R2) = E (1 +f1) - (F2(r2,R2»-
dR2 r2 
r2 
-2 
r2 
+ (1 +f1) 1- - (R2-F2(rz, R2» , -2 [ dF2] -2 ] 
dR2 r2 
= [E {h(n,r2)} ] .R2 
r2 
-2 
= j .R2 . 
Therefore: 
KlO(.) = j1/2 (.)-112 
Kll(.) = (1 + l12) (.)-112 
K12(Rl) = (1 +j1l2)2Rl-2 
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so: 
The sensitivity of al * to the uncertainty about r2 depends on the nature 
of h(n,r2). It is easily shown that: 
h(O,O) = 4 
lim h(n,r2) = 0, for all 0.$;r2.$; 00 
rl-+ 00 
lim h(n,r2) = 00, for all O.$;n < 00 
I2-+ 00 
Further, 
Therefore, 
dh > > 
= ° as r2 = n. 
dr2 < < 
Also, 
so h is locally 
convex 
inflecting in r2, 
concave 
as drl = 0, 
< 
> 
as rl = 
< 
185 
n-2 
3 
Figure 7.3, which is not drawn to,scale, depicts the shape of h(rl,r2). 
Note that h is convex in r2, for all rl, over the range Os;r2s;2. 
_ ..... -
h 
h(O,r2) 
I 1 
/ h(rl ,r2) 
4 
/ 
oL-______________ L-____________ __ 
° 2 r2 
Figure 7.3: The impact of uncertain discount rates 
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The Appendix demonstrates the use of mean-pres erving-spreads (mps) 
in conjunction with Jensen's inequality to derive the sensitivity of an 
identity to uncertainty. This is applied here by noting that a1 * is a func-
tion of 
E [h(n, r2) ] . 
r2 
If h(r1,r2) is convex in r2, 
E [h(n, r2) ] increases with mps in r2, 
r2 
and +\1' E [ (h(r1, r2) ] increases with mps in r2, 
r2 
( 1/2) and 1 + [E ( h (n, r2)) ] decreases with mps in r2' 
r2 
That is, for 0~r2~2, an increase in the uncertainty about r2 means that 
the optimum initial resource use is reduced. 
This range for r2 certainly captures the utility discount rates generally 
used in the literature, which commonly have a value of 0.1. However, if 
a very long intergenerational period is what is approximated by the 
three periods considered here, then discount rates which reflect usual 
planning procedures (with horizons of fifteen years at maximum) would 
be much higher - certainly of the same order of magnitude as 2. The 
sensitivity of a1 * to uncertain r2 then requires more detailed investiga-
tion, and in particular specific probability distribution assumptions must 
be made. 
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7.4 Discussion 
The recursive approach successfully derived an intertemporally consist-
ent optimal commitment-forecast, for an initial belief that future choice 
procedures are uncertain. As in the previous chapter, the findings go be-
yond existing pre commitment discoveries, to add to the knowledge of re-
source depletion. Therefore, the tractability of the recursive approach 
extends to at least one uncertain context. 
For the specific case investigated, the appropriate initial non-renewable 
resource use is sensitive to uncertainty about future choice procedures, 
in a way not captured by deterministic approximations, such as optimis-
ing for the expected situation. 
In particular, uncertainty about later discount rates reduces optimal in-
itial resource use for a well-defined range of later discount rates includ-
ing those generally assumed. The impact of any specific uncertainty can 
be derived (by comparison with the mean case) because an exact solu-
tion for optimal resource use is available. 
A further step in analysis of uncertainty would be to seek an analytical 
representation of the difference between the mean and uncertain cases. 
This requires that further assumptions on the form of the uncertainty be 
made. 
It is straightforward to further extend the procedure to allow for uncer-
tainties which depend on preceding happenings, for further periods, and 
for multiple sources of uncertainty. 
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Chapter Eight 
Resolution Timing 
The two preceding chapters have demonstrated that the recursive ap-
proach has potential in the analysis of decisions in dynamic, uncertain 
contexts. In such contexts many decisions concern research activities, 
undertaken to reduce uncertainty. 
Research influences the timing of uncertainty resolution. Research pro-
vides a basis for predicting events which will eventually be observable, 
so no longer uncertain. The prediction is therefore a contribution to-
ward the resolution of uncertainty. Research results also affect which 
actions are undertaken, hence which events may be observed, hence the 
timing of resolution of uncertainty. 
An earlier resolution of uncertainty is often valuable because, for many 
objectives, it allows better actions to be identified and adopted. Early 
knowledge of the long-run availability of non-renewable resources and 
their substitutes is necessary to avoid the problems of over- or under-
use in both decentralized and centralized contexts. 
Some research directed at earlier resolution of uncertainty appears to 
be undertaken for reasons other than potential implications for action. 
Knowledge of the ultimate fate of the universe seems to fall into this ca-
tegory. In this case the preference for early resolution outweighs the 
'worsening' of consequences implied by the use of resources with oppor-
tunity costs. 
If the prevailing choice procedure is concerned about the uncertainty ex-
perienced in future situations, resolution timing is important. Its im-
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portance here is irrespective of any impact on action, as Figure 8.1 illus-
trates. 
The numbers in the Figure are the event probabilities. The later actions 
(C, D, E, F, G) have been forecast, enabling the initial decision-maker 
to face a thinned tree depicting the consequences of choice between A 
and B. The attributes of concern to the decision-maker take on values 
a, b, c, d, e. The consequences of A and B differ only by their resolution 
timing, the only uncertain situation which may be experienced is after B. 
If this situation is not important to the decision-maker then A and Bare 
equally appropriate actions. 
The usual choice procedure, of maximizing the expected value of the 
utility of a time-stream of attributes, cannot incorporate attitudes to-
ward uncertain situations. No such procedure can differentiate between 
A and B. To do so, the approach must be generalized: each possible in-
itial outcome of initial choice is treated as a structured sub-tree, not just 
a probability distribution over a set of branches. 
This chapter applies the recursive approach to non-renewable resource 
problems where resolution timing is important. The investigation seeks 
to separate the impact of resolution timing on actions from its possible 
importance in formulating choice procedures, and to clarify the implica-
tions of resolution timing for intertemporal consistency. 
The method adopted is to modify the formulation used in previous chap-
ters, to cover uncertainty about technology in the third period. The opti-
mal commitment-forecasts, for two different timings of uncertainty 
resolution, are then derived and compared. Discussion of the signific-
ance of the findings concludes the chapter. 
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a c 1 c 
b D 1 d 
A 1/4 b E 1 e 
a F 1 c 
B 
1/2 
d 
1/2 
1/2 b G 
1/2 e 
Figure 8.1: Resolution timing independence 
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8.1 Initial belief formulation 
The impact of the timing of uncertainty resolution on actions can be in-
vestigated for modified versions of the three period depletion model in-
troduced in Chapter 6. 
The first modification is for it to be believed that in the third period an 
improvement in resource recovery will be made, and its size will be un-
known until then. In the second modification the size of the third peri-
od change becomes known before second period choice, so uncertainty 
is resolved earlier. 
8.1.1 Late resolution 
Let the initial and following beliefs be as outlined in Chapter 6, with the 
addition that it is believed that a technological improvement will in-
crease resource recovery by a factor K;::: 1 in the third period. The in-
itial and second period (prior) belief is that the probability density 
governing K is: 
P(K): [1,00] ~ [0,00] 
so that 
00 
f P(K) dK = 1. 
o 
The third period faces no uncertainty, and the second and first decision-
makers maximize the expected value of their previous certain objectives. 
All decision-makers are therefore neutral towards the timing of resolu-
tion of uncertainty about the utility streams. Figure 8.2 depicts the situ-
ation in (unthinned) tree form. 
V1 
Key to labels: 
A and C are upper and lower bounds on initial acti~n, B is a 'typical' interior action. 
E and G are upper and lower bounds on period two action, F is a 'typical' interior action 
givenB. 
a, d, g and c, f, i are the upper and lower bounds on the size of the factor K. 
Sl and S3 are upper and lower bounds on period 3 resource use, and S2 is an interior 
action, given actions B and F and event e. Other period 3 actions vary similarly. 
Figure 8.2: Uncertainty about third period events 
The recursive formulation is: 
V3: (given al, a2, M, K) 
Max U(a3) 
subject to: 
V2: (given al, M) 
Max E 
a2 K 
subject to: 
Vl: (given M) 
Max E 
K 
subject to: 
a3 ~ K(M-al-a2) 
al, a2, M, K given 
a3~O. 
(U(a2) + _1 U(b(al, a2, M, K)) ) 1+r2 
a2 ~ M-al 
b solves V3 for al,a2,M,K 
al,M given 
a2~O. 
(U(al) + _1 U(c(al,M)) + 1 2 U(b) ) 1 +rl (1 +f1) 
al + c(al, M) ~ M 
c( al,M) solves V2 for al, 
b solves V3 for al, c( al, M), M, K 
Mgiven 
al~O. 
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8.1.2 Derivation of optimal initial action 
Let Rt be a state variable expressing the use of resource possible from t 
onwards, and thereby reflecting previous actions. Let 0 s; ri < 00 and 
Os; r2 < 00, and the realisations of K, and hence its expected value, be 
bounded above. 
V(.):R+--+ R is everywhere continuous and twice differentiable, with 
VI> 0, V" < 0 lim V/(a) = 00 lim V'(a) = 0 
a--+ 0 
The period three optima are therefore immediately available: 
This is used to define b(K,ai,a2,M) = b(K,R3) = KR3. 
The second period faces uncertainty about K: 
V2: (given R2 = M -ai) 
Max 12 = E 
K 
subject to: 
( V(a2) + _1_ V(b(K, R3») 1+r2 
a2 s; R2 
R3 = R2- a2 
a2~0. 
The conditions on the utility function ensure that at optimality 
d12 
- = 0 
da2 ' 
that is, there is an interior optimum. 
Therefore: 
1 
U'(a2) +-
1+r2 
d E [U(K(R2 - a2) )] = 0 
da1 K 
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1 1 
=> U'(a2) = - E [KU'(K(R2-a2)) ] = - E [KU'(KR3) ] 
1+r2 K 1+f2 K 
As in previous chapters the RHS of this equation can be written as a 
function of R3: 
deriving: 
= _1_ E [KU'(K(R3))] 
1+r2 K 
K6(.) = KS -1 (.) 
The horizontal addition of the marginal utility of period two use (LHS) 
and later use (RHS) uses, as previously, 
giving 
K7(.) = K1(.) + K6(.) 
so 
The function Ks(R2) is the marginal utility to the second decision-
maker of resource available at the start of period two. 
Therefore, 
a2* = Ki(Ks(R2)) = F2(R2). 
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Knowledge of a3* and a2* enables thinning of the tree in Figure 8.2 at 
each V3 node and then each V2 node. Also, for use at Vi: 
Rewriting the initial decision-maker's problem: 
Max E 
K 
subject to: 
and at optimality: 
d ( 1 U'(ai) + - E U(F2(Ri-ai)) 
dai K 1+f1 
) = O. 
The function F2 incorporates the expected value of a function of K in its 
parameters, so it is invariant with the realization of K employed in for-
ming the expectation immediately above. 
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The expected marginal value K9 (to the initial decision-maker) 
of later use R2 can be formed as the expectation of the marginal value 
given each realisation K. 
Therefore, at optimality: 
As before, the inverse of the addition of the inverses of the LHS and 
RHS gives the expected value K12(RI) (to the initial decision-maker) of 
resource RI available at the beginning of the initial period. 
So it follows that: 
al * = KI(K12(M)). 
8.1.3. Suggestive results 
Let U(at) = -at-I, 0 < at < 00, t = 1,2,3, so that simple analytical re-
sults can be derived. Interpreting all roots as positive, so that the re-
quired inverse functions everywhere exist: 
Therefore at V2 optima: 
a2-2 + ~ (E [_1 ._K-I (R2-a2rl ] ) = 0 
da2 K 1+n 
=> a2-2 = (1 + r2rI . E (K-I ) . (R2-a2r2 
K 
=> a2 = (1 + r2)1/2 (E [K-1]) -1/2 (R2-a2) 
K 
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=> a2 = [1 + (1 + r2) 1/2(E[K-1] ) -1/2] -1(1 + f2)1/2 [ E (K-1) ] -1/2 .R2. 
K K 
Let Y = [1+(1+r2)1/2 (E[K-1])-1/2 ]-\1+r2)1/2 [E(K-1)r1/2 
K K 
= [1 + (1 +r2rl/2 (E [K-1] )1/2 ] -1 . 
K 
Then the initial problem can be written: 
Max E 
al K 
subject to: 
(U( al) + _1 U(Y(Rl-al)) 1+f1 
+ 1 2 U (K (l-Y) (Rl-al))) 
(1 +rl) 
Allowing U(.) = _0-1 ,therefore, gives: 
Max E [_a(l + (1 +rlr1 . - (Y(Rl-al)r1 
O:;;;al K 
= Max _a(l_E [(Rl-alr1[(1+f1r1y-1 + (1+f1r2(1-Y) -l K-l]] 
K 
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= Max -a1-1- (R1-a1) -1 [(1 +flr1 y-1 + (1 +flr2 (l-Y) -1 E [K-1] ] 
K 
d 
At optimality - = 0 therefore: 
da1 ' 
a1-2 = (R1-a1r2 [(1+r1r1y-1 + (1+flr2 (1-yr1E[K-1]]. 
Expanding Y gives: 
a(2 = (R1-a1r2 [(1+flr1 (1+ (E[K-1])1/2(1+r2)-1/2) 
K 
K 
+ (1 + flr2 (1 + (1 + r2)1/2 (E [K-1] r1/2) E [K-1 ] ] 
K K 
= (R1-a1r2 [(1 +flr2 E [K-1] + (1 +f1)-1 
K 
Defining W by: 
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This equation for al allows the sensitivity of the depletion decision, to 
changes in the parameters, to be investigated. In particular the response 
to a mean-pres erving-spread in uncertainty about K can be investigated. 
To estimate sensitivity to the timing of uncertainty resolution, however, 
the following further developments are required. 
8.2 Early resolution 
The formulation of section 8.1 is now modified to reflect early resolu-
tion of third period uncertainty. The adjustment factor K is now dis-
covered at the start of the second period, but still not used until the 
third period. The second decision-maker now faces no uncertainty. 
Figure 8.3 depicts this situation. 
8.2.1 Formulation 
The nested problems are: 
V3: (given R3 = M-al-a2,K) 
Max U(a3) 
subject to: 
V2: (given R2 = M -al,K) 
1 
Max U(a2) + U(d(R3,K» 
l+n 
subject to: d(R3,K) solves V3 for (R3 = R2-a2,K) 
0:::;a2:::;R2. 
Vi a2 e2 q2 V3 
Key to labels: 
A and C are upper and lower bounds on initial action, and B is a typical 
interior action. 
Similarly for E, F, G and H, I, J in periods 2 and 3. 
a and c are upper and lower bounds on the realization of the size of K, 
which occurs after the initial decision and before the period two decision. 
Figure 8.3: Early resolution of third period uncertainty 
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Vl: (given M) 
Max E [U(al) + _1_ U(F(R2, K)) + 1 zU(d(R3,K))] 
K 1 +f1 (1 +f1) 
a2 
subject to: R2 = M-al 
R3 = R2-F (R2, K) 
F(R2, K) solves V2 for R2, K; 
d(R3, K) solves V3 for R3, K; 
0:::;;a2:::;;M 
Note that, through their dependence on K, the functions F and d and 
the state variable R3 are initially viewed as random variables. 
8.2.2 Derivation of optimal initial action 
The procedure closely parallels that for late resolution. The third peri-
od decision function is available by inspection: 
This defines 
d(K, R3) = KR3 = K(R2-a2) 
The second period faces no uncertainty, 
V2 (given R2,K): 
Max [U(a2) + _1_ U(K(R2-a2)) ] 
1+f2 
subject to: 
At optimality: 
As previously, inverting each side, summing and reinverting gives the 
marginal value function K13(.), for the second decision-maker, of R2: 
this time with the additional parameter K. 
Therefore 
a2* = Kl(K13(R2» == F(R2,K). 
So far, the a3* and a2* optima permit the tree in Figure 8.2 to be 
thinned back to the V2 nodes. The initial decision problem is: 
Max E [U(al) + 1 U(F(M-al,K» 
1+f1 K 
+ __ 1 --""2 U(K(M-al-F(M-al,K»)] = 0 
(1 +f1) 
subject to: O::;;av;;M, 
and at optimality: 
[_1 U(F(M-al,K» 
l+rl 
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+ (1+~1)2 U(K(M-al-F(M-al,K»)] = O. 
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Provided the differentiation and expectation operations can be ex-
changed the previous approach can be applied. The marginal value of 
future use, as a function of carried over resource, can be found for each 
realisation of K, allowing formation of the expected marginal value func-
tion. This can be inverted, summed with the inverse of the initial period 
marginal utility function, and reinverted, giving the expected marginal 
value K14(.) as a function of the initial stock Ri. 
It follows that: 
ai * = Ki(K14(M». 
Alternatively, a direct formation of the total value of future use, as a 
function of carried over resource, and the realisation of K, is required. 
The expectation over K can then be differentiated to solve the identity. 
As throughout this work, the iterative approach allows ready use of nu-
merical approximations where analytical forms are unavailable. 
8.2.3. Suggestive results 
As in section 8.1.3, let 
U(at) = -at-i , O<at< 00. t = 1,2,3. 
Simple analytical results follow provided all roots are interpreted as 
positive so that the required inverse functions everywhere exist. 
At V2 optima: 
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= (1 + (1 +r2r1/2 K-1/2 ) -1. 
Then the initial problem can be written: 
Vi: 
Max E [ U(al) + _1_ U(Z(K) (M-al)) 
K 1+f1 
O::;;al::;;M 
+ 1 2 U(K(l-Z(K)) (M-al)) ] 
(1 +f1) 
Substituting U(.) = _(.)-1 ,and generalising M to Rl, gives: 
Vi: 
Max E [ _a{l + (1 +f1rl. - (Z(K) (Rl-al) rl 
O::;;al::;;Rl K 
+ (1 +f1r2 . - (K(l-Z(K)) (Rl-al) rl ] 
= Max 
K 
= Max -a1-1 - (R1-a1r1 [(1 +flr1 E [(Z(K)r1 
At optimality 
d 
da1 
K 
= 0 therefore 
al-2 = (R1-a1r2 [(1 +flr1 E[ (Z(K)r1 
K 
Expanding Z(k) gives; 
al-2 = (R1-a1r2 [(1+flr1 E[1+(1+r2r1/2 K-1/2 
K 
= (R1-a1r2 [(1+r1r1 E[1+(1+r2r1/2 K-l/2 
K 
= (R1-a1r2 [ E [ (1 + flr2 K-1 + (1 + fl) -1 
K 
= (R1-a1r2 [(1 +flr2 E (K-1) + (1 +flr1 
K 
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+ «1 + flr1 (1 + r2rl/2 + (1 + r1r2 (1 + r2)1/2) E (K-1/2)] 
K 
As for late resolution, this equation for the early resolution optimum 
al * allows investigation of the sensitivity of the initial decision to the 
parameters and in particular to uncertainty. 
8.3 Resolution timing sensitivity 
In accordance with the theme in this study, that 'solutions' should in-
volve an understanding of the sensitivity of action to belief, the func-
tions providing optimal actions for early and late resolution are now 
compared: 
Now, for the example used, 
which is true if: 
X>W, 
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that is if: 
[(1 + flr2 E [K-1] + (1 + r1r1 + «1 + fIr1 (1 + r2r1l2 
K 
> 
+(1+r1r2 (1+r2)1I2) E[K-1/2 ] ] 
K 
K 
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+ (1 + flr2 (1 + n)1I2) [E [K1 ] ] 1/2] 
K 
that is if: 
E[K-1/2] > [E [K-1 ] ] 1/2 
K K 
This is true for all bounded distributions on K> 0 because then: 
1 1 
> 
+ylK K 
~ E [K-1I2 ] > 
K 
E [1/K] , for all distributions, (positive root) 
K 
~ E [K-l!2] > [E[l/K] ] 112 
K K 
For this example therefore, the optimal initial use is smaller if the size 
of K is discovered earlier, and this is true irrespective of the finite dis-
count rate(s) applying to initial or second period choice. 
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8.4. Discussion 
In this case, the early knowledge of K provides an enhanced ability to 
balance second and third period use. This makes carrying-over resource 
stocks sufficiently more attractive to outweigh the opposing consider-
ation that, because balancing is improved, any level of satisfaction from 
later use can be achieved with a smaller stock. Because these opposing 
considerations seem finely balanced, and the utility function parameter 
seems intimately involved in establishing the result, it may not gener-
alise to wider contexts. 
The result is in general accord with the intuition that earlier resolution 
is akin to a reduction in uncertainty, and may repay some (opportunity) 
costs. That is, research may be worthwhile. Here, the early resolution 
optimum provides the initial decision-maker with a higher objective 
function value. The increase, over the value of later resolution, is a 
measure of the value of partial information which is analogous to the 
'expected value of perfect information' measure widely used in decision 
theory. 
The example demonstrates that the optimal solution depends on the 
timing of the resolution of uncertainty about the parameters. This is 
true even though the objective(s) are neutral over the timing ofuncer-
tainty resolution in objective values. 
The timing of parameter uncertainty resolution would be important in 
constructing a choice procedure to decide between slowly resolving 
gambles over the parameters - if this choice procedure was designed to 
satisfy (or was induced from) more fundamental preferences over 
'utility' outcomes. This idea has implications for the examples used in 
this study. If the objectives over resource use streams are surrogates for 
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objectives on other streams (e.g. consumption), then the former objec-
tives may need to be sensitive to timing of uncertainty resolution. 
Objectives which are timing sensitive are easily handled by the recursive 
approach. In pre commitment approaches timing sensitivity generally 
leads to intertemporal inconsistency, or the problem that the 'optimum' 
will not be followed hence is not optimal in any sensible way. 
The recursive approach avoids this by dealing only with the future possi-
bilities which derive from future choices. The choice procedures in-
volved, whether current, or forecast for the future, can employ timing 
sensitivities without intertemporal consistency becoming an issue. In-
vestigation of the impact of such sensitivities on justifiable objective 
forms, and in turn on optimal resource programs, is left to future work. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusions 
The introduction to this dissertation suggests that it is hard to clearly 
identify appropriate principles for guiding non-renewable resource use. 
This is partly because the consequences of non-renewable resource use 
extend into the distant future and are uncertain, and consequences of 
this sort are poorly handled in the existing theoretical investigations of 
decision-making. 
The subsequent chapters enlarge on the limitations of the current the-
oretical approaches, and develop a new recursive approach which better 
represents the position of decision-making in time. This approach is 
then used to investigate several issues in non-renewable resource use 
over time. 
This chapter collects the main findings, and discusses their significance 
in section 9.1. The section clearly identifies what contribution this study 
makes to the existing knowledge of non-renewable resource decisions, 
and of the principles guiding them. The study has some implications for 
policy, and for future research, which are outlined in sections 9.2 and 
9.3. 
9.1 Main findings 
9.1.1 Existing approaches 
Decisions will always be made on the basis of principles, or rules of 
thumb; that is, by using more or less developed guides to action. Princi-
ples are normative: they indicate what sorts of actions should be 
allowed or selected, and so are directed at achieving goals or standards. 
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Generally, principles are instrumental: they are not goals in their own 
right, but are likely to help in achieving goals. 
Only a fraction of the existing information can ever be brought to bear 
on a decision. This is because the need for and the nature of decisions 
cannot be completely foreseen, and the ability to manipulate informa-
tion is scarce. Seeking further information, before selecting ail option, 
is an option in itself. To be consistent it must be ranked with the other 
alternatives, and its selection is also governed by principles. 
The principles which are relied on change with experience. New princi-
ples are sought when there is dissatisfaction with the results of applying 
existing principles. New principles are also a source of this dissatisfac-
tion; the suggestion is that they would provide better results than exist-
ing principles. 
Theoretical investigations are a chief source of new principles. A new 
understanding of the way things operate, and/or of the ways ethical 
claims may be justified, might reveal that existing principles are defec-
tive. Suggestions for modified or altogether new principles might also 
be found. 
Generally, research into principles is motivated by a concern expressed 
in vague or everyday terms, and the initial task is to clarify this. Some 
aspects of the concern are inevitably left out in the progression to a con-
cretely defined problem. 
Research into principles uses models of the situations in which the prin-
ciples will be employed. It is useful to view models as being developed 
in two stages. Firstly, a conceptual framework is adopted. This defines 
and limits the types of things which can be examined, and how they can 
be examined. Secondly, the concepts from the framework are used to 
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construct a model. This exactly identifies and explores (a version of) the 
issue. 
The vague concern which motivates this thesis is that people depend on 
being able to use some things which are irreplaceable. However, the fu-
ture importance of these things is uncertain. Technological and social 
changes may lessen (or, for a while, increase) their importance, by 
changing what substitutes are available, for instance. 
The conceptual frameworks of economics can be used to produce mod-
els for exploring aspects of this concern. Rewritten in economic terms, 
the concern is that the material welfare of society depends on a through-
put of non-renewable resources or of substitutes for them. Uncertainty 
about future technological and resource possibilities makes a future col-
lapse in material welfare a possibility. It is not obvious how current 
principles guiding non-renewable resource use and substitute creation 
do, can or should account for the future possibilities. 
Many well-defined models of aspects of these issues can be constructed. 
However, the dynamic, uncertain context severely tests the capability of 
the economic approaches, and the relevance of their results. 
The concepts of welfare economics have been used in many investiga-
tions involving non-renewable resource owners making price-based de-
cisions under uncertainty. In general, given sufficient competitive 
pressure, and enough contingent markets or rational expectations, 
equilibrium prices exist. Further, these are ex-ante efficient. 
The apparent implication is that the principles for non-renewable re-
source use do not differ in any marked way from those welfare econo-
mics recommends for other resources. In short: allow a decentralised 
price system to guide the allocation, provided that competitive pressure 
is maintained, and externalities are treated where this is cost-efficient. 
214 
However, this implication is questionable, both because the existence of 
an equilibrium is sensitive to the underlying assumptions, and because 
some assumptions are far from 'realistic'. Theoretical explorations show 
that equilibrium prices can be indeterminate for non-renewable resour-
ces, that strategic behaviour is very important in less-than-perfectly com-
petitive situations, and that taxes can prevent efficient outcomes from 
being attained. Also, the contingent markets and/or expectations which 
are required to sustain an intertemporal equilibrium do not appear to 
exist in reality. 
The welfare framework itself is questionable. The initial endowment of 
resources to agents determines which allocation is reached. The dis-
tribution of welfare at this allocation may be what is most important to 
most individuals, and may be what is ethically important. However, dis-
tributional impacts cannot be determined within the welfare analysis. 
Neither actions with important distributional implications, nor actions 
directed at changing the welfare distribution (such as contingent trans-
fers), can be properly explored within the welfare framework. 
The welfare approach relies on 'consumer sovereignty' to justify why 
consumers, as opposed to say voters, should determine what happens to 
resources. This is a debatable ethical position, and it is more debatable 
when there is uncertainty, because agents' beliefs about the likelihood 
of various events, and agents' risk attitudes, then influence the outcome. 
These beliefs and attitudes are open to interpersonal question in ways 
that agents' tastes or ethical judgements are not. 
Personal beliefs are most critical when there are very few contingent 
markets, so that unexpressed expectations influence the resource use 
pattern. Extrapolative expectations are known to be inadequate to sus-
tain an efficient intertemporal equilibrium. There are in reality very few 
forward and contingent markets for non-renewable resources. This re-
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veals in addition that transaction costs, which are treated as unimport-
ant in this framework, are probably critical: they determine how in-
formed individuals are, and hence what actions are taken. 
The welfare economics approach is not properly dynamic. The 'tatonne-
ment' process is assumed to instantaneously bring about ex-ante equili-
brium plans, and these are imagined to be followed forever after. 
Agents are implicitly assumed to live for an infinite time and to have in-
tertemporally consistent tastes. They are generally assumed to update 
their beliefs rationally; i.e. in accordance with Bayes rule. 
Optimal growth theory is the other conceptual framework from econo-
mics which is widely used in this area: the 'socially optimal' use of non-
renewable resources, when there is uncertainty, is explored as an 
optimisation problem. The optimal aggregate intertemporal pattern for 
resource use is derived. The theoretical investigations show that this 
pattern is sensitive to the objective adopted, to the particular uncer-
tainty examined, and to the extent of the uncertainty. 
The optimal aggregate resource use patterns have obvious limitations as 
principles for guiding resource use decisions. One limitation is the very 
high level of abstraction from the social or institutional structures which 
are required to bring about any resource use pattern. These structures 
are in reality only able to produce a limited range of resource use pat-
terns, which may not include the indicated 'optimum': optimization over 
this smaller range may produce a very different' optimum'. Further, con-
sideration of the institutional' costs' may well change the objective, and 
hence the optimum. 
Another limitation of the optimal growth framework is that very few ob-
jectives can be explored. The framework produces pre commitment solu-
tions, which fix all future actions at the initial time, in accordance with 
the initial decision-maker's objective. For most objectives, these solu-
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tions are intertemporally inconsistent; that is, it is foreseen that future 
decision-makers will wish to revise the optimal resource use plans, so 
their optimality is suspect. 
Adherence to the pre commitment approach is at odds with humans' po-
sition in time. Intertemporal resource use patterns derived in this way 
can appear optimal only if it is believed they will be implemented (in ag-
gregate - institutions aside). For this to seem reasonable it must be be-
lieved that judgements are unchanging, or at least are intertemporally 
consistent. 
The stationary discounted utilitarian objective is almost universally 
used, and this is generally adjusted for uncertainty by taking its expected 
value. For this objective there is always one imaginable sequence of de-
cis on-makers for whom the optimal resource use is intertemporally con-
sistent. This sequence, however, amounts to assuming unchanging 
preferences, which may not be realistic. Also, consistency is achieved at 
high cost: the objectives or judgements which can be explored cannot 
reflect much of the richness of attitudes towards an uncertain future. 
Program risk aversion is sometimes explored, but produces intertempo-
rally inconsistent 'optima'. 
The pre commitment approach is also conceptually misleading, if opti-
mum resource use comes to be thought of as a whole plan or strategy 
(for resource use) which is fixed initially and then simply followed. A 
more adequate 'solution' must allow that the whole strategy is contin-
ually updated, and only the initial step of the current strategy is ever ex-
pected to be undertaken. 
However, the optimal growth type investigations are explicit in relating 
possible principles for guiding decisions (here, target patterns for re-
source use) to the ethical positions or preferences which support them. 
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The welfarist principles implicitly rely on consumer sovereignty for justi-
fication, and this does not seem completely morally compelling. 
9.1.2 The recursive approach 
If choices on non-renewable resource use are to be based on principles 
arising from an increasingly informed debate, the relations between 
ethical positions and options for action must be further explored. 
One of the difficulties in doing this is that the existing frameworks for 
examining choices with long-run consequences do not adequately ac-
count for the human position in time. Closely related to this is that the 
implications of many ethical positions, on creating risks for future 
people, cannot be explored. 
In this study the development of a more adequate approach is com-
menced. 
The first step is to generalise the decision-theoretic view of choice. The 
latter conceptually underpins most optimising choice models, such as 
consumer choice theory, the theory of the firm, agent-principal theory, 
multi-attribute utility analysis, and optimal growth theory. Associated 
modelling/solution techniques, for intertemporal contexts, include deci-
sion-trees, the calculus of variations, (stochastic) control theory, and 
( stochastic) dynamic programming. 
In decision-theoretic models the sole decision-maker must, at a given 
point in time, choose one plan or strategy. These are sequences of fu-
ture actions, or sequences of functions (on states) which pick out ac-
tions. The decision-maker's own criteria are applied in making the 
selection, and the initial action is undertaken. That is, precommittment 
solutions are produced. 
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Unless the decision-maker believes the whole plan or strategy will event-
ually be undertaken, it is not optimal in any sensible way. But it is not 
possible, at the initial time, to fix later actions. If later actions will be 
chosen differently, the initial strategy is misleading. 
Therefore, the decision-theoretic approach is inadequate when decision 
criteria may change. It is also inadequate if the criteria are unchanging, 
but are intertemporally inconsistent. An example of the latter is when 
every generation applies the same non-exponential discounting proce-
dure. Another example is when the attitudes to risk depend on the 
delay before risk resolution, relative to the current time. 
In this thesis the decision-theoretic model is generalised to cover a se-
quence of decision-makers. Each undertakes only one initial action. 
For each initial action there is a forecast covering the future decision-
makers, their actions, and the other events. The action-forecast pairs re-
place strategies as the initial objects of choice. Each forecast is 
constructed on the assumption that all future decision-makers choose 
their initial actions, given their forecasts, in the same way. 
This multi-stage, recursive approach amounts to forecasting future deci-
sions, conditional on initial actions, rather than selecting future deci-
sions as part of a strategy. The former is a more realistic representation 
of decision-making at a point in time; there is no overstatement of the 
initial decision-maker's power to determine the course of events. 
Forecast future actions are derived as the outcomes of choices by fore-
cast decision-makers. That is, the initial decision-maker believes that 
current and forecast decisions involve the same sort of considerations -
all decisions are treated consistently. All decisions, in this approach, in-
volve choice between completely specified, slowly resolving, lotteries or 
gambles. 
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That is, no decision-maker has available any recourse actions, since fu-
ture actions are taken by future decision-makers. Clearly, a forecast 
that (later versions of) the initial decision-maker continues to make the 
decisions, in a way consistent with that used originally, collapses the re-
cursive approach to the standard decision-theoretic special case. 
The recursive approach completely avoids the issue of intertemporal 
consistency. The action-forecast options never involve later actions 
which will not be taken, as do inconsistent strategies. The forecast ac-
tions are, by construction, explicitly feasible with respect to future deci-
sions, however decision-making procedures are envisaged to evolve. 
Procedures expressing virtually any time and risk preferences, or ethical 
positions, can therefore be explored with the approach. 
Several modelling structures are compatible with the recursive ap-
proach. The structures differ as to whether time is discrete or continu-
ous, and whether actions, exogenous 'random' events, and choice 
procedures are drawn from discrete or continuous sets. 
The recursive structures adopted in this study stay close to the well-
known decision-tree model. The time periods are discrete: a decision at 
the start of the period results in an action being undertaken; this is close-
ly followed by resolution of some uncertainty when a subjectively ran-
dom event occurs; the action and event bring about a state of affairs, or 
outcome, which prevails until the end of the period; the uncertainty 
about the next choice procedure is resolved just before the next period 
commences. 
This specification is pessimistically biased in that each decision must 
precede resolution of the whole of the 'periods-worth' of uncertainty. 
Reversing the order of actions and events at the beginning of the period 
reverses the bias. The discrete time framework cannot fully reflect the 
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gradual resolution of uncertainty and adjustment of action which occurs 
in reality. 
The specification is completed by adopting Bayesian rationality as a 
standard applying to each decision-maker's beliefs about future occur-
rences, and requiring that every decision-maker has the same beliefs, ap-
propriately conditioned to reflect the preceding actions and events. 
This stringent requirement conflicts with the observation that beliefs 
can and do change in ways not captured by updating prior to posterior 
beliefs in Bayesian fashion. However, if this sort of change (say, a drift 
from one Bayesian rational structure to another) is foreseeable, it must 
be incorporated as a possibility in the preceding beliefs structures, 
which preserves the assumption of Bayesian consistency within and be-
tween beliefs. If the change is not foreseeable then it is difficult to see 
how it can sensibly be allowed for beforehand. This is an unavoidable 
limitation of 'rational' forecasting: it is rational to believe that new 
learning will revise existing forecasts in unforeseen ways. 
Accordingly, it is rational for uncertainties about some events to be inex-
pressible as single (subjective) probability judgements. This uncertainty 
may be represented by a set of Bayesian rational initial belief structures, 
between which the initial decision-maker cannot judge. The sensitivity 
of the optimal commitment to a likelihood judgement over this set can 
then be explored. Alternatively the decision-maker may wish to invoke 
the principle of insufficient reason and attribute uniform subjective li-
kelihood to the set. 
Given this full specification of the content of a belief structure, the exist-
ence of a corresponding optimal action-forecast can be investigated. 
When actions, events, and choice procedures fall into finite sets and 
choice procedures are well defined it is sufficient for existence of an op-
timum that there is a date at which each preceding decision-makers' 
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concerns, for occurrences after that date, can be represented as a func-
tion of the state on that date. This condition is sufficient to allow a back-
wards recursion technique to iteratively identify each preceding period's 
optimum, and eventually the initial optimum. 
This condition is satisfied if there is an horizon which is agreed to by all 
preceding decision-makers (according to initial belief). In the gener-
alised framework this requires agreement of the decision-makers im-
mediately preceding the time. An alternative sufficient condition is that 
there is a time after which, for each state, the succeeding decision-mak-
ing procedures are intertemporally consistent (according to initial be-
lief), and allow solutions for all succeeding states to be found. If no 
optimum exists then there are no justifiable actions corresponding to 
that belief set. Such cases provide an interesting commentary on what is 
required to justify action. 
The recursive framework created by generalising the decision-theoretic 
view therefore can both formulate and investigate a number of pre-
viously unexplored issues. Among other things, the recursive frame-
work can be used to extend the mapping from ethical positions to 
optimal initial actions vis a vis non-renewable resources. Principles 
guiding resource use can then be developed in a more informed way. 
The recursive structure of the framework makes it well suited for nu-
merical approximation where analytical methods fail. The belief-opti-
mum mapping could be built-up piecewise, from the solutions to 
numerical formulations of cases. When all choice procedures are al-
ways backwardly recursive an algorithm akin to dynamic programming 
can be exploited in finding the optimal action-forecast. 
When used analytically, the framework provides new results on optimal 
resource use patterns. These turn out to be sensitive to changing choice 
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procedures, to the uncertainty about choice procedures, and to the tim-
ing of the resolution of uncertainty. 
The sequence of choice procedures investigated allows the discount rate 
adopted by each period's decision-maker to vary. This might approxi-
mate changes to the position adopted on intergenerational equity, with 
a higher discount rate indicating less regard for the future. Alternative-
ly, a higher discount rate could reflect a higher probability being at-
tributed to the possibility of 'Armageddon'. 
The optimal initial resource use is lower when future discount rates are 
higher or lower than current rates, for the formulation studied. There-
fore, ignoring the possibility of a drift in discount rates systematically 
biases resource use patterns towards the present. 
All pre commitment investigations to date ignore the possibility that dis-
count rates change with time, which suggests that the collection of pre-
commitment results may be misleading, in that they do not carry over 
when the initial decision-maker cannot choose later actions. It is there-
fore important that in future work this effect is investigated for other as-
sumptions on the utility function and the horizon, and for more general 
patterns of fluctuation in the discount rate. 
When future discount rates are in addition uncertain, a program risk-
neutral initial decision-maker reduces initial resource use by compari-
son with the certain mean case, for the formulations investigated, and 
discount rates in the usual range. The bias in the pre commitment re-
sults is therefore reinforced, and not offset by allowing for uncertainty. 
This in turn reinforces the need to investigate the bias in wider contexts, 
so that the pre commitment results can be better judged. 
In investigating the importance of the timing of uncertainty resolution, 
the recursive approach is able to clearly separate the effects of better in-
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formation from the influence of a 'desire to know'. For the formulation 
used, early resolution provides the initial decision-maker with an in-
crease in the expected value of later actions, so that optimal initial re-
source use is reduced. Research to bring about early resolution can 
outweigh some (opportunity) costs. The effect, however, seems finely 
balanced and may not extend to other formulations. 
The analytical results demonstrate that the framework is sufficiently 
tractable to provide new insights. The iterative analytical procedure 
takes advantage of the temporally separable objectives. The same ad-
vantage is available if the objectives are separable by sub-tree only, 
which permits a wide range of attitudes to uncertainty to be investi-
gated. Therefore, more general formulations should not present formi-
dable analytical difficulties. 
9.2 Implications for policy 
The cluster of principles which guides decisions is termed 'policy', 
whether or not it is formally set down. Most of the findings discussed 
above have at least indirect implications for non-renewable resource 
policy, because they identify the features required for a sound investiga-
tion of decisions with long-term, uncertain consequences. These fea-
tures are also relevant to many other policy spheres. The most direct 
implications for resource policy, and for policy in general, are outlined 
in this section. 
The use of existing theory 
There are reasons for caution in using the existing theoretical investiga-
tions as a basis for policy on non-renewable resource use. In both the 
descriptive and prescriptive literatures the high level of abstraction 
from the incentives and opportunities individuals face, and from 'realis-
tic' technological and environmental conditions, is a serious weakness. 
224 
Also, the recommendatory power of the analyses is hard to gauge, be-
cause their ethical foundations are generally implicit and open to sev-
eral interpretations. However, this thesis concentrates on the 
weaknesses in the theoretical treatment of dynamics and uncertainty. 
Policy directed at ex-ante efficiency (Pareto Optimality) must consider 
extra factors when there is significant uncertainty. This criterion takes 
as given whatever (probabilistic) opportunities and incentives are per-
ceived by individual economic agents. If individuals are poorly in-
formed then they will make poor decisions, but this is not inefficient. In 
addition, the 'free-rider' problem often occurs in the production of in-
formation, and counter-measures do not in general restore efficiency. 
Therefore, policy on how informed to be, or on the provision of informa-
tion to individuals, cannot be based purely on efficiency considerations. 
Other measures of merit must be applied to the activities which gener-
ate and disseminate information. Such activities include trading in fu-
tures markets, resource exploration, research into substitute 
possibilities, and general education. 
There is a further reason for questioning the relevance of ex-ante effi-
ciency to policy, when there is uncertainty. The ex-ante opportunities 
may be less ethically justifiable, as a measure of merit, than the range of 
ex-post outcomes. If so, observable market prices (which reflect individ-
uals' ex-ante jUdgements) are not good measures of merit. Policies 
(such as 'allocate resources so as to maximize their expected net present 
value') which use these prices are therefore questionable. 
Caution is also required in using the existing prescriptive Utilitarian or 
Rawlsian resource investigations as a basis for policy. Among other 
things, the treatment of dynamics and uncertainty in these investigations 
has serious limitations. The investigations poorly reflect the position of 
decision-making in time, overstate the decision-maker's power to deter-
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mine future events, and deal with few of the possible attitudes towards 
uncertain future outcomes. Investigations using the more adequate re-
cursive approach show that the 'optimal' resource use patterns are sensi-
tive to these assumptions. Therefore, the existing prescriptive literature 
may be a misleading guide for policy. 
Many intertemporal planning exercises are questionable on both the 
grounds developed above: they measure merits by observed and fore-
cast ex-ante prices, or by the consumer and producer surplus existing at 
those prices; they seek an 'optimal' intertemporal plan or strategy by 
maximising a pre commitment objective, without explicitly considering 
whether this will be followed by future decision-makers. 
Implications of the recursive approach 
Future decision-makers must be considered in analysis of public policy 
initiatives. Both 'public sentiment' and governments change over time, 
and the public choice procedures and 'preferences' are likely to change 
accordingly. This likely change should be explicitly considered in policy 
development. 
Many policy initiatives involve transition costs, and are (from the initial 
viewpoint) worth implementing only if they are continued for a reason-
able time. The method of evaluating such initiatives must have a way of 
giving them little merit if their continuation by future governments is un-
likely. 
Other initiatives are only worth implementing if they will be disconti-
nued when things go wrong. The method of evaluating these initiatives 
must have a way of giving them little merit if their discontinuation by fu-
ture decision-makers is unlikely, even though things have gone wrong. 
An instance where this is important is where continuation occurs be-
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cause the choice procedure of the existing government changes, to re-
flect its desire not to 'lose face' by reversing course. 
The interaction between public sentiment and public choice procedures 
is important in gauging the merits of different political systems, and of 
the policies employed in them. Sentiments may cycle through time, 
(say) from preferring centralized allocation to preferring decentralized 
allocation. If the cyclical nature of sentiment is not recognised then 
radical policy changes may be continually undertaken, and large transi-
tion costs may be continually borne. 
In the extreme, failure to recognise cycles might lead to destabilising 
public policy changes which cause increasing swings in sentiment. Alter-
natively, policy changes may be self-reinforcing. 
The importance of these interactions cannot be examined with the exist-
ing pre commitment approaches to choice. The recursive approach to in-
tertemporal decision-making clearly identifies why and how policy 
evaluation routines should allow for the possibility of changes in, and in-
teraction between, policy and public sentiment. The recursive approach 
may therefore both motivate and underpin the construction of im-
proved principles to guide decisions. 
9.3 Implications for research 
The chapters above have touched on many diverse areas where research 
could improve understanding of principles for non-renewable resource 
use. Many of these, such as institutions for guiding resource use, are of 
general importance, but are discussed below only for the narrower 
range of issues investigated in this study. The research implications of 
the original problem analysis are covered first. Further research into 
the recursive approach itself is then briefly discussed before applied re-
search employing recursive approaches is outlined. 
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9.3.1 Existing approaches 
Justifiable principles for guiding non-renewable resource decisions 
must be based on knowledge of both the consequences of the principles 
and their merits. Currently, the assumptions used in the descriptive or 
predictive investigations are very different from those used in the pres-
criptive or normative investigations. The former in general employ 
more 'realistic' assumptions about ownership patterns and technology, 
while the latter in general are more explicit about the ethical basis of 
their measures of merit. 
While neither set of assumptions is particularly convincing as a repre-
sentation of the real situation, the recommendatory power of the ana-
lyses is reduced by the large difference in assumptions. Improved 
recommendatory power would be possible if each type of investigation 
employed similar (sets of) assumptions. Therefore, descriptive re-
search, which continues to analyse the performance of resource owner-
ship and technological situations, but which uses wide ranging measures 
of merit, would be valuable. Equally valuable would be prescriptive re-
search which used more realistic assumptions on resource ownership 
and technology. 
The ways in which people form opinions (or remain uninformed), about 
the uncertain distant future, are poorly understood. The mechanisms 
here are crucial to the resource use patterns which ~ventuate in both 
centralized and decentralized societies. Empirical and theoretical re-
search into expectations formation in various institutional settings might 
greatly improve the 'realism' of the assumptions. 
It is not clear why resources are currently priced in only a small number 
of futures and contingent markets. These markets are a potentially im-
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portant forum in which long run expectations can be expressed and 
evolve, and so influence resource use. The nature of the transaction 
costs, and the reactions to uncertainty, which prevent the operation of 
long run futures markets, are worthy of further empirical and theoreti-
cal research. 
The range of mechanisms for guiding long term resource use has not 
been widely explored. Particularly deserving of research are ways of fos-
tering information generation and exchange. Among these is the possi-
bility of supplementing market mechanisms with centrally provided 
information or education. These are important because of the key role 
of expectations in determining the long run resource allocation, and be-
cause the 'free-rider' problems with information are well-known. 
Measures of the merits of uncertain (including probabilistic) sets of in-
tertemporal outcomes are not well developed. Empirical and axiomatic 
research is necessary to discover the ways individuals might value such 
prospects, if predictive models of resource use are to be improved. 
Similarly, measures of the (social) merits of allocation systems, and of 
their consequences, are not well developed for uncertain dynamic con-
texts. Research into the differences between sequences of ex-ante and 
ex-post allocations would improve the basis for judging their ethical me-
rits. 
'Flexibility', 'resilience', and 'robustness' are often mentioned as being 
desirable attributes for resource allocation mechanisms, or for social sys-
tems in general. Research which explores measurable definitions of 
these attributes, and investigates how they are furthered by various prin-
ciples for guiding resource decisions, would allow the wider merits of re-
source use arrangements to be gauged. 
229 
9.3.2 The recursive approach 
Many aspects of the recursive approach require further investigation. 
Choice procedures on probabilistic trees are central to the approach but 
are not well-explored. The procedures individuals use, or at least con-
form with, must be further investigated empirically. The choice proce-
dures which are compatible with various sets of 'rationality' axioms 
require research. 
A wide range of attitudes to uncertainty seem reasonable as choice pro-
cedures within a recursive model. An investigation of the dynamics of 
choice procedures, in interaction with the consequences they bring 
about, might suggest that some forms are self-reinforcing over time. 
Choice procedures are therefore likely to evolve towards these forms, 
and this knowledge would provide for better predictive theories. 
Choice procedure forms which can be specialised to represent arbitrary 
attitudes to uncertain future. outcomes, while remaining tractable analy-
tical tools, are required if the recursive approach is to be widely used. 
Research which builds on similar investigations of pre commitment ob-
jectives is needed to establish these forms. 
Recursive structures which employ continuous action and event spaces, 
and continuous time, require investigation. This is necessary to enable 
a wider comparison of results with those of pre commitment analyses, 
which generally use continuous spaces. Many powerful analytical tools, 
differential calculus in particular, might be brought to bear in recursive 
optimisation over continuous spaces, as the special cases of Chapters Six 
to Eight demonstrate. 
The question of existence of an optimal commitment-forecast requires 
further treatment, both for the discrete case examined here and for con-
tinuous cases. Exact necessary and sufficient conditions for the exist-
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ence of an optimum would delineate the cases which are open to treat-
ment in recursive structures. 
The conditions would also indicate which belief sets have associated op-
timal initial actions, and which have not. This might allow a broader dis-
cussion of the rationality of beliefs, in terms of which beliefs help in 
selection of action, and which do not. 
Research into the topological nature of recursive structures seems likely 
to be fruitful: the optimal commitment-forecast is analogous to an 
equilibrium within the space of beliefs, so the fixed point properties of 
the space may be useful in establishing when an optimum exists. 
Comparisons of the recursive structures with game theory models may 
be similarly enlightening: the commitment-forecast optimum is anala-
gous to a collection of Stackelberg optima, with each envisaged decision-
maker using the choices of all future decision-makers in forming a 
reaction function. 
The strong assumption that beliefs conform to a single Bayesian rational 
structure requires further research. The assumption may be able to be 
weakened, without preventing existence of an optimal commitment. 
Vagueness might be allowed for by requiring that the system transitions 
be specified only up to membership of sets of states, and these could 
become 'vaguer' with time. The relationship between the horizon set-
ting conditions, and growing vagueness, also needs further inquiry. 
The recursive approach can be applied in all situations previously 
treated with pre commitment formulations, and may add to or detract 
from confidence in the pre commitment results. A full research program 
employing recursive structures is required, so as to further test the capa-
bility of the approach and to build a set of recursive results of com-
parable breadth to the pre commitment results. A true comparison of 
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the gain in understanding afforded by the recursive approach can only 
then be made. 
Within this program there are two priority research topics. The first is 
to check for systematic biases in pre commitment results, which might 
follow from the overstatement of the powers of the initial decision-
maker. Preliminary evidence of this is found in Chapter 6 above, but a 
more wide-ranging examination, which relates the results to the as-
sumed parameters, is required. 
Exposure of a systematic bias would allow the pre commitment results to 
be heuristically adjusted, until such time as more complete results are 
available. Exposure of a systematic bias would also motivate the more 
complete investigation. 
The second topic with high priority is to investigate the implications of 
choice procedures incorporating attitudes to uncertainty which are out-
side the scope of pre commitment approaches. Important among these 
are choice procedures which separate risk attitudes from 'time pref-
erence'. 
In the standard utilitarian objective (the maximization of the expected 
value of the intertemporal integral of discounted utility) the implicit 
risk attitudes are affected by the discounting procedure. As a conse-
quence, all investigations using this objective implicitly assume decreas-
ing risk aversion as the risk becomes more remote in time. Choice 
procedures which reflect the 'opposite' tendency, by exhibiting increas-
ing risk aversion as the date of the risk becomes more remote, seem 
worthy of early investigation. 
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Appendix 
Methods for Uncertainty 
A.I Expected utility and risk attitudes 
Expected utility maximization is illustrated in Figure A.l for a 50/50 
gamble between two outcomes (of income, perhaps) with the numerical 
values 1 and 3 respectively. The discussion applies to evaluating any ac-
tion with an uncertain outcome. The indicator is monotonically increas-
ing, so more (income) is better, and the shape of the indicator captures 
the 'attitude to risk'. 
The expected numerical value of the gamble is 2, which, if received with 
certainty, has utility G. The expected utility of the gamble is H, less than 
G, so the agent is 'risk-averse' towards this gamble. Letting E represent 
the expectation operator, 
G = U(E[iD > E[U(i)] = H 
The 'certainty-equivalent' of the gamble is J. This certain consequence 
is of equivalent worth to the gamble. Another indication of risk-aver-
sion is that J is less than 2. Gambles over the range 0-1 in Figure A.l 
have an expected utility greater than the utility of the expected value of 
the gamble - the agent is 'risk-loving' over this range. 
Local convexity of the utility indicator implies local risk-loving, local 
concavity implies local risk-aversion, and local linearity implies local 
risk-neutrality. Two measures of risk attitude are (Pratt, 1964): 
the 'index of absolute risk aversion', r(i) = -UI/(i)/U'(i), 
and the 'index of relative risk-aversion', R(i) = i r(i). 
utility 
function 
U(i) F 
G 
I 
Figure A.I Expected utility maximization 
3 
utility 
function 
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consequences (i) 
Both measures are zero under risk-neutrality, and agent A is locally 
more risk averse than agent B if rA(i) ~fB(i). The class of 'constant-
relative-risk-aversion utility indicators' is often used; these functions ex-
hibit constant elasticity of marginal utility if applied to certain 
consequences. 
A.2 Mean-preserving increases 
Comparisons of the amount of uncertainty in various situations use the 
notion of a 'mean-pres erving-spread' rather than the variance or en-
tropy of probability distributions. This is so that the mean can be held 
constant and changes in uncertainty alone can be investigated. As de-
picted in the shift from distribution A to distribution B in Figure A.2, 
for symmetric distributions with finite range one mean-preserving-
spread is a shift to a new symmetric distribution with the same expected 
value but a wider range of possibilities (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970, 
1971; Diamond and Stiglitz, 1974). 
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outcome of random variable z 
Figure A.2: Mean-preserving-increase in uncertainty 
A .3 Jensen's Inequality 
Jensen's Inequality is often used in investigati.ng the impact of increas-
ing uncertainty in simple situations (Lippman and McCall, 1981). For 
any random variable z and function Y: 
convex 
E[Y(z)] = Y(E[z]) as Y is linear in z. 
concave 
Economic investigations often examine how the expected value of some 
function Y changes as uncertainty about some variable z increases. This 
is illustrated in Figure A3: in each part the probability density function 
(pdf) over z (in the lower right quadrant) is given, and the relationship 
Y(z) is known, so the pdf over Y (in the upper left quadrant) can be 
derived. 
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In Figure A.3a certainty that z takes the central value gives Y a value of 
A,and a mean-preserving increase in uncertainty about z increases the 
expected value ofY fromA to B, because Y(z) is convex in z. In Figure 
A3b the increase in uncertainty lowers the expected value because 
Y(z) is concave in z. 
pdf 
(Y) 
Y(z) 
pdf 
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(a) convex funct~on 
z pdf 
(Y) 
pdf 
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(b) concave function 
Figure A.3: Jensen's Inequality and increasing uncertainty 
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